Policy evaluation and design in the light of rational expectations by Snell, Andrew John
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2612
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Policy Evaluation and Design in the Light of Rational Expectations 
Andrew John Snell 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Warwick 
Department of Economics 
November 1984 
To Clare, Ellen and Melissa 
Contents 
Preface 
Summary 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The subject matter of policy analysis 
1.2 The scope of the thesis 
1.3 The framework of the analysis 
1.4 Notation and conventions adopted for the thesis 
2. Policy analysis before the Rational Expectations revolution 
2.1 A review of the policy design literature 
2.2 A review of the policy evaluation literature 
2.3 The policy experiments of Fair. 
2.4 Wallis' note on the Lipsey-Parkin study; an example 
3. Policy analysis in the light of R. E. 
3.1 Lucas' critique 
3.2 Time inconsistent policies 
3.3 An answer to K-P's critique 
3.4 The neutrality of anticipated policy 
3.5 Conclusion 
4. Multiple solutions and current practice in simulating models 
containing forward R. E. 
4.1 The problem of multiple solutions. 
4.2 Current practice and terminal conditions. 
4.3 Conclusion 
5. Rational forecasts from nonrational models 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Outline of the Fair-Anderson method 
5.3 Extrapolative proxies in common use 
5.4 Some analytical results on multiplier biases 
5.5 Some numerical examples 
5.6 Further properties of the method 
5.7 Summary and conclusion 
Appendices to chapter 5 
6. F. I. M. L. estimation of models containing forward R. E.: 
A new approach 
6.1 Existing Methods 
6.2 An Alternative Approach to FIML Estimation 
6.3 CLARE (Computationally efficient likelihood algorithm 
for estimating R. E. ) 
6.4 A small Monte Carlo Study 
Page 
1 
1 
3 
7 
8 
10 
10 
20 
25 
33 
36 
36 
39 
42 
45 
48 
49 
49 
56 
66 
67 
67 
70 
75 
77 
85 
92 
100 
101 
109 
109 
113 
124 
128 
1 
7. A test of the R. E. H. in the context of a simple financial model 133 
7.1 Introduction 133 
7.2 The Model 134 
7.3 Estimates of the model 139 
7.4 A Test of the R. E. Hypothesis 147 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion 152 
8. Conclusion 156 
8.1 A summary of the main results and their significance 156 
8.2 Unfinished work 158 
References 160 
11 
Preface 
The bulk of this thesis was written at Warwick University during the 
years 1979 to 1982 and I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of 
the SSRC throughout this period. 
I am much indebted to my research supervisor Professor K. F. Wallis 
without whose experienced guidance and encouragement this thesis would 
not have materialised. Of the several others who were generous with their 
time in providing constructive criticism and advice, Mark Salmon, Norman 
Ireland, Ian Tonks and Richard Pierse deserve a special mention. 
I would also like to thank Shirley Seal and Bobbie Coe for their 
efforts in typing a script that for the most part was in mathematics and 
Greek, languages alien to them both. 
Finally I wish to express gratitude to my family and friends, and in 
particular to my mother and father, Patricia Hartley and Scarlett Palmer, 
for their encouragement and support throughout the writing of this thesis. 
Declaration 
This thesis contains my own work and no part of it was a result of any 
research done in collaboration with other people. 
111 
This thesis examines certain key problems that the existence of 
forward rational expectations poses for policy analysis. The separate 
stages of estimating, testing and solving an econometric model are dealt 
with in turn. 
The main body of original work is in chapters four and six. In 
chapter four the problem of the existence of a continuum of solutions to a 
rational expectations model is addressed. We show that the existing 
practice of imposing terminal conditions is arbitrary and a procedure is 
advanced which in principle at least, can be used to estimate the solution 
jointly with the parameters. In chapter six analytical closed forms for 
the first order conditions of the likelihood function of the endogenous 
variables of a general rational expectations model are derived. We 
believe this is a major contribution to the literature because it opens 
the door to computationally efficient and cheap likelihood estimation, 
something not previously available. The first order conditions for a 
class of models with no predetermined variables has been programmed in 
Fortran IV and this has been used in chapter seven to estimate a model of 
financial asset demands. A likelihood ratio test of restrictions implied 
by rational expectations is comfortably passed so establishing empirical 
support for the hypothesis. 
Other original work in the thesis is contained in chapter five. Here 
we scrutinise the validity of a simulation technique advanced by Fair and 
Anderson which it is claimed solves a standard non rational model to yield 
an approximate rational expectations solution. The results of the chapter 
suggest the method is better in certain circumstances than in others and 
these circumstances pertain to the make up of the model in question. 
Finally, chapters two and three cast a critical eye over the policy 
analysis literature to which a minor contribution is made. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The subject matter of policy analysis 
It is often argued that for economic research to be worthwhile 
it must involve economic policy at some stage. It was not until 
1939 however that a formal framework for the study of economic 
policy was developed. Since this time it has evolved as a subject 
within macroeconomics in its own right. The subject, called policy 
analysis has two components: policy evaluation and policy design. 
The first of these concerns itself with an assessment of the 
effects of various policy 'instruments' such as tax rates, interest 
rates and government expenditure on various `targets' such as 
nominal GDP and the rate of price inflation. 
The procedure starts with the development and estimation of 
an econometric model as large in size and as complex in detail as 
the objective of the study demands. More often tha not nowadays 
such models are large, explaining most or all of the key variables 
in an economy. The coefficients of this model are then scrutinised 
either analytically or numerically so that the effects of various 
policies can be quantified. These end products are called policy 
multipliers. When the instrument(s) in question is (are) discrete 
in nature a more qualitative analysis may be appropriate. Exchange 
controls and prices and incomes policies are two notable policy 
instruments that fit this mould. 
The second component of policy analysis is concerned with the 
formulation of a policy or a policy rule that is expected to achieve 
objectives that are optimal by some criterion. 
Unlike policy evaluation, policy design prerequires a 'suitable' 
econometric model. 'Suitable' here means that it explains all the 
variables relevant to the chosen criterion and it includes all the 
relevant policy instruments amongst its determinants. Broadly 
speaking therefore this second component of the subject uses the 
output from the first. 
It is not always the case, however, that policy design is 
entirely conditioned on an econometric model and its coefficient 
estimates. In a stochastic world there will be a high degree of 
uncertainty concerning the model's coefficient estimates and if 
this is explicitly recognised then moments of these estimates 
(typically their variance) may enter the criterion function in some 
way. There is a possibility therefore that an instrument will be 
set not only to achieve a desired effect on the targets but also to 
reveal information about the model's coefficients and reduce their 
variance. As an example consider a policy plan for future interest 
rates meant to influence the subjective mean and variance of the 
demand for money. An optimal strategy may be to make interest rates 
highly variable in the early part of the plan. The resulting 
information will yield a better estimate of the interest rate 
elasticity of demand for money and so achieve money demand targets 
with greater certainty in the latter part of the policy plan. This 
elaborate procedure involves expensive Kalman filter estimation and 
as a result is rarely adopted. For the most part, policy design is 
carried out conditional on an econometric model and its parameter 
estimates. 
It is clear from this overview that the subject is severely 
constrained by the amount of relevant historical experience. This 
is most acute when the policy under consideration is entirely new. 
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Such a situation was encountered when exchange controls were lifted 
in the U. K. in 1979. The Thatcher government responsible for the 
move had only a priori, largely untested economic theory to advise 
them as to the consequences of their actions. Whilst the development 
of a priori theory is very worthwhile in this respect we consider it 
to be outside the scope of the subject and, therefore of this thesis. 
We are forced to acknowledge that the constraint of data bounds the 
usefulness of our analysis. 
To sum up this overview a number of key stages in the policy 
process have been defined. The first is the development of an 
econometric model. Estimation and hypothesis testing are the prime 
methodological components of this. The estimation of policy multi- 
pliers follows and for most models their size requires a numerical 
method. This gives us another methodological component, namely 
simulation. Moving further along the policy process we enter the 
policy optimisation stage. The numerical and analytical tools used 
here (including simulation) come under the methodological umbrella of 
optimal control theory. 
This compartmentalisation of the-subject of policy analysis may 
not be unanimously accepted. Nonetheless we feel that it identifies 
the key methodological elements of policy analysis and these elements 
form well defined topics with which to deal in this thesis. 
1.2 The scope of the thesis 
Tinbergen's pioneering work for the League of Nations in the 
1930's was the foundation stone upon which the subject of policy 
analysis was built. Since that work no theoretical development has 
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had a more profound effect on the subject than that of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Directly, the hypothesis raised a myriad 
of methodological problems. All stages in the policy process from 
estimation through to policy simulations had to be 
(and are still 
being) rethought and reworked. Indirectly, the hypothesis threatened 
to undermine the usefulness of the subject itself. During the 1970's 
a number of rational expectations models emanated from the New 
Classical School of Macroeconomics. Members of this school, notably 
Lucas, Sargent and Wallace advanced theoretical economic models 
containing rational expectations in which the mean value of real 
variables was wholly independent of policy. It was suggested there- 
fore that policy makers should abandon traditional policy tools and 
adopt simple, predictable policy rules. The view that the existence 
of rational expectations in an economic structure made policy 
impotent 
became increasingly popular. Whilst there is by no means a concensus 
on this view, there does seem to be a concensus on the adoption of the 
hypothesis itself. The widespread use of the hypothesis makes the re- 
formulation of policy analysis in the light of rational expectations an 
urgent issue and it is this issue to which this thesis is devoted. 
Chapter two casts a critical eye over the methodology that was 
orthodox before the rational expectations revolution. Because this 
methodological apparatus came under challenge with the advent of 
the hypothesis chapter three is devoted to a critical analysis of 
this challenge. Citing the important contributions of Buiter(1979), Pagan (1982) 
and others, two fundamental propositions (or rather, counter propositions) 
are established. The first states that closed loop rules, that is rules 
that use or feedback off current stochastic information in the economy 
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(are superior to) open loop, fixed rules. The second asserts that 
the existence of rational expectations itself is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for the failure of policy to exist. It is 
concluded that the impotence of policy is a direct property of the 
model and its construction rather than of the R. E. hypothesis. 
Having established this the rest of the thesis devotes itself 
to the reworking of methodology that we alluded to above. Estimation, 
testing and simulation of economic models containing rational expectations 
are dealt with in these chapters because these are the fundamental stages 
of policy analysis. Focus here falls firmly on the problems raised by 
expectations of future variables since this is the area where work 
appears most scant. As a corollary of this it is also the area where 
most of the original work in this thesis lies. 
Chapter four focuses on the problem of multiple solutions in 
models containing forward rational expectations. The use of terminal 
conditions is standard practice in the face of this problem and the 
validity of this practice is examined. An alternative procedure is 
advanced which involves estimating the solution jointly with the 
parameters of the model. This problem of estimation is taken up further 
in chapter six where first order conditions for maximising the likelihood 
function of a set of endogenous variables from a general linear model 
containing forward rational expectations are derived. The 
extensive use of analysis as opposed to numerical method sets this 
work aside from that of Fair and Taylor who have proposed an 
estimation method of their own. In particular we believe our method 
to be more computationally efficient as a natural consequence of this 
greater input of analysis. The first order conditions for a special 
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class of rational expectations models are programmed into the routine 
"CLARE". CLARE is used to evaluate and compare, via a small and 
simple Monte Carlo study, full information estimation with a popular 
limited information method due to McCallum. The results sound a 
cautionary warning to would be users of the latter method although 
as with any Monte Carlo study it is difficult to assess how general 
these results are. 
Chapter five revives the suggestion advanced by Anderson and 
Fair that standard models can be simulated under the hypothesis of 
rational expectations without having to re-estimate the model's 
parameters. An enticing possibility such as this deserves, we believe, 
closer inspection than that granted it by the original authors. 
Because the method uses 'old' parameter estimates policy multipliers 
are inconsistent and it is the seriousness of this asymptotic bias 
that we analyse. We conclude that the method may in many circumstances 
yield relatively accurate results (relatively small multiplier biases). 
No thesis of a practical bent would be complete without some resort 
to data to support either the results or the basis of the thesis. 
Considering the profound nature of the hypothesis it is astonishing 
that its widespread acceptance has been accompanied by so little 
formal testing of its validity. In chapter seven then, a test of the 
hypothesis is carried out in the context of a simple model of financial 
asset demands. As well as verifying the hypothesis the chapter emphasises 
how full information estimation and testing must go hand in hand as the 
first stage in policy analysis when the hypothesis is invoked. 
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1.3 The framework of the analysis 
It should be apparent from this by now that our framework is 
the standard linear dynamic model. Passing reference only is made 
to nonlinear models. The arguments for and against confining 
attention to linear models should be well known. We must stress 
however, that most of the large macro-models in the UK are nonlinear. 
Exactly how far our results carry over to nonlinear models is not clear 
but more and more modelling schools are maintaining condensed forms of 
their models as well as the models themselves. These are generally 
linearised minature versions of the larger model and are used to 
explore model properties and model policy responses in less detail 
but greater depth. Our methods and analysis can be directly applied 
to these condensed forms. Other areas of application can be found 
in small empirical models. These are usually developed to examine 
either a particular hypothesis or to focus on a particular aspect of 
policy. They arise from partial equilibrium theoretical analysis 
and are often just descriptions of a particular sector of the economy. 
One familiar example is the wage-price models of the labour market 
employed by for example, Lipsey and Parkin. (1970), and Desai. (1975). In 
any event we should not dwell too long on justifying what is the 
adopted framework of 90% of the profession. 
Nonstationarity receives the same cursory treatment. We are on 
more solid ground here. Whilst it is clear that the world is nonlinear 
it is by no means clear that it is nonstationary. Again only a small 
segment of the profession troubles itself with the implications of 
nonstationarity. 
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For most of the thesis it is assumed that expectations at period 
't' are formed in period 't-l' rather than in period 't'. This is 
purely our own preference as we view a lagged information base as a 
more palatable and realistic assumption. Fortunately the analysis 
is equally valid for either assumption although the exact form of 
the relevant algebraic expressions will of course differ. 
1.4 Notation and conventions adopted for the thesis 
Notation is not always uniform between chapters. Where special 
reference is made to existing literature we have adopted within limits 
the author's conventions so that the reader may compare our analysis 
with that of the original work more easily. Therefore, to maintain 
absolute clarity the notation adopted in each chapter is explained 
within the chapter itself. Certain conventions have been adhered to 
throughout however. In particular the rational expectation of yt 
based on an information set dated at time t-1 (denoted Q t-1) 
is 
written in longhand as E(yt/2t-1) and (where this longhand becomes 
too cumbersome) in shorthand as ytelt-l. Symbols denoting vectors 
are broadly in keeping with the literature. For example yt, xt 
or zt and ut or vt denote vectors of endogenous, exogenous 
(or policy and predetermined) and white noise variables respectively 
and matrices are distinguished from scalars by using upper case 
symbols. 
Multivariate R. E. models have three basic representations. 
The first form is where the basic economic relationships of the model 
(supply and demand curves, etc. ) are simply stacked into a simultaneous 
equations system. This is the familiar structural form. Solving this 
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structural form completely so that each endogenous variable is 
written purely in terms of observable exogenous and predetermined 
variables gives us our second representation, the reduced form. 
The third form the model can take lies between these two. If. the 
structural form is partially solved by premultiplying by the 
inverse of the parameter matrix on the endogenous variables then 
each of the variables will be represented purely in terms of 
exogenous, predetermined and expectations variables. We have termed 
this the 'quasi reduced form' because unlike the reduced form the 
structure has only been partially solved. Other terminology used 
is either in general accordance with the literature or is explained 
where used. 
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2. POLICY ANALYSIS BEFORE THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS REVOLUTION 
2.1 A review of the policy design literature 
We open this chapter with a brief overview of the policy design 
literature prior to the advent of R. E. in macroeconomics. 
A formal framework for policy design and evaluation was laid down by 
Tinbergen as long ago as 1952. In his pioneering work for the League of 
Nations he considered the possibility of influencing the course of a 
static economy of the form [1] 
y= Rx +s (1.1) 
where y is a gxl vector of endogenous variables, x is a kx1 vector of 
policy instruments, s is a gxl vector of exogenous influences not subject 
to control and R is a gxk matrix of parameters which in Tinbergen's 
formulation were known. 
The policy maker's objective function was assumed to be 
Q=.. (Yt-Y*)'(Yt-Y*) (1.2) 
where '*' denotes a targetted or desired value and a lower value of Q 
reflects a more successful policy. 
A few notes on the form chosen for Q are pertinent. (1.2) does not 
allow us to weight each targetted variable differently. For example if 
two of the elements of y are unemployment and the trade deficit then these 
would have equal impacts on welfare. Further, positive and negative 
deviations from targetted values are treated symmetrically and this is 
clearly not satisfactory. It is probable that (1.2) was chosen by 
Tinbergen because of the emphasis of his study on stabilisation policies. 
In minimising (1.2) we may be attempting for example to minimise the 
-------------------- 
[1] The original analysis was in terms of scalars. We have generalised it 
here to vectors. 
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variations of output around its targetted level, very relevant in 
Tinbergen's time where apart from the great depression economic experience 
had been one of regular trade cycles. (1.2) also ignores society's (the 
decision maker's) intertemporal tastes as reflected by a discount rate. 
The form of welfare function is taken up in our discussion of dynamic 
economies where we generalise (1.2) in an attempt to eliminate some of the 
deficiences. 
The problem then was to minimise 
Q= y'y + y*ly* _2y*? y 
subject to y= Rx+s 
Substituting (1.1) into (1.2) gives us the unconstrained maximisation 
problem 
min Q= x'R'Rx + 2x'R's + s's + y*'y* - 2y*'Rx - 2y ''s (1.3) 
for which the K first order conditions are 
dQ/dx = 2R'Rx + 2R's - 2R'y* =0 (1.4) 
We may distinguish three cases 
Case (i); K=g 
This is the case where the number of instruments equals the number of 
targets. In this case 
(a) R-1(y*-s) (1.5) 
and (b) Q=0 (1.6) 
where a '"' denotes an optimal value. We see then that in this case all 
targets are met exactly. 
Case (ii) K<g 
In this case R'R is of full rank so that 
(a) x= (R'R)-1R'(y*-s) (1.7) 
and (b) Q= (y*-s)'M(y*-s) 
where M= (I-R(R'R)-1R') 
Note that x is simply an OLS estimate in the regression of (y*-s) (the 
desired value of Ri) on the matrix R and so its interpretation is clear. 
Case (iii) K>g 
Here there are an excess of intruments over targets and obviously K-g of 
the targets cannot be set using the first order conditions (1.4) and have 
to be set arbitrarily. The remaining g instruments take on values in a 
similar way to those of case (i) 
x9 = Rg-(Y*-s) (1.8) 
1 
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where xg is the g subvector of x containing the chosen elements and Rg 
contains the appropriate g columns of R. Note that it doesn't matter which 
g-k subset of x is set arbitrarily as (1.2) does not reflect instrument 
costs. 
Subsequently Tinbergen's work was generalised chiefly by Theil (1968) 
and Brainard (1967) to incorporate various forms of uncertainty. 
Theil considered the case of fixed R but random s. If instead of 
minimising welfare loss (Q) we now minimise its expectation 
E(Q) = x'R'Rx+2x'R'E(s)+E(s's)+y*'y*-2y*'Rx-2y*'s (1.9) 
then it is clear that our previous results are unchanged providing that s 
is replaced by what Theil called its 'certainty equivalent' namely its 
expectation. A comparison of (1.9) with (1.3) confirms this. 
Finally before we leave this very restrictive scenario of a static 
economy we note the case of Brainard where both R and s are allowed to be 
random and correlated. In particular joint normality is assumed. The 
uncertainty may either be in the structure of the economy or may reflect 
ignorance of the true values of R and s. Minimising expected loss in this 
case gives [21 
X=(? R R+R'R)-1 
ý\(-ý('sý)-"IR 
(1.10) 
where R= (rij}, R= E(R), IiRR = (dRij) = E(R-R)'(R-R) is a variance K 
covariance matrix with elements öii = .1 var(rik) and K k=1 
6i =Z cov(rikr "k), j#: i k=1 
In showing this result for scalar x, r, y and s Brainard noted the 
radical departure from the previous literature of the setting for the 
instruments. In practice, the coefficients (parameter estimates) of an 
econometric model are assumed to be certain when a control exercise is 
undertaken and the analysis in our simple case gives some indication of 
how complex policy optimisation may become when this assumption is 
dropped. As a further example consider the case where we explicitly 
recognise the fact that all the elements in (1.10) bar y* have to be 
estimated then the situation is very complex indeed. In this case the 
-------------------- 
[2] Note that quantities such as (5-RR may not be known and replacing them 
by their estimates may or may not provide a good approximation. 
12 
settings of the instruments actually affect the precision of the estimate 
of R. In turn the precision of the estimate of R is likely to have an 
important effect on x and so on expected loss (E(Q)) just as the variance 
covariance matrix 1RR (representative to some degree of the uncertainty in 
R) has in (1.10). Assessing the truly optimal policy in this case is a 
difficult task which we do not delve into here but touch on below in our 
discussion of dynamic economic systems. 
Although Tinbergen's framework dates back to 1939 it was not until 
relatively recently that the more general problem of controlling 
stochastic dynamic economic systems was tackled. In his book Chow (1976) 
applied the then long established tools of engineering's optimal control 
theory to this very issue and it is to this that we now turn. 
In the discussion above our economy was static and we were able to 
discuss policy unambiguously as a set of independent settings for 
xi(i=1, T). In our discussion of dynamic models however we have to 
distinguish two forms of policy. The first is open-loop policy where the 
time paths of policy variables are set at the beginning of the planning 
period without any regard to future events. This is the form that our 
policy took in the static world above. The second form is a specification 
of policy variables as functions of observations yet to be made. This 
function is called a feedback control rule and the policy a feedback 
policy. ('Feedback' indicates that results of current policy will in turn 
determine future policy). Note that there is obviously no role for 
feedback policy in static econometric models. 
Consider now the general dynamic economic model considered by Chow 
yt =A lyt-1 + ... Amyt-m + Cpxt +.... Cnxt-n + bt + 
Ut (1.11) 
where yt and xt are as above, the Ai are gxg and the Ci gxk matrices 
respectively which are assumed known. Again bt represents a vector of 
uncontrollable exogenous influences the form of which is unimportant to 
the analysis that follows. Finally ut is a vector of disturbances 
representing structural innovations and to a limited extent capturing 
misspecification of the system. 
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Once again we consider minimising a quadratic welfare function 
subject to (1.11). Many other forms of welfare function could have been 
specified as 'better' approximations to that of the decision maker. We 
cannot guarantee in more general cases however that an analytically 
tractible control rule will emerge from the control process whereas as we 
see below our quadratic function gives us analytical and computational 
simplicitly. Further, if the disturbances and exogenous influences are 
normally distributed random variables then providing that xt is subject to 
open loop or linear feedback control yt will also be normal. Thus our 
quadratic welfare function contains all the relevant moments of the 
distribution of y, namely means, variances and covariances. 
Before we proceed any further we reduce the order of (1.11) to one by 
redefining the vector yt. In particular we may rewrite (1.11) in 
companion form as 
14 
t 
AAA; A; C.. ;C 12 m-1 m1n 
y t-1 
c x b u t t t 
------ -------------- ººr 
00 0 U 0 
rrr 
Irr0º 
rrr 
t-m+1 ººr t-m 
------ - --------------; ----t----------- ---- + -- + : + 
xt 0 ...... 00 ; x t-1 
------ 
rºi 
-------------- ; ---- -------- -- 
x t-1 
- 
0º'0 º, º , r"rr" 
x t-n+1 
0;; 0 x t-n 
0 0 Q 
ººº_ 
- - 
or as 
yt = Ayt_1 + Cxt + bt + ut (1.12) 
where the vectors are redefined according to (1.11). Because we have 
redefined our system in terms of a new y-vector we have to redefine our 
welfare function accordingly. In particular we write (1.2) as 
T 
Qt 
ÖYt -yt*)'K(yt-yt*) 
(1.13) 
where K may be specified appropriately with elements of unity and zero to 
give (1.2) as a special case. We go further however and specify K 
generally as a full matrix to allow for instrument costs (Yt+1 as 
redefined contains the vector xt) and to allow intertemporal covariances 
of the y's to affect welfare (these are no longer zero in our dynamic model 
(1.12)ß 
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Our problem. is finally specified; minimise (1.13) or rather its 
expectation subject to (1.12) and this we do using Bellman's method of 
dynamic programming. 
If we look at the time structure of our economy we see that YT is 
independent of future events (in periods T+i). Dynamic programming 
exploits this causal or recursive time structure found in all economic and 
physical systems by optimising backwards in time conditional on the past. 
Consider the problem of the decision maker in the final period T. It is 
min QT =E (YT-YT* ) 'K (YT-YT* ) w. r. t. xT (1.14) 
st. YT = AyT_1 + CxT + bT + UT 
This is obviously the case since in period T xT_i (i>O) will already 
have been set and so optimisation proceeds conditional on (without regard 
to) their values. 
Denoting an optimal value by '"' (1.14) gives a solution for xT in 
terms of the past, i. e., 
XT = xT(YT-1'XT-1'bT-1) (1-15) 
and corresponding to this will be a minimum cost in T 
QT = QT(xT, yt-1, bT) (1.16) 
The problem in T-1 is now 
min QT-1 = E(YT-1-YT 
*1)'K(YT-1-YT-*1) 
+ QT(xT'yT-1, bT) (1.17) 
s. t. YT-1 = AyT_2 + CxT_1 + bT-1 + uT-1 
We may substitute out for zT using (1.15) since we know that this is its 
truly optimal value in terms of yT_1' xT_1 and bT_1 from (1.14) so that 
once again our problem is to minimise a function (conditional on) given 
past decisions. We can ignore xT_1's influence on xT and in turn on QT as 
this has already been taken account of by the substitution for the optimal 
value of xT(XT) in terms of YT-1'xT-1 and bT_1 according to (1.15). This 
procedure continues until the initial period is reached by which time a 
complete stream of policies 21... xT will have been determined in terms of 
lagged values of y, b, and initial x(x0). The method will become clearer 
as we apply it explicitly to our problem. 
Consider the first stage of our problem in (1.14). 
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Expanding gives 13] 
(a) QT = ET-1 (YT'HTYT-2YT'hT+CT) (1.18) 
where (b) HT=K, hT=KyT and cT=YTKyT 
Substituting into (1.18) the constraint and differentiating with respect 
to xT gives us the optimal instrument setting as 
(a) XT = GTYT_1 + gT 
where (b) GT = -(C'HTC)-1C'HTA (1.19) 
and (c) gT = -(C'HTC)-1(C1HTbT-C'hT) 
Substituting (1.19) into (1.18) gives QT as 
QT 
= yT! 1(A+CGT)'HT(A+CGT)yT-1+2yT! 1(A+CGT)I(HTbT-hT)+(bT+CgT) 
HT (bT+CgT) -2 (bT+CgT) 'hT+cT+ET-1 (uT'HTuT) (1.20) 
As we would expect this unwieldy expression is independent of any events 
in time T and we may now move on to the second stage of our procedure as in 
(1.17). Using (1.20) the problem is now 
(a) min QT-1 = ET-2(yT-, HT-1YT-1-2yTL1hT-1+eT-1) 
where (b) HT-1 = K+(A+CGT)'HT(A+CGT) , 
(c) hT-1 = KYT_1+(A+CGT)'(hT-HTbT) (1.21) 
and (d) cT_1 = yT!, KYT_1+(bT+CgT)'HT(bT+CgT) 
-2(bT+CgT)'hT+ET-1(UT'HTUT) 
The important thing to note from this mass of algebra is that the 
problem in T-1 is of exactly the same form as in T. (Compare (1.18) with 
(1.20)). Because of this (1.21) (b) to (1.21) (d) form a set of difference 
equations in H, h and c with initial conditions (1.18) (b). These 
equations are recursive from (b) (determining Ht, Vt) to (c) (determining 
the ht given Ht, Vt) to (d) (determining the ct given Ht, ht, Vt ). 
We may ask at this stage under what circumstances does (1.21) (b) 
yield a steady state or long run value for H (and thus for G)? The steady 
state values must satisfy (using (1.21)) 
(a) H=K+ R'HR=>H= R'1KR1 where R=A+CG 
i=0 (1.22) 
and (b) G= -(C-HC)C'HA 
We see then that the steady state exists only if the summation on the 
right-hand side of (1.22) (a) converges. This is guaranteed if and only if 
-------------------- 
[3] The expressions use Chow's notation. 
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the eigenvalues of R are less than one. 
Note, however, that under no circumstances regarding the system's 
parameters will there exist a corresponding steady state (long run) value 
for the gtu,,,. This is because they depend on the time varying target 
values yt and exogenous processes bt. 
The important result to emerge from this section may be summarised. 
If a quadratic objective function such as (1.13) is accepted as a good 
approximation to the decision maker's preference function then the optimal 
policy is of the feedback form (1.19). These feedback equations will have 
constant slopes if the planning period is long enough providing that the 
parameters satisfy the eigen value condition above. The intercept terms, 
however, do not have long run constant values. Their role is to react to 
accomodate changes in the exogenous influences bt and target values yt. 
In an entirely analagous manner we may derive the optimal open loop 
policy, that is the policy that is 'best' given information only at the 
start of the planning horizon. 
Again the problem is to 
T 
(a) min Q0 = 
týDEO(Yt-yt)'K(Yt-Yt) (1.23) 
s. t. (b) yt = Ayt_1 + Cxt + bt + ut 
It is more useful to write (1.23) (b) as 
t t_1 i t-1 i Im i i+1 (c) yt =A y0 + .1A UT_i +ZA bt_i +ZAC xt_i i=0 i=0 i=0 
and to substitute (c) into (a) and apply our dynamic programming 
technique. 
Because the open loop rule is based on less information than the 
feedback rule it always does worse than (is dominated by) the optimal 
feedback rule. Basically the latter allow the x's to respond to shocks and 
events occuring up until the previous period whereas the former rule does 
not. 
Before we close this section we note a few extensions which are 
easily accommodated within our framework. 
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Firstly we may allow the system to have time varying parameters by 
simply subscripting these parameters with appropriate time indices in 
(1.19) and (1.21). The difference equations for G, H etc., have the same 
form but obviously no steady state exists for the Gt, 11t. 
Secondly allowance may be made for unknown parameters that have to be 
estimated. 
(1.19) (a) - (c) become 
(a) XT ° GTyT-1 + 9T 
(b) GT = -(ET-1G? HTG)-1 (ET-1G'HTAT) (1.24) 
and (c) 9T = -(ET-1CTHTCT)-1[(ET-1CTHTbT) - (ET-1CT)hT] 
all notation as above. On the face of it (1.24) (a) is again a linear 
feedback rule in YT-1. This is not however the case because in general 
the expected values of the coefficients will be functions of YT-i' XT-i 
and these functions themselves will be very hard to derive to provide 
optimal estimates. If however we are prepared to accept that the expected 
values of the coefficient matrices in all periods t=0,..., T may be 
approximated by their estimated values at the beginning of the planning 
horizon then the situation is essentially that of fixed coefficients and 
treated as above. In practice it is unlikely that the information 
revealed during the planning horizon if incorporated into the estimates 
each time period would have a significant impact on welfare. For one 
thing this information is often small relative to that accrued up to and 
including the start of the planning period. 
Finally another form of uncertainty may be incorporated into our 
analysis. 
It is often the case that certain elements of the yt(target) vector 
are observed with an error through another variable say St. It has been 
argued for example that using money supply figures as a measure of 
liquidity in the economy is subject to error. A more obvious example 
perhaps is the permanent level of income or consumption which is observed 
only through actual levels. We have then observations on St where 
St = Mt yt + it (1.25) 
where Mt is assumed a known matrix. 
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Providing that nt is normally distributed and independent of the 
variables in the model then the optimal rule for t based on information at 
t-1 is 
xt = GtEt_1yt_1 + gt 
where Gt and gt are derived in exactly the same way as above so that they 
obey (1.21) (b) - W. (The proof of this result is given by Chow (1976) 
ch. 8). The problem then separates naturally into two parts. Firstly 
calculate Et_1yt_1 by some means and secondly calculate Gt and gt (as 
above). The first part is accomplished via use of the Kalman Filter 
(Kalman (1960)). Essentially this is an updating formula for 
E (yt$st) (=Etyt) of the form 
E(ytlst) = E(ytist_1) + Dt[st-E(stist-1)] (1.26) 
where Dt is a matrix whose ith row contains the regression coefficients of 
the ith element of yt on the elements of st. 
Dt by definition will be a function of the conditional expectation of 
the variance covariance matrix of st and so (via (1.25)) of that of yt. An 
updating formula for the latter and for E(stlst_1) may be derived using 
(1.25) and the linear model for yt in (1.12). Details are given in Chow 
(1976) pp. 186-191. 
This completes our discussion of policy design prior to the R. E. 
revolution. 
2.2 A review of the policy evaluation literature 
In this section we deal with early attempts to estimate the response 
of endogenous variables (targets) to policy variables. These policy 
variables may be discrete (of the policy-on, policy-off type) or 
continuous in nature and we begin with the former. 
The early policy literature had focused on discrete policy and in 
particular on assessing the effects on a wage-price structure of prices 
and incomes policies (see Bodkin (1966) for a survey of this extensive 
literature). In these studies time series data was split into two periods 
according to whether the policy was thought to be on or not and wage-price 
equations for both periods were compared. Possibly the most noteworthy of 
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these policy-on policy-off studies was that of Lipsey and Parkin (1970), 
henceforth referred to as L-P. 
Previous to L-P's study focus of the two period policy-on policy-off 
comparison had been on the significance of an intercept dummy added for 
the policy-on subsection of the data. The main force of their paper 
however was to show that intercept dummies may not be sufficient to 
capture fully the effects of the policy on wage-price relationships. In 
their analysis therefore they allow for policy effects on slope as well as 
intercept terms. Rather than explicitly add dummies however, the wage and 
price equations were estimated separately for the two periods and a test 
for coefficient stability (Chow or F test) was performed. 
Now it is s 
yt = XtB 1 
yt = XtB2 
the regression 
yt 1 
yt2 
imple but tedious to show that in the model 
+ Ut t-0.... r-1 
+ ut t=r+1,... T 
Xt1Xt2 B+ 
LO 
ut 
Xt2 S t1 u2 
gives values for B and S as B1 and (B2-Bl) respectively (hats denoting OLS 
estimates). It follows then that an F (Chow)-test based on (B1-B2) from 
the separate regressions for t=O,... r and t=r,... T is identical to the (F-) 
test of joint significance of slope and intercept dummies in the complete 
regression for t=0.... T. The wage-price model used there and in the 
preceeding literature was 
(a) pt = a1+a2wt+a3mt_1+a4gt+uit (2.1) 
(b) wt = a5+a6Ut+a7pt+a8Nt+u2t 
where p, w, in, q, U and N are the price level, the nominal wage rate, the 
price of imports, a labour productivity variable, the unemployment rate 
and union aggressiveness variables respectively. Superscripted dots 
denote rates of change with all variables in logs. The slope coefficients 
for the policy on period were found to be significantly lower than for the 
policy-off period with the intercepts dramatically higher. L-P's broad 
conclusion then was that (focusing on the wage equation) although the 
incomes policy effectively 'broke' the wage-price relationship (the 
Phillips curve) the constant term therein was substantially augmented. 
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This it was argued represented the establishing of a norm leading to wage 
settlements well above that which would come about in the absence of 
policy at least for a wide range of values of the exogenous variables. 
In his comment on the study Wallis (1972) pointed to a number of 
noteworthy deficiencies in L-P's work. The innapropriate use of O. L. S. on 
(2.1) for example. Of special interest to us here however is Wallis' 
closing suggestion that "the decision to implement the policy may not have 
been independent of the current values of endogenous variables 
themselves". Indeed if this were so L-P's Chow test is invalid. To see 
this consider a simplified version of (2.1) with policy dummies. 
(a) pt = alwt+a1Stwt+a2mt+a2Stwt+ult (2.2) 
(b) wt = a3pt+a38tpt+a4ut+a4Stut+u2t 
where St=O if tG TO (the policy-off period) 
and 8t=1 if t6 T1 (the policy-on period). 
Considering an identical procedure to L-P's Chow test we say that the 
policy has an impact if a', a2, a3 and a4 are significantly different from 
zero. Now one interpretation of Wallis' policy regime is 
St=O if pt<p (2.3) 
St=1 ifpt>p* 
where p is the critical rate of inflation above which an incomes policy 
is enforced. 
The implication of (2.3) is that even if appropriate instruments are 
used in (2.2) for pt and wt (2SLS instruments for example) St is correlated 
with the error term violating the standard assumptions upon which most 
estimators are based. Estimates of all the parameters in this case are 
subject to simultaneous equations bias. Whilst an attempt is made in 
section 1.4 below to evaluate this bias and suggest an alternative 
procedure the simultaneous determination of the policy regime with the 
endogenous variables thwarts any such policy-on policy-off tests. 
We now turn to the literature concerning continuous policy 
instruments. In the case where we have a structure containing continuous 
policy variables such as the level of government spending or money supply 
then two ways of estimating policy multipliers are discernable from the 
early literature. One is by means of solving a structural form to make 
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the endogenous variables appear naturally on the left-hand side of each 
equation and then estimate the multipliers directly as the relevant O. L. S. 
coefficients. This 'reduced-form' method was proposed by Anderson and 
Jordan (henceforth A-J). Referring to equation (1.1) in the previous 
section this amounts to regressing the variables in y on the vector x 
providing multiplier estimates {rid}. These estimates will be consistent 
providing that the menu of left-hand side variables is complete. 
The second method is to estimate the structural coefficient using say 
2SLS and then to solve for the {rid} either through a policy simulation or 
as the reduced form coefficients. 
This then was the state of the art at the beginning of the 1970's. A 
critique of the (then) current methodology by Goldfield and Blinder (1972) 
(henceforth G-B) formed a milestone in policy evaluation history. 
Following Wallis' note on the L-P study an extensive analysis of the 
problem of simultaneous equations bias that arises when Federal or 
Government behavioural rules are ignored during structural or reduced 
form estimation is highlighted and forms the focus of their paper. 
In the context of a simple example G -B derive the expected biases 
arising when a fiscal and monetary authority are estimating multipliers 
with varying degrees of astuteness using the A-J method. The model they 
use is (G-B's notation) 
(a) Yt =K+ ocFt + BMt +ut (2.4) 
where Yt is nominal income, Ft is government spending, Mt is money supply 
and K and u are a constant and error term respectively. 
Reaction functions for Ft and Mt were specified so that their values 
deviate from a normal or equilibrium value (Ft and Mt) only when income is 
not at its targetted value (Yt ). 
They are 
(b) Ft = Ft -F(Yt-Yt) + Vit (2.4) 
(c) Mt = Mt - m(Yt-Yt) + v2, 
The degree of astuteness with which multipliers are estimated by the two 
authorities is measured as the ratio of estimated residual variance to the 
actual and so is for the fiscal and monetary authorities respectively 
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Y2=u2F/d2u and S2=u2m/d'2u 
where u2F, U 
2m 
and (F2- u are the error variance of the fiscal authority, 
monetary authority and the actual model respectively. 
The ratio of actual to estimated multipliers (the latter obtained by 
O. L. S. in (2.4) (a)) are for oc and B respectively 
(a) I1+ S(PY-S)/0 
(2.5) 
(b) RP =1+ Y(pS-Y)/0 
where Q-Y2+82-2pY8+Y282(1_ 2)>0 
and e is the correlation coefficient between uF and um representing the 
degree to which the two authorities utilise the same information. Note 
that if 
1 
e<S/Y<- 
a condition which is satisfied for negative e and probably satisfied for 
small positive p, then both multipliers are biased towards zero with the 
more serious bias attributing to the more astute authority! These 
findings were confirmed by Monte Carlo experiments which were undertaken 
(1971) 
using the Moroney-Mason/model. For these experiments the standard version 
of the model was augmented by reaction functions like (2.4) (b) and (c) and 
used to generate data. Using this data they then proceeded to estimate 
multipliers in the A-J reduced form fashion and through structural 
simulation ignoring the reaction functions. In the former case 
multipliers were biased by a factor of between 10% and 120% for structural 
estimates however the implications of treating policy variables (F and M 
in (2.4) (a)) as exogenous when they are in fact endogenous according to 
(2.4) (b) and (c) are not so grave. Intuitively this is for two reasons. 
Firstly the policy variables concerned are likely to be few in number and 
will probably enter only a few equations in a large macro model. It is 
only these equations that suffer inconsistent estimates. Secondly the 
'menu' of exogenous variables used as instruments in 2SLS is likely to be 
large in most cases and the mistaken addition of (say) two more (F and M) 
is not likely to be serious. When, however the structure is solved or 
simulated omitting policy rules such as (2.4) (b) and (c)' then serious 
multiplier biases could be expected. 
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To make this clear consider G-B's simple model in (2.4) but exclude 
(2.4) (c) so that M is truly exogenous whilst F is subject to endogenous 
feedback as in (b). If the Fed was estimating responses to money supply 
whilst ignoring the reactions of the fiscal authorities (the government) 
then (2.4) (a) provides them with an estimate of B (B) and this would be 
interpreted as the multiplier. In fact the true model is '(2.4) (a) and 
(2.4) (b) so that 
(a) Yt = Kt + B'Mt + ut (2.6) 
where K' = (K + aFt* + aFYt*) / (1 - aF), 
ut = avt +Ut 
with policy multiplier (2.6) (b) B' =B/ (1 - aF) = SYt/SMt 
(2.6) (b) shows that even if all the structural estimates were consistent 
the Fed's estimate of the monetary multiplier (B) is less than its true 
value B'. 
The Monte-Carlo results for the structural estimation and simulation 
method showed multipliers to be overestimated by a factor of 2 contrasting 
strongly with the downward biases from the A-J method. 
Finally we note that the class of reaction function of Chow (1976) or 
Buiter (1980) are excluded from the G -B critique as far as estimation 
goes. Clearly feedback rules that use predetermined variables do not 
cause correlation between the current error term and any regressors. 
Again however ignoring the reaction functions at the simulation stage has 
serious implications for multiplier estimates. 
We conclude then as G -B do that 
"there seems to be no substitute for specifying reaction functions and 
estimating (and simulating) the complete structure". 
2.3 The policy experiments of Fair. 
In this section we discuss some simulation techniques discussed and 
used by Fair (1975) in the context of his theoretical work "A Model of 
Macroeconomic activity". The study is an interesting one because policy 
responses derived using these techniques from a complex theoretical model 
are used to guide the specification of its empirical counterpart. As a 
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result of this, policy multipliers from the empirical model are 
constrained by the theory and this is in stark contrast to the A-J 
methodology where policy multipliers are entirely based on the data. 
Before we discuss the simulation techniques we provide a very brief 
outline of the theoretical model. 
The model's key features lie in its strong microeconomic foundations. 
The economy is divided into four sectors and the government. There is a 
bond dealer, a financial sector (banks), a corporate sector (firms) and a 
household sector. Every time period each sector solves a deterministic 
control problem subject to its binding quantity constraints and its 
available information (information set). The model is recursive with a 
flow of information and decisions running from a bond dealer to banks, 
from banks to firms and then on to households. 
The fundamental difference between this model and its theoretical 
predecessors is the absence of forced equilibrium conditions which are 
usually achieved through a tätonnement process. Indeed recontracting is 
not allowed anywhere in the model and this gives rise to its neat 
recursive structure. The model describes an economy in a state of 
fundamental disequilibrium there being no guarantee that 'desired' or 
targeted values of current decision variables are in fact met. 
Expectations are non rational and are in fact very naive bearing in 
mind the model's overall level of sophistication. For example banks are 
assumed to expect the short rate not to change from its current value and 
this information is related to the bond dealer who then sets stock prices 
accordingly. 
The sequence of decisions is fairly easy to follow. Each period a 
bond dealer sets current bond and bill rates according to his perceptions 
of current demands and supplies and communicates this information to firms 
and banks. Armed with this knowledge plus information from the government 
on tax rates and the reserve requirement ratio and having formed 
expectations about the level of current (and future) deposits available 
the banks set a loan rate, decide on the value of bills and bonds to buy 
and on the maximum amount of money that they will lend in the period. 
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In turn, firms receive information on the banks' decisions and on the 
current profit tax rate before they set their main decision variables. 
These are the volume of funds borrowed from banks, the maximum amount of 
labour hired from households, the amount of investment to undertake and 
the current level of output and the prices of goods. 
Finally at the end of this decision sequence are households who 
decide how many hours to work subject of course to the upper bound set by 
firms. 
As a final comment the model ignores distributional and search 
questions because there is perfect information within the structure 
described and aggregation over agents being coarse and over goods total. 
It is not our purpose here to evaluate the model's microeconomic 
foundations or to establish the type of (dis) equilibrium described by the 
system. Instead we focus on the simulation methodology employed in an 
attempt to both 'condense' the model into a simple log linear form 
(henceforth this is referred to as the "condensed model") and to assess 
the affects of policy instruments on the dynamic path of key endogenous 
variables. 
The simulation procedure involves six basic steps 
Step 1: 
Taking each sector separately write down the set of equations governing 
expectational behaviour the identities and flow of funds constraints 
facing the sector and its objective function. 
Step 2: 
Using an algorithm that searches over the parameter space find a set of 
'parameter values' [4] such that when the sector maximises its objective 
function the sector's decision variables are in a steady state. [5] 
Step 3: 
Using this set of 'parameter values' (hence-forth 'steady-state 
-------------------- 
[4] 'Parameter values' here means parameters, initial conditions and 
exogenous variable values. 
[5] The condition for the endogenous variables' time profile is that they 
are "broadly flat" rather than in an exact steady state. 
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parameters') change either one of the initial conditions or one of the 
exogenous variables and calculate the (proportional) response of key 
endogenous variables to this in subsequent periods. 
Step 4: 
Calculate the average response from two such experiments for each 
subsequent period. Substitute these average elasticities into a log 
linear dynamic model which explains the key current endogenous (decision) 
variables in terms of predetermined variables and variables determined 
outside the sector. 
Step 5: 
Simulate this condensed form to provide a 'base run'. This involves the 
setting of previously undetermined intercepts included in the condensed 
form in such a way that a steady state is once again achieved for the key 
endogenous variables. 
Below we have set out a simple two sector two period analogy to Fair's 
model. Performing steps 1 to 5 on this will help to illuminate the method. 
Our model is similar to one of temporary equilibrium where households 
are rationed on the labour they may sell so that there is involuntary 
unemployment and firms in turn are rationed on the goods supply side. 
Both firms and households then are off their unconstrained supply and 
demand functions (respectively) and so this is allied to the temporary 
equilibrium interpretation of a Keynsian system. 
Households decide on consumption 'today' (Cl) versus consumption 
'tomorrow' (C2) given an initial endowment of money (m0) and ration of 
labour (11 and 12). This decision is encapsulated in their holdings of 
money in the current period (ml). Note that money has no direct effect on 
utility. 
Faced with their goods supply ration firms simply decide on the least 
cost combination of capital and labour at the current wage rate (Wi) and 
at the current rental price of capital services (ri). To make the model 
truly recursive, it is not the actual goods supply ration that affects 
employment (ci) but the perceived or expected ration (C? ). A simple 
lagged value proxies these expectations and so the current sequence of 
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decisions is recursive with firms deciding on employment independently of 
the household's consumption decision. 
The control problems of firms and households and the first order 
conditions which determine optimal values for m1(m1), 11(11) etc are laid 
out below in Table 2.1. 
Having derived optimal settings for our key endogenous variables 
(step 1) we now emulate step 2. Taking each sector separately we find a 
set of 'parameter values' that yields a steady state solution for the 
decision variables. In the firm sector this implies 
l1=12(=L, say) (and kl=k2=k) (3.6) 
and so (for example) 
r1c0/Awl = r2c1/Aw2 or (3.7) 
r1/r2 = (w1/w2) (c1/c0) 
A steady state in the household implies 
cl=c2=cO=c (3.8) 
and so condition (3.7) reduces to 
r1 = (w1/w2) r2 (3.9) 
Further, current money holdings must equal initial endowments so that 
m1=m0(=m, say) (3.10) 
Using (3.8) and (3.10) with optimal household decisions gives 
(w1-w2)1=m (3.11) 
Combining (3.6) - (3.11) we may write (for example) 
a2 = a1(2w21 + m) /m (3.12) 
Counting equations that our second stage delivers with those from the 
first order conditions in the optimisation stage we see that we have 12 
equations (5 from the former and 7 from the latter) in 7 decision 
variables, 2 initial conditions, 4 exogenous variables and 6 parameters 
(19 'parameter values' and decision variables). Clearly there are an 
excess of 'parameter values' to solve for (5 equations in 12 'parameter 
values' once the decision variables have been solved for) and what values 
our unknowns take depend upon the ones for which solution values are 
sought or the way in which the equations are solved. We have provided two 
examples above where we have chosen to express r1 in terms of w1, w2 and r2 
in (3.9) and o: 2 in terms of cc1, w2,1 and m in (3.12). 
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Table 2.1 
Households 
Max U= ale + B11ý + oc c2 + B212 
(ml) 
s. t. c1 = m0 - mi + will 
and c2 =w212 + ml 
with 11 = 11 and 12 = 12 
Bl, B2<0; B2>B, ; at1 , oc2> 0 ; a2<aý 
Firms: 
Max{11,12} Il = ce + Pct - wlll - w212 - rlk1 - r2k2 
s. t. c1 = A11 k1 = cl and c2 = A12k2 = c2 and c1 = ci_l 
with 0<p<1, e being a discount rate. 
First order-conditions: 
Households: SU =2o: 2(w212+m1)-2a1(m0-m1+w, l1)=0 
6mß 11,12 
_> m1=(a1m0+a1w111-oc2w212)/(a2+a1) 
(3.1 ) 
_> Cl = m0-ml+will 
(3.2) 
and c2 = w212+m1 
(3.3) 
Firms: Si-Ia = ric01-2/A - w1 =0 
811 cl, c2 
Sýý = r2c1122/A - w2 =0 
612 c1c2 
> 11 _ (r1c0/Aw1)0.5 (3.4) 
and 12 = (r2c1/Aw2)°'5 
(3.5) 
Parameters: aj, cx2, B1, B2, p, A. 
Exogenous variables: w l, w2, r l, r2, 
Initial conditions: co, m0. 
Decision variables: ml, cl, c2,11,12 (and kj, k2), 
ki and k2 are residuals from the production function given 11 and 12. 
Note: to simplify the problem and to maintain recursivity a nash type of 
equilibrium is described where agents assume no response from others to 
their actions. 
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Because our 'parameter values' are underdetermined we would expect 
that given start values for the former we would require very few 
iterations to achieve our steady state. 
We do not however wish to labour the point that in our example the 
'parameter values' are underdetermined by step 2. In fact in Fair's model 
30 periods with 30 equations per decision variable have to solve for the 
unknowns in step 2 (in addition to the first order conditions). This 
number of periods may provide a just sufficient or over sufficient number 
of conditions to solve for the unknowns. If the latter is the case then 
only an approximate steady state can be derived with decision variables 
having only a 'broadly flat' not totally flat time profile in most cases. 
The key point to note from this analysis is that whether over or 
underdetermined the values for the 'parameters' are entirely arbitrary. 
If for example we rearrange (3.12) we get 
(a) o: 2/et1 =1+ 2w21/m (3.12) 
Because positive start values for w2 and m0 will have been chosen (3.12) 
(a) states that a2 will exceed a1 so that referring back to the utility 
function we see that consumption 'tomorrow' is valued more highly than 
consumption today. This is obviously unacceptable. 
Pressing on regardless to steps 3 and 4 we would estimate multipliers 
by perturbation of exogenous variables or initial conditions. In our 
model for example the multiplier response of the demand for money to its 
previous value (a dynamic multiplier) may be written as 
M(m1m0) = Sm1/Smp = (2coc1 -(x2w2l)/(2ca1 -oc2w2l+2cx2) 
We see that the multipliers in our model are functions of parameters 
initial conditions and other variables in the model as indeed we would 
expect from a nonlinear model. Because all these elements are 'chosen' 
arbitrarily the multipliers are correspondingly arbitrary. 
To sum up then we could say that multipliers delivered by the Fair 
routines may or may not be unique depending on whether there is a unique 
setting of the 'parameter values' that forces a steady state on the system. 
Either way there is no guarantee without inspection that the 'parameters' 
and multipliers so derived are sensible. 
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It is difficult to see why the criterion of steady state was chosen 
to derive multipliers to guide the specification of a macro model which is 
designed to, explain short run and disequilibrium phenomena. Why not for 
example impose the criterion that outcomes from the simulation exhibit 
certain time series features such as those corresponding to observable 
data series? Alternatively, since it could be argued that to a large 
extent models merely formalise a modeller's a priori beliefs, why not 
choose 'parameters' that appeal to intuition? 
This brings us to the final stage in the procedure. Given multiplier 
responses from steps 1 to 6 we must note how they are used to guide 
specification of the empirical counterpart. 
The fundamental constraints imposed on the latter took the form of 
exclusion restrictions on the structure as is usual in economic modelling 
since exclusion restrictions allow parameters of interest to be 
identified from the data. Whilst most of the lag structures in the model 
were chosen for goodness of fit there are certain areas of the model where 
the data are a poor discriminant of dynamic structure. Such is the case 
of the response of various decision variables to tax rates; 
"There is unfortunately much uncertainty regarding both the short 
run and the long run response of the economy to various tax law changes. 
The data do not appear to be very good at descriminating amongst different 
lag structures ... " 
Thus certain equations contain lag polynomials in tax rates whose 
order was constrained by the predictions of the theoretical model. The 
simulations of the condensed form in step 5 guided all of those 
specification decisions. 
We conclude this section by noting that simulation of complex 
theoretical models is undoubtedly the best way of exploring their 
responses. The problem of choosing numerical parameter values to input 
into this procedure is not trivial. Obviously the investigator's 
judgement plays an important part in this. However, whatever criterion is 
chosen should be explicitly stated and supported rather than left 
submerged in some complex numerical procedure. 
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2.4 Wallis' note on the Lipsey-Parkin study; an example 
We noted in section 1.2 that policy evaluation studies of the policy 
on policy off nature may be subject to simultaneous equations bias if the 
decision to implement the policy is contemporaneously linked with an 
endogenous variable (G-B's critique). In this section then we conclude 
the paper by taking a closer look at the form of this bias in the context 
of a simplified version of L-P's wage-price model. 
Omitting constants and two exogenous variables L-P's model reduces to 
wt ' e11pt + B11Ut + vlt (4.1) 
Pt oc21wt + B21mt + v2t (4.2) 
all variables as above with all coefficients positive apart form B. 
Taking the simplest hypothesis we assume that the effects of a prices 
and incomes policy falls on oc, 1 and a21. 
Because we wish to focus on bias arising purely from endogenous 
policy we assume that appropriate instruments are used for pt and 
wt (pt 
and wt respectively) so that an L-P type exercise would amount to testing 
the significance of oc12 and a22 in the regressions 
t= apt 0c1A6t, + B11Ut + vlt (4.3) 
Pt = oc21wt + oc22Stwt + B21mt + v2t (4.4) 
where St is as above. 
We would expect oc12 and a22 to be negative as they represent a 
dampener on the impact of p on w through the influence of the incomes 
policy on trade union bargaining and of w on p through the effect of the 
prices policy on firms' price-cost margins. 
How would we expect the significance of oc12 and 0c22 to be affected if 
St was subject to feedback of the form 
(a) 6t=1 if pt>p* 
(b) St=O if pt<p* 
(4.5) 
where p* is a target level of inflation? 
The two equations in (4.5) endogenise the variables Stpt and Stwt. 
Asymptotic biases takes the standard form (when O. L. S. is applied to (4.3) 
and (4.4)); 
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Bcx APP 6PSP 6Pu 0 
(a) B«12 = 6g2p2 (Wu 6gpV1 
Bß 11 ll'uu 0 
-0 1ý 
(4.6) 
-^ AA.. -1 B°C21 d`ww Irw6 6wm 
2^2 (b) Ba 
22 = 
aS w ISwm 
[B21 
a 
where B denotes bias in the relevant subscripted variables, öxy denotes 
T 
lim 1/T xiyi and the R. H. S. matrices are symmetric. Focussing on Ba12 
T->w i =1 
and Ba22 we see that 
(a) B(x = (5 2'2) a'gpvl (4.7) 
and (b) B7(ge = (cWS2p2) TSmv2 
where ö'' and are the 2,2 elements of the inverse of the relevant right 
hand side matrices. Because these terms are diagonal elements of the 
inverses of positive definite matrices they are positive. Both öspvl and 
cySwv2 are positive so that 
B« 
12 
>0and Ba 
22 
>0 
T 
lim 1/T xiyi and the R. H. S. matrices are symmetric. Focussing on Bcx12 
T->w i =1 
and Ba22 we see that 
(a) BcK = (5 2'2) ca- 
12 vl (4.7) 
and (b) Bat = (cWS2p2) TSmv2 
where ö and ß are the 2,2 elements of the inverse of the relevant right 
hand side matrices. Because these terms are diagonal elements of the 
inverses of positive definite matrices they are positive. Both öSpvl and 
cySwv2 are positive so that 
This result suggests that if a prices and incomes policy successfully 
broke the wage-price relationship in (4.1) and (4.2) so that ot12 and ct22 
are negative then endogenous policy of the form of (4.5) may lead to an 
inference of policy impotence. 
A suggestion then is to use an instrument for S. In particular we 
suggest 
St=1ifpt>p* 
and St =0 if pt <p 
where pt is again a valid instrument for pt. 
Pt* however is unobserved and unless it can be inferred from the data 
or from extraneous information such as the often invaluable accounts of 
historical policy, then clearly the method fails. We may assert then that 
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knowledge of p is a necessary condition for identification of the true 
effects of policy on (4.1) and (4.2) as written in (4.3) and (4.4). This is 
not surprising since (4.3) and (4.4) is obviously an incomplete 
description of the generation of wages and prices. 
Finally by an exactly analagous argument the observed impact of 
policy is reduced if intercept rather than slope dummies are used to 
represent the effects of policy. It is not however, possible to make such 
definitive statements about the nature of the biases if both slope and 
intercept dummies are included (the full L-P method) as the forms for 
biases are complex and uninformative. 
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3. POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF R. E. 
3.1 Lucas' critique 
Possibly the most important and powerful critique of traditional 
policy analysis was made by Lucas (1976). In his influential paper he 
argues that unlike standard models R. E. models have structural parameters 
that vary directly with economic policy. His argument is easily seen in 
the context of a simple two equation model explaining a price level (p) 
and income (y); 
(a) pt =V+ Yyt + Bmt +u lt 
(1.1) 
(b) Yt = oý(pt-pe tIt-1) + yo + u2t 
yo is a constant representing a natural level of income and mt is the 
money stock. ult, ua are white noise errors and all variables are in 
logs. 
For simplicity assume that the money stock is under the direct 
control of the authorities and that a simple open loop policy is in 
operation so that 
Mt - mt-1 = mo + at (1.2) 
mo is obviously the rate of growth of the, money stock and Et is white 
noise. 
The quasi reduced form of (1.1) is 
(a) Pt = 11 + 
fl12Pte, 
t-1 + 
F113mt +v lt 
(b) Yt = '21 + R22Pte, t-1 +f 23mt +v lt 
(1.3) 
where 1111 = (YYp+V)/(1-ocY), 512 = -ocY/(1-aY), 
n13 
= B/(1-aY), 
r121 = y0'+oc(YYQ+V)/(1-aY), n122 = -of/(1-ocY), r123 = aB/(1-ocY), 
vlt = (Yu2t+ult)/(1-OCY), va (cult+u2t)/(1-aY) 
The model contains a static version of the Lucas supply function (1.1)(b) 
where output deviates from its natural level (yo) only when there are 
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mistakes in anticipating the price level (ignoring the structural 
disturbance term). If I=1 and Y=-1 then (1.1)(6) is simply a quantity 
theory of money equation where the velocity of circulation, (V) is 
constant. 
Solving (1.3) for pt and yt in terms of observables gives the reduced 
form 
(a) Pt =[1112(fT13mo+fl11)/(1-f12)]+[f12l13/(1-f12)]mt-1+fl13mt+vlt 
(1.4) 
(b) Yt =[I I22(i I13m0+1111)/(1-I 112) ]+[) I22I 113/(1-I 112) ]mt_l--I (23mtv2t 
Immediately we see that the reduced form parameters vary directly with 
monetary policy. 
In chapter two we discussed traditional policy analysis and saw that 
a standard technique of the pre R. E. era was the reduced form multiplier 
approach of Anderson and Jordan. Adopting this approach we would regress 
yt and pt on mt, mt_i and mt_2 as our theory suggests that these are the 
relevant reduced form variables. We would have, in this case the 
following model 
(a) pt =a+ bmt + cmt_j 
(1.5) 
(b) yt =d+ emt + fmt_, 
where a '"' denotes an OLS estimate. 
If the rate of monetary growth was constant over the period of the 
regression sample and equal to (say) mo then 
ac (l12T113mo+H11) / (1-fl12 ) 
bc n13 
cc fl121113/(1-(T12) 
dc yo - odT113mo (= Yo 123mo ) 
ec x"113(= 1123) 
fc 
-aT(13 (_ -112 3) 
denotes "is a consistent estimate of" 
To evaluate the effects of an announced and permanent monetary 
contraction to (say) ml, we would simulate (1.5) substituting values for mt 
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and mt_1 from the planned (tight) money trajectory. However at the 
instant the policy was implemented our estimated model (1.5) becomes 
invalid and redundant. The policy change of mo to m1 will shift the 
intercept term and a structural break will be observed. The policymaker 
following this procedure will be continually revising monetary targets as 
his estimates of policy multipliers are continually falsified. This was 
the main force of Lucas' paper that became the 'Lucas critique'. 
As a straightforward answer to this problem Wallis (1980) suggested 
that parameters associated with policy (and with exogenous variable 
processes) be separated from those associated with the economic structure. 
The latter, because they are behavioural parameters of private economic 
agents should be termed 'structural' parameters. A structure so defined is 
invariant to changes in policy and to changes in the structure of 
exogenous variables so that identifying them 
if... allows policy evaluation to proceed in the 
traditional manner. " 
Wallis (1980) 
In concluding his paper Lucas remarked that an implication of his 
analysis was that if policy was varied in a discretionary manner from 
period to period then we may never hope to infer anything about private 
economic behaviour. Put another way, unless policy makers confide with 
private agents to make policy forecastable, expectations of policy will be 
ill defined and the economic structure hard to identify. This would make 
policy analysis a vague and uncertain procedure. We certainly share this 
view. However, such a constraint in no way binds policy makers to a 
particular form of policy. In particular the constraint does nothing to 
advance the case against closed loop policy rules in favour of open loop, 
fixed rules. A closed loop rule may make policy just as predictable as an 
open loop rule as long as it is announced and explained. Further if 
agents see that the rule is adhered to then the policy can be made just as 
credible as a simpler fixed rule. 
We can conclude then by noting that if Lucas' closing remark 
"The preference for "rules versus authority" in economic 
policy making suggested by this point of view is not ... 
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based on any optimality properties of rules in general. ... 
The point is rather that this possibility {of authority) 
cannot in principle be sustained empirically. " (p. 141 of 
the paper. Brackets denote our words). 
was meant to suggest that because of his critique the scope for closed 
loop discretionary policy was severely limited and that as a result an 
open loop rule must be adopted we must reject this insinuation outright. 
3.2 Time inconsistent policies 
In their highly influential paper Kydland and Prescott (henceforth 
K-P) consider the problem of policy optimisation in a model which contains 
forward R. E. (K-P(1977)). The conclusions they draw have very serious 
implications for policy design. Their basic claim is that whereas in a 
non rational world there is scope for economic stabilisation using optimal 
control theory in a world where future R. E. are present the scope for such 
policy disappears and control theory is useless. They argue further that 
it... stabilisation may well be dangerous and it is best 
that it is not attempted. Reliance on policies such as a 
constant growth in the money supply and constant tax rates 
constitute a safer course of action. " 
K-P (1977) p. 487. 
These conclusions constitute a powerful attack on discretionary (closed 
loop) policy. 
Other economists, notably Sargent and Wallace (1972) and Lucas (1975) 
have constructed and advanced models in which discretionary policy is 
useless but as we shall see in the next section the force of their 
criticisms rests on the validity of the particular models that they 
advance. It is because K-P's proposition is independent of such 
considerations that it forms with Lucas' critique one of the two most 
important attacks on standard policy analysis. 
To expose their argument it is sufficient to use the simple model 
they present in section II of their paper (equations 2.1 to 2.3 below). 
W= w(x1, x2, n1, n2) (2.1) 
x1=F (Il1, ), (ý2 = rT2) (2.2) 112 
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X2 = g(x1, 
fl1, fl2) (2.3) 
w is a welfare function in terms of a policy instrument, fl and a state 
variable x. Subscripts 1 and 2 denote time periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
(2.1) states that not only are the targets of importance to the 
policymaker but also that there are welfare costs associated with the 
levels (and changes in the levels) of the instruments. Note that the 
system is deterministic so that the policy 112 is perfectly anticipated in 
period 1. The more interesting stochastic case is discussed below. 
K-P go on to define a consistent policy solution to the model: 
"A policy 11 is consistent if, for each time period t, fl 
maximises (2.1) taking as given previous decisions, ... and 
that future policy decisions are similarly selected". 
op cit p. 475. 
It is clear from this definition that consistency requires that the 
policy H be derived by dynamic programming methods. 
The consistent plan then must set fl2 such that (2.1) is maximised 
given the past decisions j11 and given x1. Explicitly, 52 must be the 
solution to 
dw I= dw dg + dw =0 
dý2 IX 1ii1 dX 2 dfl2 
T2 
(2.4) 
Because the consistent policy ignores the influence of 'tomorrow's' 
policy (A2) on 'today's ' state (x1) it is suboptimal. In the second time 
period the policy maker will wish to abandon the plans for R2 that were 
made in period 1 because (to his surprise) his plan for n2 has changed 
period one's state. A truly optimal policy would take this into account. 
Explicitly, T12 should be the solution to 
dw dg + dw + df dw + dw dg =0 (2,5) 
dx 2 dx 
i dx2 dý2 dT'2 diý2 
Ldx 
1 
The reason why (2.4) is adopted by policy makers in preference to (2.5) K-P 
argue, is that there is no mechanism to force future policy makers (the 
people responsible for setting 112 in period 2) to take into account the 
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effects of their action (in period 22) on the outcome of the current 
period. In other words, period 1 will be history as far as the planners in 
period 2 are concerned and policy for the current and future periods may 
be revised away from the initial plan. The optimal policy (2.5) is 
therefore said to be time inconsistent. 
We defer answers to K-P's critique to the next section. Suffice to 
say for the present that if expectations rely on policy announcements then 
the necessity to make these announcements would itself guarantee that in 
the future, policy makers would not cheat or renege on previously planned 
policy. For this reason the optimal policy in (2.5) will not be revised 
and the time inconsistency of the policy is removed. 
To close this section we note that to have R. E. is not sufficient to 
induce time inconsistency. Referring to our simple example, the optimal 
value of 11, must satisfy 
dw df + dw + dw dg + dw dg df =0 
dx1 ý1 dý1 dx2 L1 dx2 dx1 dIý1 
If there are no direct instrument costs except in the terminal 
(second) period then dw/d111=0. Further, if the function g was directly 
independent of [I, (dg/dfl1-0) so that the current state is not directly 
influenced by lagged policy, a not too unreasonable assumption then this 
condition becomes 
df dw + dw dg =0 
di-P, Li dx2 dxi 
The term in square braces is the same as that in (2.5) and is equal to 
zero in this special case. This leaves the optimal solution for P2 from 
(2.5) identical to the consistent solution for T12 from (2.4). The problem 
of time inconsistency disappears. This result holds for the general n- 
period case (see for example Buiter (1979)). 
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3.3 An answer to K-P's critique 
Buiter (1981) and Driffill (1980) have argued that the deterministic 
model used by K-P is uninteresting and even misleading. 
It is uninteresting because 
"... it is uncertainty and the fact that the economy is 
continuously subjected to unexpected shocks which provides 
the need for stabilisation policy". 
Driffill (1980) 
It is misleading because in the presence of unpredictable shocks there is 
scope for discretionary or interventionist policy. The suggestion 
advanced by Buiter and Driffill was that the policy plan should feedback 
from future unpredictable events. In this way, agents are unable to 
adjust current plans to (the stochastic part of) future policy in the way 
that K-P say they can simply because the feedback part of future policy is 
unpredictable. 
To expose their arguments we consider the following model from 
Driffell's paper 
92 e yt Ayt-1 + Boxt +. B 
-1+ 
ut (3.1 ) 
yt and xt are vectors of state and control (instrument) variables and ut 
is a vector of independently distributed disturbances. A, BQ and B1 are 
conformable and known parameter matrices and the information set includes 
all policy plans made at time t-1 and all variables dated t-1 and earlier. 
The policy objective is to choose xt so as to minimise 
WO =LZ yt'Ktyt3e10 (3.2) 
t_1 
The suggestion then is to plan the following policy for time r 
T-1 
XT XTIO + 
tý1 
YT1u1 (3-3) 
The first term in (3.3) is deterministic and represents the plan for 
period T made at the start of the planning horizon. This policy cannot be 
determined recursively by dynamic programming. This is because it 
explicitly recognises the dependency of current outcomes on future policy 
thus violating the optimality principle, the time recursiveness that 
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dynamic programming exploits. As we noted above credibility requires that 
this deterministic plan is rigidly adhered to. This component will not be 
revised therefore. The second part of (3.3) represents the response to 
innovations that occur between time 0 and T. The y coefficients have 
subscript T to emphasise the fact that at each and every time period this 
response component is revised in the light of the new information that has 
become available. 
To get a feeling for how this optimal policy is determined, using 
(3.3) we can solve (3.6) as follows 
et Yt = Yt 10 t pt u (3. L ) T T-1 
where 
el0 AtY0 
tT 
+ .1ZA yt Birk+il0 k=1 i=0 
is the deterministic part of yt itself the sum of a policy independent 
component and a deterministic policy induced component and where 
t t -k - Bi y el+ At-T for T=1-t-1 ýT _ k= -z T+1 A i= O01 ktl T 
and 
ntt =I 
are the matrix weights for each time period assigned to the innovations in 
the stochastic innovation-dependent part of the policy. 
Substituting (3.4) into (3.2) gives the unconstrained problem: 
max Wp =t- [yt'e, OKtyteIO + (T. 
1l 
u! TuT)eIO] 
This problem is exactly analagous to that of chapter 2, section 1. As we 
did then we can minimise W in two stages dealing with its deterministic 
and stochastic parts in turn. The former problem is 
T 
min 
t- 
yttelp Kt ytel0 
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with respect to x1e 10, .... xTIO 
and the latter problem is 
Tt 
min Z( >- uT atT kt eý0 
t-1 T-1 
ýtT UT) 
with respect to the parameter sets YtT (t=1.... T, T=1 .... t-1 ). 
The beauty of the stochastic component is that although it is 
determined in a mechanical way, the policy revisions are unpredictable 
before they occur. The policy makers are seen therefore to be acting in a 
rational manner, maintaining credibility and, of course the ability to 
revise plans in a discretionary manner. 
Although this problem is not subject to traditional dynamic 
programming techniques it is a standard optimal control problem. As we 
might expect therefore, the standard result on dominance applies. The 
rule that allows reaction to stochastic news as it becomes apparent and 
that also controls the mean path of the economy dominates the rule that 
only controls the latter. Closed loop feedback rules achieve a lower 
expected loss than do fixed deterministic open loop rules. This result 
contradicts K-P's conclusions that 
"... policy makers should follow rules rather than have 
discretion ... " 
and that 
"... there is no way control theory can be made applicable 
to economic planning when expectations are rational". 
K-P were led to these conclusions by considering a deterministic model. 
In such a world there is no 'news' upon which policy may be revised. 
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3.4 The neutrality of anticipated policy 
K-P have not been the only critics of discretionary policy. Other 
authors have advanced the view that closed loop stabilisation policy has 
no bearing on the real economy when this policy is anticipated. This 
assertion can be stated formally in the context of a partially solved 
reduced form of a linear R. E. model due to Barro (1977). 
IeT 
Yt =A 1Zt +iö Bi (Xt-i - Xt-i lt-i) + i-ýO 
CiXt-i + Ut 
(4.1) 
yt, xt and zt are vectors of endogenous variables, instruments and 
predetermined and exogenous variables respectively. ut is a vector of 
white noise error terms. 
(4.1) is the partial solution to a more general R. E. model. The 
question as to whether or not such a solution will exist in general is 
addressed below. 
The effect of an anticipated increase of xt_i on yt is 
dyyt + dyt Ci 
e dxt_i + dxt_1't-i 
The new classical school of economists assert that 
Ci =0 Vi 
that is that anticipated policy has no influence on real economic 
variables (yt). In this section we wish to make the point that this 
impotence of anticipated policy has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
presence of R. E. Rather it is a feature of the way in which these models 
are constructed. More explicitly, elements of the matrices in (4.1) are 
subject to restrictions which are the implication of some a priori 
economic theory. 
All this may at first seem obvious. However a proliferation of 
models emerged in the 1970's in which policy (primarily monetary policy) 
had no impact on real behaviour. The models of Barro (1977), Lucas (1975) 
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and Sargent and Wallace (1975) are notable members of this class. This in 
turn led to counter examples where the scope for policy did exist and it 
was this fragmented debate that provoked Pagan (1980) to construct 
generalised and formal theories on the existence of economic policy when 
R. E. are present. The paper is general and rigorous in its approach and so 
we restate the essence of-his argument below. For a rigorous treatment of 
the matter the reader is referred to the actual paper. 
Focus is on deterministic models so that it is the expected mean path 
of the state variables that are the targets of policy. We start with 
models in which there are no predetermined variables and define the 
existence of policy to be the ability to achieve m targets by the setting 
of m instruments. The existence of policy in this context depends on the 
existence of a mapping from instrument space to target space and on the 
form of this mapping. In particular if xt is a vector of m instruments and 
yt is a vector of K targets and if yt and xt are related by the mapping 
yt = fixt + bt (4.2) 
(bt is a vector of exogenous variables), then policy exists 
iff e([I)>K (4.3) 
where P denotes rank. 
The question of the existence of such a mapping in the presence of 
R. E. (a question raised above) is answered for a general dynamic model in 
Theorem 8 on p. 27 of his paper. Broadly speaking the proof states that 
such a mapping must exist in order that R. E. of the endogenous variables be 
defined. 
The parameter matrix 11 will be a matrix function of the structural 
parameter matrices. The existence of policy then depends on the 
restrictions imposed on these structural parameter matrices. 
To take a concrete example, consider the model 
yt = Axt + Bytelt_1 (4.4) 
(we have suppressed the exogenous variables as it adds to simplicity 
without affecting the argument). The solution to (4.4) is a simple 
problem (see Wallis (1980)) and is achieved as follows: 
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yt = Axt + Bye lt_1 => yetlt_1 = Axet1t_i + Byetlt_i 
_> ytlt_1 = (I-B)-1 AXtit-1 
=> yt = Axt + B(I-B)-1 Axtlt-1 
Because the model is deterministic, policy is likewise deterministic so 
that 
XteIt-1 ' Xt 
and 
yt = (A+B(I-B)-1A)xt = (I-B)-1Axt 
is the solution to (4.4). 
(4.5) 
Note that we have assumed that (I-B)-1 exists. If it does not the 
R. E. vector ytejt_1 is not defined. Note also the nonsingularity of (I-B) 
guarantees the existence of a mapping from xt to yt. Assuming that the 
whole vector yt is targetted then the condition (4.5) is 
e[(I-B)-1A] = P(A)>K 
and this is independent of whether or not R. E. enter (4.4) (that is, 
independent of whether B is a matrix of zeros or not). 
To press his argument further Pagan shows that a simplified version 
of McCallum's wage-price-output model (McCallum (1979)) can be written in 
the form of (4.4) and then proceeds to show that the restrictions McCallum 
places on the counterpart of our matrix A is the root cause of the failure 
of monetary policy to exist. In his model McCallum's a priori 
restrictions on A make it rank deficient. 
The existence of policy in dynamic models with (forward) R. E. is a 
more difficult concept. Instead of being able to achieve a particular 
target as in the static case the existence of policy is defined in terms 
of being able to achieve a target path. Again existence of policy depends 
on the existence of a mapping of the targets onto the instruments (this is 
guaranteed by theorem 8) and on the rank of the matrix premultiplying the 
vector of instruments in this, mapping. Again the mere presence of R. E. on 
its own has no bearing on this condition and is therefore neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for the failure of policy to exist. 
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The introduction of unpredictable stochastic terms opens a new 
dimension to policy. Even if models are constructed in such a way that 
anticipated policy fails to achieve an expected target path, in a 
stochastic world the variance of the target may be influenced by policy. 
This policy will always exist even in the class of models proposed by the 
New Classical School because such policy is related to unpredictable 
shocks and is therefore always unanticipated. 
Finally even when (4.2) holds for the class of models in (4.1) policy 
may still exist. The argument is advanced by Buiter (1980) and relies on 
asymetric information. Broadly speaking, if economic agents are slower to 
perceive a policy than the authorities are at setting it then policy will 
exist. For full details of this argument the reader is referred to the 
original paper. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We have shown in this chapter that despite vigorous claims to the 
contrary the superiority of discretionary rules over fixed (open loop) 
rules is unaffected by the existence of R. E. forward or current. The case 
advanced by the New Classical Macroeconomics School in favour of open loop 
policy rests purely on the a priori restrictions placed on their models by 
their economic theory. The existence of R. E. in itself has no bearing on 
the matter. 
This is all very comforting in terms of' the usefulness of the 
following chapters. We can now proceed to- grapple with the methodological 
issues raised by R. E. and in particular the problems posed for estimation, 
(chapter six), testing (chapter seven) and numerical simulation (chapters 
four and five). 
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4. MULTIPLE SOLUTIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE IN SIMULATING MODELS 
CONTAINING FORWARD R. E. 
4.1 The problem of multiple solutions. 
The problem of multiple solutions in models containing forward R. E. 
is now well known. Efficient estimation, the use of powerful tests and 
policy simulations, three crucial procedures in policy analysis all 
require a unique solution in terms of observables for all the endogenous 
variables. The existence of a continuum of solutions in R. E. models then 
undermines the whole feasibility of policy analysis against the 
background of the hypothesis. 
In this section we review the problem in the light of Blanchard 
(1978), and Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1982). (Henceforth the 
latter shall be referred to as G. LM. ). 
The analysis in this literature focuses on the single equation 
p (1.1) ' ocPe t t+1 + Mt + 
where p is the price level, m the outstanding nominal money stock and 'e' 
denotes an expectation. The usual R. E. assumption employed is 
Pt+1 'E (pt+1 lflt ) 
where fit is an information set containing current exogenous variables, 
past values of p and m and the model in (1.1). The assumption of a current 
information set is made purely in accordance with the literature and the 
analysis is equally valid with a set dated at (say) t-1. 
(1.1) is the reduced form of a system of structural equations and it 
describes euilibrium in the money market. In accordance with the 
literature our analysis shall also focus on (1.1) but there are more 
compelling reasons for its consideration. It is easy to show that many 
linear models with forward R. E. can be reduced to a form or forms such as 
(1.1). As an example consider the system 
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Yt + Ayt_1 + Bye+1It + Cxt + ut =0 (1.2) 
where A and B are nxn matrices of full rank, C is an nxk matrix and ut a 
vector of (quasi) reduced form errors. 
(1.2) may be written as 
zit ' 1i. Zit+11t + Cixt + uiti = 1, ... n 
where 1, are the diagonal elements of A in the matrix decomposition 
InA-1-B0 0I 
P/ýP-1 == 
In 00I 
L_A_1B 
-A-1 
Zit are the elements of the vector 
Y 
P-, 
t (P is a matrix of eigenvectors) 
Yt-1 
and cixt and uit are the respective elements of 
0 01 Xt 
^0 
In t 
p-1 and P-1 
-A-1 CO 0 A-1 -A-1 ut 
We now set about solving (2.1). Blanchard (1978) uses the method of 
undetermined coefficients due to Muth (1960) in solution of (1.1). 
Writing a general solution gives 
LID (D 
(1.3) pt = aimt-i + )mt + i=1cimt+ilt 
+ Ut 
i=1 
Leading (1.3) one period 
and taking expectations gives 
Q2 m 
Pt+11t =. aimt_i+1 + t+l (t + cimt+i+1 
It (1.4) 
i=1 i=1 
Substituting (1.3) into (1.1) and equating coefficients with those in (1.3) 
gives 
(i) a1 = ()-1)/a 
(ii) ai = ocai+l i=1,... m 
(iii) c1 = a). (1.5) 
(iv) Ci = oo_1Ci+1 i=1,... ® 
and we see immediately that the general solution is indeterminate. There 
are a continuum of solutions and all of them are parameterised by ),. 
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Heuristically this indeterminacy arises because from (1.1) the market 
at time t has to determine (the expected path of) current and future 
prices so that however far forward the time horizon is taken there will 
always be one market (clearing condition) too few to determine a unique 
price path. We return to this question of the source of the indeterminacy 
below. 
Writing the general solution in (1.2) as 
Pt = TptF + (1-)JPtB (1.6) 
where 
(1.7) PtF = mt +2o: lmt+iIt + Ut 
Pt 
a) i-I 
=-Z a-lmt-i + ut (1.8 ) i=1 
we see that the set of solutions in (1.3) can be expressed as a linear 
combination of the well-known "forward" and "backward" solutions. 
The approach (above) of Blanchard has been criticised in the 
subsequent work of G-L-M. Couching the problem in a more general 
framework they expose the deficiencies of this solution method. In 
particular it is noted that when expectations of more than one step ahead 
occur then both "forward" and "backward" solutions may fail to exist 
invalidating (1.3) or (1.6) as a solution. In return we must note that 
models of this kind may have representations in terms of canonical 
variables in the form of (1.1) and at least one solution must exist. The 
point is taken however that the solution method lacks generality because 
it does not necessarily provide the complete set of solutions. In 
response to this G. L. M. propose a general method of solution based on 
standard difference equation techniques. We briefly outline the method 
here. For a full treatment the reader is referred to G. L. M. 's paper itself. 
The general solution for Pt may be written as 
Pt = PtP + a-tMt 
where PtP is a particular solution to (1.1) and Mt is any martingale 
process (see Doob (1953) ). G. L. M. provide specific examples when the x- 
process is of AR, MA and mixed ARMA form. As an immediate example consider 
the AR(1) process for mt 
Mt = Pmt-1 + St jp1<1, @t is white noise. 
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The particular solution in this case is 
PtP = Zt/1-Pa Fý1 
and this exists for all oc and e" Any martingale forms a solution to the 
homogenous equation 
Pt = ocPt+1 It 
so that this time the solution is not parameterised by a constant but by 
the specification of the martingale process. The crucial point here is 
that each of the solutions implies different behaviour. Focussing on the 
solutions in (1.7) and (1.8) we see that under (1.7) current price is 
independent of current unanticipated changes in the nominal money stock 
whereas the opposite is true in (1.8). 
At this stage we might suspect that the model (1.1) is poorly 
specified and in some sense incomplete. We may even be tempted to assert 
that well specified models-and in particular those built on a choice 
theoretic base would not suffer such problems. To examine this assertion 
we turn to describe one such choice theoretic model due to Mirrlees 
(1968). 
Under an assumption of perfect foresight (an assumption which 
coincides with R. E. in a non-stochastic economy), profit and utility 
maximisation, and full arbitrage in assets markets, Mirrlees derives a set 
of (two) behavioural relationships describing an equilibrium growth 
process in a two sector model in discrete time. 
The model is one of overlapping generations where consumers leave and 
receive no bequests, work for a period, live for one further period and 
(for further simplicity) have homothetic preferences. The two sectors 
produce capital and consumption goods respectively. The two equations 
describing equilibrium growth are 
WtS(Fk(Pt+1)) = Pt(Fp(Pt, Kt)+Kt) (1.9) 
(1+n)Kt+1 = Fp(Pt'Kt) (1.10) 
with Pt+1 = Pt+1 (perfectly foreseen capital gains) and where 
Wt is the wage rate per worker, 
S is the proportion of income saved, 
n is the rate of population growth, 
P is the price of a unit of capital relative to the 
52 
consumption good whose price is unity 
K is the real capital stock per man, and 
F= F(P, K) = Max(p. y: (y, k)6. Y} 
where Y is a convex and bounded per capita production set. 
The first equation describes equilibrium in the assets market with 
savings (on the L. H. S. ) being just sufficient to finance next period's 
captial stock. The average propensity to save, s, is a function of the 
marginal product of capital which in equilibrium growth is equal to the 
rate of return on assets. Note that as a result of there being no 
bequeathals or bequests saving can only take place out of current wages 
earned during the first period of life. The second equation is the 
equilibrium constraint for the real side of the economy. Note that Fp is 
the output of the captial good sector because at a profit maximising 
optimum 
max Y=F= P(K) + 1. C 
(where C is the consumption good whose price is normalised to unity, and K 
is production of K) and so this second equation is a technological 
constraint on the evolution of the capital stock. 
Although the model is in descrete time a phase diagram is still a 
useful illustrative (though not rigorous) tool for tracing the 
equilibrium paths for K and P. The stationery locus for K (Kt+1°Kt) is 
defined from (1.9) as 
nk = Fp 
and that for p from (1.10) as 
(1.11) 
(F-KFk)s(Fk) = p(Fp+K) (1.12) 
(The first term in (1.12) is the difference between the value of output per 
head and rental returns on capital per head and is therefore just w). 
We shall see below that the growth process depicted in Figure 4.1 is 
possible. In the diagram K1 is capital in sector 1 (consumption goods) 
and K2 is capital in sector 2 (capital goods). From (1.12) if (pt, kt) lies 
above ABC (the stationery locus for capital) then the capital stock is 
growing (Kt+1 >Kt )" Providing that 
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REPRESENTATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH PROCESS 
i 
I 
K 
0 
E' 
K(=K1 +K2) 
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Fkp < -1 and Sfk >0 [6] 
then from (1.11) if (pt, Kt) lies to the left of DBE (the stationery locus 
for prices) then prices are rising (i. e. pt+1>pt)" The second condition in 
(1.13) requires that the savings propensity rise with the rate of interest 
(equal to fk) and is thus reasonable. The first condition in (1.13) 
however requires that output of capital must be lower the higher its price 
and this requires some justification. There will be two forces at work 
here. The higher its own price the more profitable capital production 
will be. On the other hand the higher the price is the greater is the cost 
of the capital input for any extra production (given an exogenous labour 
force). If the amount of captial per man employed is already relatively 
great so that its marginal product is relatively low then this second 
effect may outweigh the first by a sufficient margin to give the desired 
inequality. Finally then the relative slopes of the two stationery loci 
as drawn holds providing that 
1+ sFpk >0 or Fpk > -1/s 
and from our arguments above this is a clear possibility. 
Having established that Figure 4.1 is a plausible description of 
equilibrium growth derived from a choice theoretic model we must reject 
out earlier assertion that non-uniqueness in R. E. models arises only in 
poorly specified models. From the diagram given an initial capital stock 
K0 we see that any path with initial price in the range pp' to poll 
satisfies the equilibrium conditions. Further, many other well specified 
economic models have the same property. (See for example, Calvo (1977)). 
We must conclude therefore that the problem lies not with the models 
but at the very roots of the R. E. hypothesis itself. It is the latter that 
is "poorly specified" and incomplete. Without further investigation of 
the process by which R. E. are formed (the so called 'learning process') 
this incompleteness will remain as will the problem of multiple 
solutions. [71 The literature in this area is very scant and due to the 
difficulty of formulating a model for (unobservable) expectation 
formation it is likely to remain so in the near future. The seriousness 
----------------- -- 
[61 Derivation of these conditions is tedious and uninformative and so is 
not presented here. 
[7] One possible direction for such an investigation would be the 
description of the evolution of R. E. in a Bayesian context. 
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of the problem for policy analysis has already been noted above so that in 
the absence of such detailed research described in the preceeding 
paragraph some medium term answers must be found. 
In the next section therefore we analyse some current practices and 
some solutions to the problem in the context of policy analysis and in the 
conclusion to that section we propose an alternative procedure based on 
the data. 
4.2 Current practice and terminal conditions. 
Current practice in policy analysis in large macro models in this 
context is dominated by the methodology of Minford (1978), Holly (1980), 
Fair (1979), etc. which involves the imposition of a terminal condition 
on a numerical solution to the model. Their procedures form the focus 
of this section. 
Before we turn to this we must first revise some non-numerical 
suggestions put forward to identify a unique solution in such models. 
If we invoke stationarity in (1.1) [8] whilst maintaining the 
assumption of an AR(1) process for mt we can distinguish two distinct 
possibilities dependent on the value of a. 
(i) jai<$; in this case the only stationary solution is the forward solution 
which we may recall is 
ptf = pt = 1/(1-ocp) mt +ut (2.1) 
In terms of the general solution of G-L-M the martingale in this case is 
forced by the stationority condition to be a sequence of zeros. 
(ii) ýxI>j; in this case the general solution is an infinite one-sided MA 
process and the complete set of stationary solutions is provided by a 
linear combination of two particular solutions (G-L-M). Taking the 
forward and backward solutions (which may be represented as one-sided 
infinite M. A. 's) as our two particular solutions gives the set of solutions 
as 
-------------------- 
[8] Note that stationarity is a pre-requisite for likelihood estimation. 
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Pt = -a- mt + 
L, -L) mt_l + Ut (2.2) 
1-ap a-L 
so that ), parameterises a continuum of solutions. 
We see then that a priori information about a may or may not be 
sufficient to give a unique solution when stationarity is invoked. 
Consistency with a priori economic theory has been put forward by 
Sargent and Wallace (1973) as a way out of the problem. Citing our money 
market example they note that in the forward solution 
"(it is) the price level at each moment (which) adjusts 
instantaneously in order to ensure that the real balances 
people hold equal the amount they would like to hold" 
and thus argue that the forward solution is more satisfactory at least in 
this case. 
A related argument advanced by Burmeister, Flood and Turnousky (1978) 
says that because only current and future dated variables enter (1.1) none 
of which necessarily depend on the past, the forward solution may be 
chosen. 
Whilst arguments such as these are at best contentious (see Blanchard 
(1978) for a full exposition) they have led to undue consideration of the 
forward solution in the R. E. literature. Wallis (1980), Ravenkar (1981) 
and Schmidt (1982) for example focus exclusively on the latter in their 
discussion of forward R. E. 's. 
Finally we note one further solution criterion, namely that of 
predictive power. Using the results in G-L-M we note that for iah>) the k- 
step ahead prediction error satisfies the equality 
et(k) = 
ft(k) 
+ (1-N)eBt(k) 
where of and eB are the respective prediction errors of the forward and 
backward solutions. The suggestion put forward in ad hoc forms by earlier 
authors [9] but generalised by G-L-M is to choose the solution that 
minimises 
[9] See for example Taylor (1977). 
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02(k) = Var(et(k)) = Var(t(k) + (1-)ý)et(k)) (2.3) 
The X that minimises (2.3) is given as 
= dg (k) - (5-, (k)/ (k) + 
4(k) 
- z6FB(k) 
where 6F = Var(etF(k)), d = Var(etB(k)) and 
F dFB(k) = Cov(et(k), etB(k)) 
This general selection procedure incorporates as a special case that 
of Taylor (1977) who suggests choosing the price path with minimum 
variance. This is because 
lim d2(k) = Var (pt) 
k4w 
and minimising the L. H. S. in this limiting case minimises the R. H. S. 
Rather than impose one of the analytical solutions above the common 
practice in current policy analysis is to obtain a set of consistent 
structural estimates using a limited information method and then simulate 
the model with a terminal condition imposed on one or more of the 
endogenous variables dated outside the forecast horizon. This procedure 
has been proposed and used notably by Minford (1978) and Holly and 
Beenstock (1980) in the U. K. and Fair (1979) in the U. S. A. against the 
background of the L. I. T. P., L. B. S. and Fair (1976) models respectively. 
To solve the indeterminacy problem, numerical solution paths are 
forced through a point at some time t+N. The terminal value chosen varies. 
In arguing that terminal conditions in macro models are exactly analagous 
to transversality conditions in micro models where dynamic optimisation 
is involved, Minford proposes that the terminal condition(s) for the 
(expectation(s) of the) endogenous variable(s) be their equilibrium 
solution from the model. (We interpret 'equilibrium solution' to mean 
'steady state solution' in line with Minford and Holly). 
"... the terminal condition is exactly analagous to the 
transversality conditions in micro-economics which provide 
the necessary condition for an optimum". 
Whilst accepting Minford's analogy H-B see difficulties in practice 
in obtaining a steady state solution from typical nonlinear models and so 
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propose the condition that at some future date t+N the expected change in 
the endogenous variables will be zero. 
We shall return to the analogy between terminal and transversality 
conditions below but presently we shall focus on the affect of these two 
terminal conditions on the solution to our model in (1.1). 
We assume that m follows a simple AR(1) process with parameter e and 
that the world is stationary. Recall that there are two distinct cases 
here; fad<` in which case prices follow (2.1) and ja1>1 where prices follow 
(2.2). 
Minford's terminal condition in either case would be 
NIt -P=0 (say) (2.4) Pt+e 
Using this in (1.1) and solving backwards gives 
Pt+N-1 It - aPt+NIt + mt+N-1 
It 
' mt+N-1 
It 
Pt+N-2It = amt+N-1 It + mt+N-21t 
ee lt ie Pt+n-n lt = Pt ýt = Pt-ýt 
i? ý 
a mt+i it 
or Pt = 1-(ap)N Mt + Vt (2.5) 
1-ap 
Taking the case jai<1 first (in (2.1) ), although (2.5) violates (2.1) 
if N is sufficiently large they are approximately the same. 
H-B would use the terminal condition 
ee Pt+NIt - Pt+N+1 It 
using (1.1) gives 
Pt+N lt a Pt+N+l lt + mT+N lt 
and so 
Pt+N+1 It = Pt+N It = mt+N It/ 1-a 
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Using this in (1.1) and substituting backwards gives 
Pt+N-11t 7 (a/1-a) mt+NIt + mt+n-1lt 
£ t+N-21t = (a2/1-a) mt+Ntt + amt+N-1 It + mt+N-2; t 
Pt+N-Nlt - Pte Pt-vt (aN/1-a) mt 
N 
+NIt + lýýalmt+ilt 
(ae)N 1-(ap)N-1 
or Pt = ----- + ------ Mt + vt 
1-a 1-ae 
(2.6) 
Again if ja1<1 this approximates (2.1) well for a sufficiently large 
value of N. 
So we see that in the case where invoking stationarity yields a 
determinate solution for sufficiently large N the two terminal conditions 
described give this (forward) solution fairly accurately. 
Turning to the more interesting case where invoking stationarity 
fails to give a determinate solution, the relevant comparison is now 
with (2.2). A glance at (2.2) reveals that there is no value for ) for 
which (2.5) or (2.6) is an exact solution. Even if )h1, the most favourable 
case, because ja1>1,1ý1 would have to be very small indeed for (2.5) or (2.6) 
to approximate (2.2) well. For V the situation is even worse since not 
only would the impact multipliers be wrongly estimated but the infinite 
distributed lag response of prices to money in (2.2) would be totally 
ignored. 
Forcing an absolute steady state N periods in the future then would. 
typically truncate a distributed lag response (for > that is) and an 
'equilibrium' type response is observed. This is interesting since it 
implies that whilst a model with (say) a long run neutrality property may 
have the potential for exhibiting fluctuating economic activity in the 
short run, the imposition of a terminal condition will suppress this 
potential. 
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Further, we see no reason why this result should not carry over to 
models with either more than one forward R. E. term and/or more than one 
endogenous variable (i. e. simultaneous models). In either case the system 
is representable in terms of canonical variables as a set of separable 
equations like (1.1) and forcing the endogenous variables into on absolute 
steady state at t+N also forces these canonical variables into a steady 
state since they are just linear combinations of the former. 
The above analysis also provides an explanation of Minford's 
numerical result that simulated endogenous variable paths are relatively 
insensitive to the choice of N the terminal date. A glance at (2.5) and 
(2.6) above shows this insensitivity clearly. 
We now turn to the theoretical basis of terminal conditions namely 
that they are the macro analogy of transversality conditions and to this 
end we briefly review the role of the latter in microeconomics. 
Consider the intertemporal optimisation problem of a utility 
maximising agent. For an individual starting a T-period life in period 1 
and earning income from the sale of an exogenous labour endowment. 
T_ 
max a= 
t>-1 
Ut (Yt, gt) s. t. Yt+1 = Yt - qt + wt+l and yj=y 
Or in Lagrangean form this is 
T 
max L=I [Ut (yt, gt) + )`t (yt+1 - yt + qt - wt+1 t=1 
where yt is income at time t consisting of savings and constant wage 
income (wt) and qt is the value of consumption. 
The F. O. C. are 
(i) dL . dU +0 
(t = 1-ýT) 
dqt dqt 
(ii) dL _ ±_ ý-). +\-1 '0 (t 2-T) 
dyt dyt 
(iii) dL 
(2.7) 
t- -ytýtýt+l =0 
(t c 14T) 
dXt 
with (iv) y, =y 
We now have only 3T equations to solve for 3T+1 variables (namely Al 
->)T, g1->qT and Y1->YT+1)" The final or terminal value of income (YT+1) is 
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indeterminate and so the intuitively plausible restriction is invoked 
that the consumer must plan to have no income after his death. That is 
that 
YT+1 -0 
This is called a transversality condition since it allows us to 
'transverse' individual decisions and aggregate over many agents born at 
different dates. If the utility function is of a 'convenient' form an 
aggregate closed form expression may be derived describing the evolution 
of (say) aggregate income or savings over time independent of any 
generation. It is often the case however that such optimisation problems 
have only numerical solutions. In this case a macro equation (aggregate 
decision rule) corresponding to the situation in (2.7) may be interpreted 
as some form of approximation. Either way transversality conditions are 
'used up' in the derivation of such macro rules (implicitly in the case of 
the approximation and explicitly in the case of the closed form solution) 
and are not available for invokation at some later stage of the analysis, 
Minford's analogy then is somewhat surprising. 
As a specific example for the R. E. case consider the growth model in 
section 1. Recall that the individual's problem was to maximise utility 
for the two periods of his life working in the first but not in the second. 
The assumption of no bequests gives us an initial condition like (2.7) and 
the assumption of no bequeathals gave us a transversality condition like 
(2.8). This latter with the initial condition enabled us to write the 
generation independent equation (1.9) describing the evolution of savings 
and thus capital through time in equilibrium growth. (Recall that this 
equation simply said that all current outstanding financial assets needed 
for the current capital stock had to come from current savings, a direct 
consequence of the transversality condition of no bequeathals). 
Referring to the diagram illustrating the growth process we conclude that 
the transversality condition was required to draw it in the first place 
and invoking it again is of no consequence for the solution. We must note 
however that invoking a terminal condition such as 
Pt+N =p 
is of consequence as it gives us a determinate path in the diagram. This 
terminal condition is not the transversality condition here and in general 
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will not be in any model. Indeed if it were it would be impotent as a 
device to obtain a determinate solution in models containing forward R. E. 
Clearly then justification of terminal conditions may not be given by 
an analogy with transversality conditions. The interpretation of 
terminal conditions that we are left with is vacuous. They simply force 
the model into a steady state at some point in time t+N and so arbitrarily 
choose a solution. 
This conclusion is hardly surprising since we saw in section 1 that 
the indeterminacy in R. E. models lies at the roots of the hypothesis and 
not the model. Invoking a condition for a determinate solution that 
pertains to the formulation of the latter and not the former is therefore 
an arbitrary way to proceed. 
What possibilities are we left with then? We saw at the beginning of 
this section that one possibility is to invoke a solution on the grounds 
of consistency with a priori economic reasoning. Such is Taylor's 
procedure of imposing a minimum variance condition on a price path. We 
have noted however that any such a priori reasoning is eminently open to 
challenge. What is not subject to controversy however is the data itself. 
Since it is the data that are a product of economic behaviour a solution 
consistent with the former must be consistent with the latter and we 
therefore propose that the solution (if identified) be jointly estimated 
with the parameters of the model. 
We consider for this purpose identification and estimation of the 
system 
yt - Ayt+l It + Cxt + Vt (2.8 ) 
where A and C are gxg and gxk matrices and v, y and x are gxl, gxl and kx1 
vectors respectively. For simplicity we assume that A is of full rank 
although the analysis is equally valid when this is not so. We also 
assume separate AR(p) processes for each element of the exogenous variable 
vector x, with lag polynomials c1.... 
We may write the quasi reduced form in (2.8) in terms of observables 
by parameterising all the solutions to (2.8) by the gxg diagonal matrix Xg 
to get 
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yt = [BXgG(L) + B[Ig->]LH(L)]xt + vt (2.9) 
where 
H(L) = [gij(ai-L)-1] i=l->g, j=1, k, 
with [qij] = B-1C and >g = X, 0 
0 
B= [bik] is the matrix of eigen vectors and ai the eigenvalues of A 
and C(L) is a lag polynomial matrix representing the 'forward solution' 
component and therefore of order p-1. 
The issue of FIML estimation is taken up in full in chapter 6. For 
the present we discuss an estimation procedure that may be more 
computationally simple. 
Conceivably we could estimate the parameters of the likelihood 
function corresponding to (2.9) i. e. 
max L(yt, ))3, ai, bijlxt, Qm) (2.10) 
s. t. X, =I iff Jaij<j i=1->g, j=1-ßg and m=14k 
Because of the strange restriction in (2.10) this likelihood function 
is highly discontinuous in the neighbourhood of )ý, =Jaij=1 and in practice 
this may cause numerical problems. 
We therefore suggest a two stage procedure. Firstly, to obtain 
estimates of the elements the elements of A and C (A and C) through a 
limited information procedure such as the e. v. m. of Wickens (1978). 
Secondly conditional upon Jaij<j impose ), 1=1 and 
Jail<1 and so remove the 
discontinuity in (2.11) when it is estimated in the second stage. We note 
a few points here. 
Under this scheme the estimates äi, bid, cif and a complex have 
distribution of the form 
FG(ai, ý, bid, cif) = Ghf(äi, ... ) _ (1-G)hB(j, ai) (2.11) 
where G= +lSg(ä)dä [10] 
-------------------- 
[10] A '"' denotes an estimate from the first stage and denotes one from 
the second stage. 
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g is the marginal distribution of the e. v. m. estimator of äi (in the first 
stage), hf is the distribution of the estimates from the forward solution 
under the initial hypothesis (subscript '0') and hB is that from the mixed 
solution. 
The method obviously provides consistent estimates since in infinite 
samples the first stage provides the 'correct' hypothesis upon which to 
condition the second stage. Obviously the final estimates are efficient 
if the information accrued at the first stage is considered as true in 
some sense and forms the maintained hypothesis for the second stage. 
Because the parameters of the quasi reduced form (2.8) enter the 
final 'observable' form (2.9) in such a highly non-linear fashion 
sufficient conditions for identification are in general not available, 
(see for example Pesaran (1982)). We therefore only discuss necessary 
conditions for the identification of the parameters in (2.8) and the 
solution. 
If our first stage reveals that h of the ails lie within the unit 
circle then we have g-h+g2+gk parameters to solve for from the 
equations [11] 
a. [AI(L) - B>'gC(L) + B[Ig-), g']LH(L)] _ [0] 
(2.12) 
0 
where 19' =1 and other symbols are as before. 
0 
)h+ 
For (2.12) to have a non trivial solution there must be at least as 
many independent equations as this. The equations in Lp+l(Vi>O) provide 
only g-h equations because II(LP+l) i>O are restricted by the lag 
polynomial in H(L). A necessary condition for identification then is 
g+k <- kp (2.13) 
So we see that if there are more exogenous variables than endogenous 
variables and if p>2 (neither of which is very restrictive) then this 
-------------------- 
[11] Note that our first stage does not aid identification since the a 
priori information this latter yields, reduces the number of 
equations (in (2.12)) and parameters (Vs) by the same amount. 
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'order' condition is satisfied. 
The existence of lagged exogenous varibles worsens the situation, 
however. For example when DL is added to C in (2.8), (2.13) becomes 
g+ 2k <_ kp 
On the other side of the balance sheet however an information set 
dated at t-1 [12] aids identification as (2.13) becomes 
g IKp 
Further the elements of A and C are very likely to be subject to 
restrictions because most macro models are in fact heavily overidentified. 
Such restrictions may aid identification of (2.8) and the solution. We 
believe therefore that not only are such models likely to be identified 
but that the R. E. hypothesis in this case may yield overidentifying 
restrictions which could form the basis of a test of the hypothesis. 
In practice identification beyond some order condition is likely to 
be a numerical issue focussing on the rank of the information matrix. 
There are problems however in using Newtonian optimisation techniques 
where the latter is rank deficient since most of these routines require 
the inverse of this matrix. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that existing practices in policy 
analysis in the context of models with forward R. E. 's are deficient in one 
important respect, namely that at some stage they impose a solution using 
criteria which are at best contentious. Numerical conditions were found 
to have no firm theoretical basis and so provide a completely arbitrary 
way of choosing a solution. In response to this we proposed and described 
joint estimation of the parameters and solution of simultaneous models. 
Finally we derived some necessary conditions for identification of this 
model and its solution. 
-------------------- 
[121 Certain authors consider this assumption the more plausible of the 
two e. g. Wallis (1980). 
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5. Rational Forecasts from'Nonrational Models 
5.1. Introduction 
It is now widely accepted that the existence of Rational 
Expectations (henceforth R. E. has profound implications for 
economic policy analysis. The so-called 'R. E. revolution' has 
returned the whole question of the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal stabilisation policy to the centre of economic debate. 
For example the well known policy trade off between inflation 
and unemployment (the Phillips curve) disappears when the 
hypothesis is invoked (Lucas, 1973). However imposing the 
hypothesis on a simultaneous equations econometric model gives 
rise to complex within and cross equation nonlinear parameter 
restrictions and to acknowledge these fully requires FIML 
estimation. Perhaps this computational complexity has inhibited 
the widespread adoption of R. E. 's in the estimation of the large 
scale macroeconometric models that are used for forecasting and 
policy analysis. Nevertheless interest in the implications of 
the R. E. hypothesis for policy analysis has provoked investigation 
of the possibility of extracting 'rational policy responses from 
nonrational models'. 
In his influential paper Anderson 
[13] 
describes and uses an 
algorithm for 
"simulating standard models under the assumption of R. E. 
[14] 
when re-estimation under that assumption is considered too costly" 
[131The simulation algorithm was also developed simultaneously 
by Fair but for use in a different context to that of 
Anderson. 
[14]A11 quotes are taken from Anderson (1979) and brackets 
denote our own words. 
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By means of a simple alteration of the coding of standard 
simulations, it is claimed that solution paths may be obtained 
from existing non-rational structures which approximate those 
that would have been obtained from models that incorporate R. E. 
as a maintained hypothesis. 
Whilst this method is not put forward as a long term 
alternative to re-estimation under the maintained hypothesis of 
R. E. it is suggested that it provides a cheap interim method of 
simulating under R. E. 
"The estimation of a large R. E. macroeconometric model is 
a costly time-consuming project. While research on the R. E. 
hypothesis continues it seems useful to develop a method for 
simulating existing models under the added assumption that 
expectations adjust in an optimal manner. This chapter presents 
one such possible simulation method which incorporates a 
rationality postulate. " 
Anderson uses this method to derive monetary and fiscal 
policy multipliers from the St. Louis and FMP models. These 
latter are compared with multipliers obtained from the existing 
models and are found to be substantially smaller in magnitude 
(in fact policy multipliers were halved when the method was 
invoked). 
Because of the quantitative and qualitative significance 
of these results and of the potential attractiveness of the 
method to macro modellers the method deserves closer scrutiny. In 
this chapter we examine the method and evaluate its claims. 
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The next section provides an outline of the method in the 
context of a simple two equation model also used by Anderson. 
Section 3 briefly reviews ad hoc extrapolative proxies in common 
usage and their implementation in macro modelling. Adaptive 
expectations and data determined schemes are considered because 
of their overwhelming popularity. An unbiased and optimal (in 
the sense of minimum forecast error variance) extrapolative 
predictor is also described and used in the analysis because it 
provides a useful benchmark as the 'best' extrapolative proxy 
available. Section 4 provides some analytical results on 
multiplier biases using the method whilst in section 5 some 
numerical examples of these biases are tabulated and discussed. 
The numerical study uses a simple two equation macro model that 
bears a close resemblance to the two main equations of the 
condensed St. Louis model described by Anderson and this with 
its linearity and simplicity makes it an ideal structure in 
which to house the analysis. In section 6 we examine further 
properties of the algorithm. Focus here is on the seriousness 
of ignoring 'mistakes' during simulation by substituting actual 
outcomes for expectations and on problems raised by Lucas' 
critique of policy evaluation (Lucas, 1976). Section 7 
provides a summary and conclusion. 
I 
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5.2 Outline of the Fair-Anderson method 
In his influential paper Anderson (1979) undertakes dynamic 
deterministic ex post policy simulations on the FMP and St. Louis 
models with a general aim of deriving dynamic policy multipliers. 
The method is easily exposited in the context of the following 
simple two equation model explaining a price level and nominal 
income 
pt amt + ult (2.1) 
e 
yt = ßmt + YPt + u2t (2.2) 
where superscript 'e' denotes an expectation formed at time t-1 
and pt, yt, mt and uIt and u2t are the price level, nominal 
income, money supply and structural disturbances respectively (all 
variables in natural logs). The model is incomplete without an 
assumption about expectation formation and until the R. E. revolu- 
tion macro models such as this were typically estimated incorporat- 
ing extrapolative schemes such as 
Pt Ept-i (2.3) 
i 
The R. E. of prices (pt*) however is defined as 
pt* = E(ptIýlt_1) 
where SZ t-1 
is an information set containing the model ((1.1) and 
(1.2) in this case) and all variables up to time t-1 and so 
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p t* = amt 
(2.4) 
where a hat denotes an optimal (minimum forecast error variance) 
extrapolative prediction. 
The R. E. compares starkly with any extrapolative scheme 
such as (2.3) since it involves optimal prediction of the 
exogenous variables (in this case, the money supply) and the form 
of this predictor will obviously depend on the exogenous variable 
process. 
Having obtained estimates of the structural parameters of 
(2.1) and (2.2) by incorporating (2.3) and imposing an arbitrary 
restriction on the d's (such as that they sum to one) to 
identify y one might proceed to a simulation exericse. This 
would normally involve setting all structural errors at their 
means of zero (for deterministic solution) and numerically solv- 
ing (2.1) to (2.3) under different money supply settings with a 
general aim of deriving policy multipliers such as 
api ayi [15) 
8m. and 8m. J) 
JJ 
Our simulated values would thus satisfy 
[151 Obviously in our linear example the multipliers are 
independent of initial conditions. This is not so in 
nonlinear models where multiplers such as 
ap. 
are calculated. am. 
J yo, ... 
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S_S 
Pt am t 
(2.5) 
nn 
ytS = bmts +c 
. 
E1 6ip 
t-i = 
bmts + ca 
lZ' 
S. mt-i (2.6) 
where superscript 's' denotes a simulated value. Numerical 
values for multipliers are easily calculated by comparing the 
time paths of endogenous variables (given the same initial 
conditions) under different money supply settings. 
To repeat the exercise under a 'maintained'hypothesis 
of R. E. Anderson suggests simulating under the expectations 
scheme 
e 
Pt Pt (2.7) 
in place of (2.3) so as to make 'expectations consistent with 
the predictions of the model'. Justification of this comes 
from the fact that R. E. 's differ from actual values only by a 
stochastic error consisting of current structural disturbances 
via the reduced form and current innovations in the exogenous 
variables. In our example the error in the R. E. is 
Pt - Pt = am +uIt- amt = vt + aet 
where ct is one step ahead prediction error of the money 
supply. In deterministic simulations however the model is 
solved with structural disturbances set at their expected values 
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of zero so that imposing (2.7) it is claimed provides approximate 
rationality. For example in our model such 'consistent' 
expectations are given as 
ess 
pt = pt = amt (2.8) 
as an approximation to the R. E. in (2.4). Using (2.2) and (2.8) 
the substitution for income is-then 
yts = (b + ca)mts (2.9) 
If the hypothesis of R. E. 's is maintained from the beginning, 
comparable forms for price and income are obtained by solving 
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.4) to give 
pt = amt +u It (2.10) 
yt =0+ Ya); t + 
ßet + u2t (2.11) 
By comparing (2.8) and (2.9) with (2.10) and (2.11) ignoring 
differences due both to structural disturbances and money 
supply innovations (we shall take up these differences later) 
we see that the essential distinction rests on the estimates a, 
b and c. Making expectations consistent with the predictions 
of the model as in (2.8) and (2.9) is not imposing R. E. 's 
because the structural parameter estimates used therein were 
obtained under a different expectations hypothesis(in our example 
the ad hoc scheme in (2.3)). As we show in section 4 below 
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purely extrapolative proxies are always inadequate for providing 
consistent estimates of the parameters of an R. E. model. Indeed 
Anderson himself acknowledges this problem although he sees it 
purely as a problem of identifying the coefficients on the 
expectational term ('c' in our example); 
it... as equation ((2.6)) is usually estimated by time 
series methods the coefficient 'c' is not identified 
econometrically ... (and so) one's judgement must come into play". 
As we shall see however the problem is not strictly one of pure 
identification, moreover bias is not just restricted to the 
coefficient on the expectational term. Three key questions 
arise at this stage. Firstly how serious are the implications 
of this for multiplier estimates in practical situations? 
Secondly, are some extrapolative proxies better than others in 
the sense that (under fairly general circumstances) they result 
in better multiplier estimates when the method is used? 
Finally because R. E. 's are generated from past information 
does the substitution of a. current outcome for an R. E. give 
rise to any peculiar properties during simulation, either 
desirable or undesirable? 
The first of these three are taken up in sections 4 and 5 
whilst the third is dealt with in section 6. Before we set 
about tackling these questions however it will be useful to 
briefly review extrapolative proxies in common use in existing 
macroeconometric models. 
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1 
L 
5.3 Extrapolative proxies in common use 
Of the extrapolative proxies typically used in macro 
modelling we may distinguish those of finite order from those 
of infinite order. Infinite schemes obviously require a 
restriction on the lag structures for practical implementation, 
the exponentially declining lag of adaptive expectations 
providing a classic example. Finite schemes may or may not 
be further restricted; in an Almon lag the weights follow a 
polynomial in terms of the lag operator whereas the scheme in 
(2.3) allows the data to determine the weights up to the 
imposed truncation point (n). We consider estimation 
incorporating each scheme in turn in the context of the income 
equation (2.2) above. Using the finite but otherwise 
unrestricted scheme of (2.3) we would substitute (2.3) into 
(2.2) and estimate freely by O. L. S. 
n 
yt = bmt +c Si Pt-i + ut X3.1) 
i=1 
The restriction that the d's sum to one would be imposed 
afterwards to identify c. The maximum lag n may be chosen 
'sufficiently' large to capture the bulk of the distributed lag, 
leaving the error largely free of autocorrelation although it 
has often been set equal to one giving a simple lagged variable 
proxy. The advantage of this procedure lies in allowing the 
data to determine the form of the distributed lag where cues. 
from the underlying theory are weak. Its weakness lies in the 
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arbitrary restriction required to 
identify the structural 
parameter. In dynamic models further such restrictions are 
required. 
Among all extrapolative schemes available those of the 
Almon lag and adaptive expectations stand out through frequency 
of use. 
Using the former would mean estimating 
n 
yt = bmt +cE d(i) pt_i + ut 
i=1 
where 6 (i) = K0 + K1i + K2i2 + ... Kim 
with additional 'degrees of freedom' requirement that n 
be 
greater than m+I (m is commonly set equal to two giving a 
quadratic form) and this may be achieved using restricted 
least 
squares methods. 
Invoking adaptive expectations gives 
yt = bmt +cL (1 - 6L) 
] 
nt-1 + ut (3.2) 
where L is the lag operator. 
A Koyck transform is often applied to give 
yt = bmt - bdmt-1 + c(1-S)Pt-I + Syt-1 + (1-oL)ut (3.3) 
and this is typically estimated by nonlinear least squares 
methods incorporating the relevant nonlinear parameter restric- 
tions but approximating the induced first order M. A. error term 
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with an autoregressive error scheme. 
[161 
The next three sections describe the implications for 
estimates derived using these proxies when expectations are 
really rational. In any linear dynamic simultaneous model 
which includes exogenous variables so generated there always 
exists a univariate representation for each endogenous variable 
(Prothero and Wallis, 1976) from which may be obtained a 
predictor that is unbiased and which has minimum one-step-ahead 
forecast error variance among the class of purely extrapolative 
predictors. This optimal extrapolative predictor (henceforth 
O. E. P. ) is to our knowledge, never purposefully used in non- 
rational models although it may by chance coincide with an 
ad hoc scheme. It nevertheless provides a useful benchmark in 
the analysis because, like an R. E., it is a conditional 
expectation, but it differs from the R. E. by being conditioned 
on a smaller information set, namely the past values of the 
variable itself and as a result it is less efficient than the 
R. E. 
5.4 Some analytical results on multiplier biases 
We stated in section 2 that using an ad hoc extrapolative 
proxy in place of the R. E. results in inconsistent parameter 
estimates. We show this below and then turn our attention to 
[161 A programme by Osborne recently written would incorporate 
the M. A. and so provide an exact ML estimation procedure. 
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the seriousness of this problem for the multiplier estimates. 
Consider the general linear model 
Byt + rxt + Cyt* = ut (4.1) 
where B is agxg matrix of full rank, r and C are gxk 
and gxg matrices respectively, yt is agx1 vector of 
endogenous variables with R. E. yt*, xt is akxI vector 
of exogenous and predetermined variables (henceforth x-variables) 
and ut is a vector of non-autocorrelated structural disturbances. 
(4.1) has reduced form 
y= nx +ny*+v (4.2) 
t 
1 
ýt 
2t 
_t 
where 111 _ -B-I r, 11 2= -B 
1C, 
vt = B-Iut 
and xt = xt +et 
Before we discuss x-variable multipliers we must first draw an 
important distinction between responses to the anticipated 
component of the x-variables and their unanticipated components. 
The latter is the response to shocks or innovations in the 
exogenous variables and occurs only when current x-variables 
enter the structure in their own right. 
The anticipated components of the x-variables have their 
effects both through the current x-variables in the structure 
and through the rational expectation and these effects represent 
responses to changes in the x-processes themselves. Solving 
(4.2) gives 
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yt = nlXt +112(1-11 2)-1n1Xt + vt (4.3) 
= liet+ (I -II2)-lxt+vt 
The first of these multiplier components then is 
(a) Mu 
ay 
= aet = 111 
(4.4) 
t 
and the second is 
(b) Ma = -(, 
axy 
t_ 
(I - R2)-lII1 (4.4) 
Although often not explicitly stated focus falls on the 
responses to anticipated x-variables (the Ma's). Indeed such 
were the multipliers that Anderson derives in his deterministic 
simulations. (There are no shocks and thus no Mu's in 
deterministic simulations. ) 
Note that the substitution of an extrapolative proxy (yte) 
for the R. E. augments the error term in (4.1) by 
(a) its = C(gte -y *) = C(yte - Yt + lie + vt) (4.5) 
and in (4.2) by 
(ý) qtr=n2(yt-yte-llc -vt) (4.5) 
The term in brackets is just the error in the proxy minus that 
in the R. E. and in general is correlated both with all the 
exogenous variables in the model and (in general) the proxy 
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itself invalidating standard structural and full information 
estimation methods. The multiplier biases resulting from this 
inconsistency have complex uninformative analytical forms even 
in the simplest of models of the form of (4.1) incorporating the 
simplest proxies and so some numerical examples are discussed in 
the next section. However, because of its position as 'best' 
extrapolative proxy available we examine the case where the 
proxy coincides with the O. E. P. from the model. 
In this case (4.5) becomes 
ýts = C(11 e+ Vt -u) 
Etr = 112 (ut - 11 1Et - vt) 
(4.5? ) 
where ut (equal to p 
[171 
t- pt) is the vector of 
innovations 
in the univariate representations of the elements of y. 
Taking first the case where (4.1) is just identified 
then simple O. L. S. yields direct estimates of the II's. 
Denoting Y and X as txg data matrices respectively we 
now write the estimated equations in stacked form as 
Y= X1l 1'+ 
in 
2' +v= 
Exyl 
1I 1'+E 
ýr 
2 
[,, r 
where Er+v... qtr] and 
v= 
[VI 
... vtl ) 
[17]A '^' denotes O. E. P. 
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Now denoting 
Qy 'y = pUMT 
1(Y'Y) 
oXtY = plimT (X'Y) 
we may write asymptotic forms for the biases in III' and II2 
(B1 and B2 respectively) as 
B1 
x'x 
-1 
x'E 
B2 Qytx Qy, y Qy'E 
Now noting that the vector of O. E. P. 's (Y) is uncorrelated 
with all current innovations being a function of only past 
information so that 
vy'E =0 
and premultiplying both sides by the R. H. S. moment matrix gives 
OX, X axly B1 aX, E [ax 
Qy, y B2 0 
Rearranging the lower g equations gives 
Qy, yB2 = -CT y, XBl (4.6) 
Now note that we can rewrite (4.3) in data matrix form as 
Y= XMa' +E (4.7) 
(" (' 
where E=v- eHIII I-n 2' 1 II2', and c=[ el ... et 
11' 
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Premultiplying (4.7) by Y' and taking plims gives 
ay, y = ay, X a' + ay, E (4.8) 
Now 
y+ 11 => Qy, y = Qy, y 
(because ai, u = 0) 
Further 
vy, E =0 
so that after postmultiplication by B2 (4.9) becomes 
Qy, yB2 = ay, X a'B2 
(4.9) 
Combining (4.9) with (4.6) gives the equality 
Ma'B2 = -B1 (4.10) 
It is easy to show that (4.10) is the unique condition that B2 
and B1 must satisfy for Ma to be consistently estimated. 
Denoting the estimate of Ma' as Ma' we have 
Ma' _[ B1 + Bl 
II- 
R2' - B2 
so that we require 
Ma' = Ma' => [ri, ' + B1J[I - II2' - B2] = II1' [I - n2']-1 
Postmultiplying both sides by LI- 11 2' - B2 
] 
and rearranging 
gives 
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11 1' + B1 = 
II1'LI - n2'] 
[i 
- n2'] - "1'[I - 112'] B2 
or more succinctly 
B1 = -Ma'B2 
Q. E. D. 
We thus have the rather surprising result that although 
all the estimated coefficients are biased when the proxy 
coincides with the O. E. P. the multipliers derived during 
deterministic simulations (the elements of Ma) are consistent. 
It is slightly more tedious to show that the above proof holds 
when the H's are subject to overidentifying restrictions and 
so this is relegated to appendix A. 
This proxy that is 'best' in the sense of minimum one step 
ahead forecast error variance is thus also 'best' in our current 
context. It is tempting to assert that the nearer the proxy is 
to the O. E. P. the less serious is the problem of multiplier bias 
using the method. This of course is impossible to prove. For 
one thing we have no rigorous definition of 'nearness'. 
However, if we define 'nearness' in terms of m. s. e. of prediction 
then the numerical experiments in the next section appear to bear 
out our assertion. 
We must note that we have considered only asymptotic 
estimates. In finite samples the variance of the estimates of 
Ma are likely to be relatively large even when consistent. The 
choice of instruments for 2SLS estimation of (4.1) will no 
longer be optimal for example. Also, estimates of Mu obtained 
in stochastic simulations remain biased. 
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Finally, we have not considered an important class of 
models in our analysis namely those containing forward 
R. E. 's. Solution and analysis of these is difficult in 
all but the simplest of circumstances. However in 
Appendix B we prove in an analogous way to that above that 
our results hold true for the general linear model 
yt = Ayt+ý + Bxt + vt 
and x process 
[181 
xt = Pxt_1 + Et 
118] 
Most forward R. E. models may be written in this form and 
any finite order AR x-process may be written in first 
order form. 
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under the assumption that the eigen values of A lie within the 
unit circle. This assumption 'chooses' the widely implemented 
'forward (looking)' solution as the unique stationary one given 
a stationary x-process. 
5.5 Some numerical examples 
Having established that when an O. E. P. proxy is incorporated 
during estimation in place of the R. E. the method yields 
consistent multiplier estimates in deterministic simulations we 
turn to examine our assertion that the nearer the proxy is to 
this 'best' case the less serious is the problem of multiplier 
bias. To this end we consider the following simple two equation 
linear macro model explaining a price level and real income. 
= (a) pt B12yt + aPte + u1t 
(5. ý) (b) yt = B21(mt - Pt) + Ygt + u2t 
with reduced form 
(a) Pt = "Ilpte + 11 12nt + 11 ]3gt + vlt 
e (5.2) (b) Yt ý21pt + fl22mt + ]I 23gt + v2t 
a_ 
B21B12 
__ 
YB12 
_- 
B21Q 
where nII A' X12 A' 11 13 A' 1121 A 
22 A= 
B21, 
II23 =d with 0=1+ B12B21 11 
85 
and where gt is the level of government purchases and mt 
is the nominal money stock (all variables in logs). 
Specifying R. E. 's for pte and processes for m and g 
completes the model: 
mt pImt-1 + Et 
gt p2gt-1 + ýt 
covet, it) =0 
We consider this model specifically because it resembles the 
two main equations in Anderson's condensed version of the 
St. Louis model. (5.1b) is a static analogue of Anderson's 
total spending equation (equation 11 in his paper) and (5.2b) 
of Anderson's 'price equation' (equation 12 in his paper). 
Below are tabulated the results of 8 numerical experiments 
using four sets of parameter values. Taking (5.2) as our data 
generation with 
Pý = P2 =P 
(merely a convenient simplification) we derived[191 asymptotic 
values for multiplier estimates obtained incorporating firstly 
an O. E. P. proxy and secondly a simpler extrapolative proxy. 
[191 
Taking the rational model as the data generation, 
asymptotic values of data moments (app, up, etc. ) 
involved in 2SLS were derived in terms of te parameters 
of this data generation (B12, a, ae2, au2 etc. ) and these 
expressions were used to generate estimates for a set of 
model parameter values. 
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r I 
khý 
Because the system is overidentif ied we quote asymptotic 
values of 2SLS estimates as this would be a typical estimation 
procedure here. The simple proxy used is that in (3.1) with 
n set to unity i. e. 
e_ Pt Pt-1 (5.3) 
The O. E. P. is 
pt PPt-1 - eut-1 tel <1 (5.4) 
where u is the innovation in the univariate representation 
of p. (Full derivation of this predictor is given in 
appendix C. ) 
In four of the experiments, a assumed the value it took 
in Anderson's equation (10) namely 0.86. The remaining 
structural parameters were set to an order of magnitude 
thought 'reasonable' in the sense that they give rise to 
sensible multiplier responses. For the remaining four 
experiments a was chosen to be unity. This was thought 
interesting since when a is unity money is said to be 'neutral' 
i. e. a doubling of the money stock doubles prices leaving real 
output unaffected. Government expenditure is also 'neutral' 
in this case. 
Each of these sets of four subdivide into a low value of 
the AR parameter (0.5) and a high value (0.9). The rationale 
for this comes from the form of the O. E. P. Referring to (5.4) 
it is trivial to show that the m. s. e. of our lagged value proxy 
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differs from that of the O. E. P. by 
m. s. e. pe - m. s. e. p= (p - 1)2var(p) + 2(1 - p)9c2 -u 
The simple proxy (5.3) then is by our criterion close to 
the O. E. P. for values of p close to unity (say 0.9) but not 
for other values (say 0.5). 
The multiplier estimates are tabulated in the table below 
with their corresponding parameter sets. The multipliers 
reported are 
apt 11 12 ýIý M1 -3 mt -1- 1111 
IT 13 (III M2 
aag 
1- 11 t 11 
(III) 143 = amt = II21MapM + R22 
t 
(IV) M4 
ayt 
Ma 
pg 
= 8g 
t= 
121 + n23 
aP t 
(5.5) 
(V) N1 = Bet = 12 
aP 
3E =ß14 (VIA N2 
t 
t 
(VII) N 
ay 
3= aEt 
t= 
1122 
(VIII) N 
ay 
4= ay 
tt= 
X23 
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(5.5)(I) to (5.5)(IV) are the responses of p and y 
respectively to anticipated policy and (5.5)(V) to (5.5) (VIII) 
their stochastic policy response counterparts. 
Referring to the table we see that when (by our 
criterion) the simple proxy is close to the O. E. P. the Ma 
multiplier estimates are nearly consistent biases averaging 
around 10%. This contrasts starkly with the cases where the 
proxy differs markedly from the O. E. P. (p = 0.5). Biases of 
between 50% and 70% are reported with one multiplier estimated 
at nine times its actual value. 
These results bear out our assertion that the closer the 
proxy is to the O. E. P. the less the multiplier bias arising 
from the method in deterministic simulations. We must draw 
attention however to the results on the Mu's. All of these 
are seriously biased even when the O. E. P. is used. The method 
clearly does not give good estimates of responses to stochastic 
disturbances. 
The conclusions drawn from our numerical experiments 
point towards using the method in deterministic simulations 
when it is reasoned that the proxy incorporated during estima- 
tion is close to the O. E. P. from the model. These conclusions 
are of course'at best tentative as are any results derived from 
specific numerical experiments. 
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Parameter Actual value O. E. P. estimate Simple proxy estimate 
B12 0.5 0.5 4.4803 1.6659 4.525 1.6717 
a 1.0 1.0 0.9367 0.9993 0.8552 0.3293 
B21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
y 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
n11 0.88 0.88 0.4418 0.7055 0.4013 0.2323 
12 0.11 0.11 0.5.5&2 0.294 0.5308 0.2948 
B13 0.11 0.11 0.5582 0.294 0.5308 0.2948 
21 -0.22 0.22 -0.1105 -0.1764 -0.1003 -0.0581 
22 0.22 0.22 0.1179 0.1765 0.1173 0.1763 
1123 0.22 0.22 0.1179 0.1765 0.1173 0.1763 
M1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8866 0.384 
M2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8866 0.384 
M3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0284 0.154 
M4 0.0 0.0 0.0: 0.0- 0.0284 0.154 
N1 0.11 0.11 0.5582 0.294 0.5308 0.2948 
N2 0.11 0.11 0.5582 0.294 0.5308 0.2948 
N3 0.22 0.22 0.1179 0.1765 0.1173 0.1763 
N4 0.22 0.22 0.1179 0.1765 -0.1173 0.1763 
p 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 
SET(Z) SET(2) SET(Z) SET(2) SET(l) SET(Z) 
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Parameter Actual value O. E. P. estimate Simple proxy estimate 
B12 0.6 0.6 1.1275 1.9984 1.1534 2.2073 
a 0.86 0.86 0.7387 0.5714 0.1516 0.3674 
B21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
nll 0.7679 0.7679 0.6028 0.4082 0.1232 0.2549 
1112 0.1071 0.1071 0.184 0.2732 0.1874 0.3063 
11 13 
0.1339 0.1339 0.23 0.3414 0.2343 0.3828 
II21 -0.1536 0.1536 -0.1206 -0.0817 -0.0346 -0.0051 
11 22 0.1786 0.1786 0.1632 0.1429 0.9857 0.1387 
II23 0.2232 0.2232 0.204 0.1786 0.2031 0.1734 
M1 0.4614 0.4614 0.4614 0.4614 0.2137 0.411 
M2 0.5769 0.5769 0.5769 0.5769 0.2672 0.5138 
M3 0.1077 0.1077 0.1077 0.1077 0.9783 0.1177 
M4 0.1346 0.1346 0.1346 0.1346 0.1939 0.1472 
N1 0.1071 0.1071 0.184 0.2732 0.1874 0.3063 
N2 0.1339 0.1339 0.23 0.3414 0.2343 0.3828 
N3 0.1786 0.1786 0.1632 0., 1429 0.9857 0.1387 
N4 0.2232 0.2232 0.204 0.1786 0.2031 0.1734 
p 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
SET(3) SET(4) SET(3) SET(4) SET(3) SET(4) 
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5.6 Further properties of the method 
The preceding sections show that to impose R. E. during 
simulation may require a set of parameter estimates obtained 
under the same maintained hypothesis, since the set obtained 
using an ad hoc expectations hypothesis may be inadequate. 
This section exposes further properties of the method assuming 
that a set of parameter estimates has been obtained under the 
correct hypothesis of R. E. 
Properties associated with Lucas' critique 
Because an R. E. differs from the actual outcome only by 
an innovation uncorrelated with the 'past' as contained in 
the information set then substitution of the actual value for 
the R. E. will ensure immunity from the structural variation 
noted by Lucas (1976), since no varying parameters associated 
with optimal prediction enter the simulation. Indeed this 
was very much the motivation for the method. 
To make this clear recall the model as in (5.2) 
e (a) pt = llpt + r12mt + 1113gt + °lt 
(5.2) 
e (b) yt = II21pt + ll22mt + 1123gt + v2t 
Specifying R. E. 's and general AR MA (p, q) processes for m 
and g gives 
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12 m+ 
11 13 
pt - Pt 1- 1111 t1- II11 gt (6.1) 
1112 1 41 
(L) 11 13 _1 
ý2(L) 
-- nll L- i- el(L) mt-i+ i- nil LI- el(L) gt-i 
where ýi(L) i=1,2 are the AR(p) lag polynomials 
and 61(L) i=1,2 the MA(q) lag polynomials on m and y 
respectively. 
Substitution of (7.1) into (5.2a) and (5.2b) gives a reduced 
form in terms of observables which includes the parameters of the x- 
processes (the ý's and the 6's). Changes in the latter bring 
about changes in this reduced form and these must be accounted 
for when such changes are simulated. Making expectations 
consistent with the predictions of the model we would simulate 
Rnpp [181 
(a) pts =1 
-lIlI 
mts +I 
-113I 
8tS = Ma 
mmts + Ma ggts 
11 11 
(6.2) 
(b) yt 
s_ 
IT211112+11 
22 ts+ 
1121 1113+11239ts 
1- II11 1- II11 
= Maymmts + Mayggts 
and changes in the x-processes do not raise a problem during simula- 
tion. In effect then the method keeps separate the parameters 
of the x-processesfrom those of the economic structure (a distinc- 
tion drawn by Wallis (1980)) allowing policy simulation to proceed 
in the traditional fashion. This feature of the method combined 
with the removal of the need to solve the model to obtain an 
expression for the R. E. form its most attractive properties. 
............... 
[18] 
MayX = 
ayt 
ax 93 
'Properties associated with deterministic simulation 
The key element of the method is to make expectations 
consistent with actual outcomes. At first sight this seems 
like imposing not R. E. 's but perfect foresight. However 
properly executed deterministic simulations yield paths for 
the endogenous variables that are themselves expectations 
(conditioned not on the previous period's information but on 
the information available at the first period of simulation). 
Making expectations consistent with outcomes in this 
deterministic setting then is an exact procedure in the R. E. 
context. To make this clear consider simulating our model 
in section 5. Simulated paths using the method must satisfy 
(6.2). However, the model's actual solution is 
Pmý Pm pp 
(a) pt = Ma mt + Mu et + Ma 
ggt + Mu get + v1t 
Ym^ ym yy 
(b) yt = Ma mt + Mu et + Ma 
ggt + Mu get + v2t 
(6.3) 
Now taking expectations of both sides conditioned on the 
information available at the first period of simulation (cL ) 
gives 
pp 
(a) E(pt 526) = Ma mE (mtýS2O) + Ma gE(gtf c20) 
(6.4) 
yy (b) mE gE(ytI2p) = Ma (mt1c. ) + Ma E(gti20) 
Comparing (6.4) with (6.2) we see that in order to provide a 
path for the endogenous variables conditioned on o0 (as a 
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deterministic simulation should) we require the x inputs to be 
mtS =E (mtIco) (6.5) 
and gts =E (gtL0) 
Using actual x's instead of those based on 00 allows 
unforeseeable exogenous events to be foreseen. It is 
unfortunate that this latter option is much more convenient 
than (6.5). 
Stochastic simulation and problems associated with perfect 
foresight in neutrality models 
There are certain classes of. model for which mean paths 
obtained from deterministic simulations, are very uninteresting 
and uninformative from a policy analysis point of view. For 
such models structural disturbances must be added to all the 
equations and actual exogenous variable values (as opposed to 
predicted or mean values) used i. e. stochastic simulation must 
be undertaken. In this situation setting outcomes equal to 
expectations is imposing not R. E. 's but perfect foresight since 
outcomes include all current stochastic disturbances. 
One class of models that require stochastic simulation and 
for which the imposition of perfect foresight instead of R. E. 's 
has very serious consequences is the so called neutrality class 
of Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975). Broadly speak- 
ing these models are built to give a steady state in which the 
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level of real output is independent of the money supply. 
Typically they have as a central feature a Lucas supply function 
determining output, and a quantity theory equation or a demand 
for money equation determining the price level. The former has 
real output deviating from a natural level only through the 
effect of current and past errors in predicting the price level. 
If expectations are rational these errors are unpredictable and 
consist of innovations in the exogenous variables and in the 
structure, both being uncorrelated with past events contained in 
the information set. In effect then mistakes in expectations 
consisting of these innovations drive a trade cycle, and if they 
are ignored by invoking perfect foresight then output will not 
deviate from its natural level for the period of simulation. 
As an illustration consider the simple neutrality model 
m 
n 
yt __ y+ 
iE 
yi(pt-i - pt-iý + uIt (6.6) 
pt =V+ it - yt + u2t (6.7) 
where yn is a natural level of output. The reduced form is 
m 
yt yn + ý1 + y0)-11 E0 yi(et-i + u2t ult) + ult (6.8) 
m 
Pt=V+ mt - yn - (1 + YO)-11E y. (et-i + u2t u1t) + u2t - u11 
(6.9) 
where et is, as above, the current innovation in the money 
supply. Deterministic simulation of (6.6) and (6.7) or (6.8) 
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and (6.9) using the method would yield solution 
sn 
Yt =Y 
Pts =V+ its - Yn 
This is clearly useless for analysis of the short run behaviour 
of say, output and for this end we require stochastic simulation. 
However, making expectations 'consistent' in a stochastic simula- 
tion yields the solution 
sn 
its yt =y+ uit 
pts =V+ mts - yn + u2ts - uItS 
Again this is totally uninformative about short run fluctuations 
in output, now because of the perfect foresight problem. 
Clearly we must reintroduce 'mistakes' in expectations in the 
simulation procedure. A more natural substitution of the R. E. 
comes from the identity 
Pt - Pt lit (6.10) 
where nt is the error in the R. E. In our simple model the 
substitution derived from (7.8) and (7.9)191 
is 
[19]In linear models calculation of the error in the R. E. is 
relatively easy. In nonlinear models, however, a linear 
approximation may have to be taken first. 
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pt* =pts- uts = pts -6 Cs 
+ y0(1 + YO)-1(ets + u2ts - ults) 
Because this substitution is exact, traditional policy evalua- 
tion may now proceed. It may not be feasible or easy however 
to obtain such a neat analytical form for the error in the R. E. 
We therefore propose a further suggestion which is exact in 
linear models but only an approximation 
[201 in nonlinear models. 
Undertake a deterministic solution using the method but this 
time instead of using (6.5) for the x variables use 
s (a) mt = E(mtlt - 1) 
(6.11) 
(b) gts=E (gt It -- 1) 
The simulated paths for p and y are now approximately 
E(ptit - 1) and (ytit - 1). Since these are just the R. E. 's 
pt* and yt* they may be used as an expectations series in a 
second simulation which adds stochastic disturbances (v it's) 
to each equation and uses actual exogenous outcomes, that is in 
a second stage full stochastic simulation. If the model is 
dynamic care must be taken to add to all predetermined 
variables their respective reduced form errors in the first 
stage. (These are the errors that are generated and added to 
the equations in the second stage, stochastic simulation. ) 
[20]It is well known that replacing exogenous and predetermined 
variables in nonlinear models with their expectations and 
solving does not yield exact expected values of the 
endogenous variables. 
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This has to be done because predetermined variables (and not 
their expectations) are contained in the information set upon 
which the R. E. 's are based. Again, obtaining a series as an 
approximation to the R. E. in this way allows policy evaluation 
to proceed in a traditional manner. 
5.7 "Summary and Conclusion 
The analysis in section 4 and the numerical experiments 
in section 5 have led us to conclude that providing that the 
extrapolative proxies incorporated in existing models are close 
to the O. E. P. derived from the model's rational counterpart 
then the method will yield approximately consistent multiplier 
estimates in deterministic simulations, performed in the manner 
outlined in section 6. 
Unfortunately a glance at our review of expectation 
proxies in common usage shows that the rather ad hoc mechanisms 
typically incorporated into existing macro models at the estima- 
tion stage may not correspond closely with the O. E. P. from the 
rational model. Where this is the case then our numerical 
experiments in section 5 warn of severe multiplier biases. 
The simulation concept itself however is very useful 
provided that'mistakes' in expectations are reintroduced into 
the simulation procedure where stochastic simulation is required. 
This latter point is especially relevant for policy analysis in 
so called neutrality models where deterministic simulation is 
uninformative about the short run behaviour of the endogenous 
variables. 
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Finally, the most attractive feature of the algorithm is 
that which motivated it in the first place, namely that it 
allows policy evaluation to proceed in a traditional manner. 
Making expectations consistent with the predictions of a macro 
model has the effect of separating the economic structure from 
the 'structure' of the exogenous processes and thus removes the 
source of the structural variation referred to by Lucas, namely 
these processes themselves. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proof of multiplier consistency when a structure is overidentified. 
Consider the general overidentif ied model written in data 
matrix form 
Yß = Y*a + xr +u 
where a, ß are gxg and r is akxg parameter matrix 
(all other symbols are as in the main text). 
We may rewrite this as 
Y= Yß + Y*a + xr +u (Al ) 
where I-ß has zeros on its diagonal. 
The Ma matrix is 
rt 
Ma' = P[ I-ß- «] 
Consistency of Ma requires that the biases in 2SLS estimates of 
ß, a and r (Be, B. and Br) obey the relation 
r1 j" -t (Mä=) r[I -ß- a]= [r+Br][I-ß-Y-Bß-Ba1 
and tedious manipulation reduces this to 
Mat[Ba + Ba] =- Br (A2) 
TSLS estimation of 
Y= Yß + Ya + xr +Z 
where z=u+a[u - (Y-Y*)1 
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gives the biases as 
sß ay y 
Ba = ay, y 
Br axy 
a9'9 
ay, y 
axy 
Qy, x 
[yz 
QyIx Qyiz 
(A3) 
ax'x , 
where a '^' denotes unrestricted reduced form predictions from 
the first stage of 2SLS as opposed to a" which again denotes 
O. E. P. 
Premultiplying both sides of (A3) by the R. H. S. matrix, 
noting that 
a tZ = 0, 
and rearranging the second block of equations gives 
B+ cr B+a ý, B=0 (A4) yyß yya yXr 
From the properties of 2SLS we have 
y= cr y, y 
Using this in (A4) and rearranging gives 
Qyt9 
rBß 
+ B«] =- ay, 
XBr 
(A5) 
To show that (A5) is equivalent to (A2) rewrite (Al) as 
Y= Ma +u- aE 
where E=[u+ (Y-Y*)][I-ß -a 
]-1 
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Premultiplying both sides by Y' and taking plims gives 
(ay'y -) an - aylx a (A6) 
Postmultiplying (A6) by L B$ + Ba 
I 
and combining with (A5) 
gives 
-Br = Ma L Bß + Ba 
1 
which is just our consistency condition (A2) 
Q. E. D. 
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APPENDIX B 
Forward Expectations 
Consider the general linear model 
Y+IA' + XB' + výýý 
with x-process 
X= X_1 P' +E 
(ill) 
On the assumption that all the eigen values of A lie inside 
the unit circle . the forward solution 
is uniquely stationary. 
A general form for this solution may be written as 
Y= X-1 F' + XB' +V 
(B2) 
To get a form for F advance (B2) by one period and take 
expectations conditional on t-1 to get 
Y+1 = X_1 LFPJ, + X_1 BP2 
' 
(B3) Cý 
Substituting (B3) into (BI) gives 
r 
Y= X_1 [AFP + ABP2] + XBr +v (ß4) 
(1) 
Y+1 YI 
yt 
yt+ 
and ay+l, 
y 
= plim Y+1'Y 
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Equating coefficients in (B2) and (B4) gives 
F= AFP + ABP2 
Vectorising both sides, applying the rule 
vecXYZ = (V (D X)vecY (B5) 
(for Z= I) and rearranging gives an explicit form for vecF as 
r 'j 
vecF =LI-P. ' 0A1 vecABP2 (B6) 
Turning now to the multipliers in this model Ma is now 
Ma =F+ BP (B7) 
Taking vecs of (B7) applying the rule (B5) and using (B6) gives 
r1 
vecMa =LI- P'(3 A vecABP2 + vecBP 
P' ®A1 (P' ® A) +Ir vecBP 
1 
JJ 
vecMa =LI- P' ®A] vecBP (B7) 
Once again the matrices of biases in A' and B' (BA and BB) that 
arise using an O. E. P. in place of the R. E. must satisfy 
ß9++X BA 0 
y+1g+i i 
__ cri CT XIX BB aX tE q+t 
where E= A(u - eP'B' - e+1B') 
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Rearranging the upper equation block gives 
crBA = -ßy iXB (B8) B 
+1 
Now, following earlier procedures we derive a form for Y+1 
in terms of Ma. Advancing (B2) by one period gives 
y+l = XF' + X+1B' +v 
= XF' + XP' B' +v+e (B9) 
Y+1 = XMa' +v+e 
It follows straightforwardly that 
Qý fý _ aý ' 
(B10) 
Y+IY+l Y+1X Ma 
Combining (B8) and (B10) gives 
CFy+ltx Ma'BA -oy+1, XBB 
(B11) 
Now we must verify that condition (B11) guarantees a consistent 
estimate of Ma. 
Recalling (B7) the condition we require is 
"j (' 
[I - P' 0A- P' ©BA'] 
1 
vec[BP + BB'P] = 
[I 
- P' ©A] 
1 
vecBP 
Premultiplying both sides by the L. H. S. matrix gives 
rr1 
vec[BP + BB'P] = vecBP - (P ® BA')[I - P' 0 A] vecBP 
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Cancelling terms gives 
vecBB'P = -(PIG BA')vecMa 
Premultiplying by (P'-' Q I) and using (B5) gives 
vecBB' - -(I (D BA')vecMa 
vecBB' = vecBA'Ma 
so that we have 
BB = -MaBA 
and this verifies (B1 1) 
Q. E. D. 
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APPENDIX C 
Derivation of the O. E. P. for pt in (5.2) 
Solving (5.2a) gives an 'observable' equation 
P- 
i1 
il II 
mt-1 +I- 1111 gt-1 + 
112mt + ý13gt + 
t It 11 
To derive a purely autoregressive predictor we must substitute 
out mt, mt_1, gt and gt_1 to get 
pt =i P-- 
11_ý2p 
et-1 + 
II 11 II 
t -1 
+ ý12Et + ý13t 1'pL + al11 
[illii] 
Multiplying throughout by 1- PL gives 
n11ý12p 
Pt 1- 1111 "'+ vIt - p°lt-1 + ppt-1 
(C1) 
The R. H. S. of (CO is the sum of two independent MA (1) processes 
and thus has a representation in terms of a single innovation 
lit giving 
pt = Ppt-1 + lit - eut-I (C2) 
where I8j <I and where 6 and the variance of ut are found 
by means of the cannonical factorisation of (CI). The O. E. P. 
in (5.4) follows trivially from (C2) 
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6. F. I. M. L. ESTIMATION OF MODELS CONTAINING FORWARD R. E.: A NEW APPROACH 
6.1 Existing Methods 
The first and some would say most important step in policy analysis 
is estimation. In the R. E. arena this topic is most controversial. 
Academic argument on the matter appears to be polarised into two schools. 
The first regard FIML as an appropriate and indeed imperative tool for 
estimation and inference whilst the second school argue that the costs of 
this approach outweigh the benefits and put forward limited information 
methods. Because these methods are well known and documented we comment 
only briefly on them. 
Broadly speaking there are two approaches to limited information 
estimation. The first proposes that actual values be substituted for 
expections and then the problem be treated as one of errors in variables 
(see for example, Wickens (1980)). The second proposes that expectations 
terms be proxied by fitted values from a regression of their corresponding 
actual values on all variables in the information set (see McCallum (1976) 
for more details of this). Both of these approaches have dominated 
econometric practice to date and it's not difficult to understand why. 
Using existing software consistent estimates are obtained simply, 
conveniently and most important of all, cheaply. Limited information 
methods do not however provide any framework at all within which a test of 
the R. E. hypothesis may be made. The method simply does not impose any 
testable restrictions that the R. E. hypothesis provides and so no 
inference may be made as to the validity of the expectations mechanism vis 
a vis some alternative. Such methods do of course provide the usual t- 
ratio tests on the significance of structural coefficients but such a test 
applied to coefficients of expectations terms has no clear interpretation. 
As an illustration, consider the simple model 
e Yt ' ayt+1It-1 + Bxt + ut (1.1) 
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with xt ' ext-1 + 
6t (1.2) 
The t-test on otin (1.1) has the rather uninteresting null hypothesis 
yt = Bxt + ut 
Further, suppose that the true model were (1.1) but with Yt1It-1 replaced 
with the naive expectations scheme of a lagged variable so that the true 
model is 
yt = ocyt-1 + Bxt +Ut 
Using (1.2) we may rewrite the true model as 
yt =1 Ax yt+1 - B/ot ext - B/ocSt+1- 1 /oc ut+1 (1-3) 
Now because all variables in the information set (xt-1-i and yt-1-i' i>O) 
are orthogonal to the composite error term in (1.3) a Wickens type e. v. m or 
a McCallum type procedure would yield consistent estimates of -Be/cK rather 
than of cc and B respectively. In any case the significance of the 
observed coefficient on the expectations term can clearly not be treated 
as a verification of the R. E. hypothesis in (1.1). Thus, to undertake 
limited information estimation the investigator must have total faith in 
the R. E. hypothesis since no meaningful diagnostic tests are available in 
this context. 
Until very recently investigators wishing to undertake FIML 
estimation of models incorporating forward R. E. have had no software to 
help them. Faced with this they have confined their attention to simple 
models with analytically tractable parameter restrictions obtained by 
imposing the forward solution on the model. Then, using some numerical 
differentiation routines or packages have found the point in the 
structural parameter space that maximises the likelihood function (see 
Burmeister and Wall (1983) for an example of such empirical work). In 
their recent paper Fair and Taylor describe and use an algorithm that 
delivers exact FIML estimates of the parameters of a general linear R. E. 
model. For full details the reader is referred to Fair and Taylor (1983). 
Essentially the routine mimics the FIML procedure described above except 
the model solution is executed numerically rather than analytically: Given 
a set of parameters, expected exogenous variable paths and a sufficient 
set of terminal values for the endogenous variables the program sets all 
stochastic disturbances to their means (usually zero) and then iterates on 
endogenous variable paths until convergence is reached between these and 
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their corresponding expectations in the model. By allowing calculation of 
the L. F. this expectations solution then forms the basis for its numerical 
maximisation with respect to the parameters of the model. 
In the context of the multiple solutions debate the algorithm appears 
to be neat because terminal values for the endogenous variables which are 
normally set to identify a solution are not required. In fact the 
algorithm chooses an integer 'N' such that changes in the terminal values 
(chosen arbitrarily) for periods beyond t+N to solve uniquely for the 
endogenous variables in periods t+i, i-1, N, do not significantly affect 
these latter solution values. In simpler terms the solution that is 
chosen by this procedure is one where expectations far into the future 
have negligible influence on current outcomes (and therefore on current 
expectations). It was shown in chapter 4 that terminal conditions were 
needed to determine a unique solution. Therefore a solution chosen so 
that the terminal conditions dont 'bite' should raise our suspicions to say 
the least. 
Consider as an illustration the simple model in (1.1) and (1.2). If 
ýxj>j then solving backwards from a terminal conditon at t+n (Yt+n, t-1 
gives us 
N 
Ytejt-1 - °ýnYt+n1t-1 + Bi? 1oxlXt+n-ilt-1 
Obviously the solution for the current value Yt+n-ißt-1 is extremely 
sensitive to the choice of terminal condition Yt+n and extending the time 
horizon only makes matters worse. The programme would fail in this 
instance in that it would not find a solution satisfying its own criteria; 
the solution would most definitely depend on the terminal value Yt+nýt-1 
Note however that if I(xl<J then the algorithm chooses the only stationary 
solution in this case namely the forward solution with n chosen 
sufficiently large to obliterate the effect of the terminal condition 
e yt+nlt-1 
Despite this shortcoming the programme does have the important 
property of being general enough to handle any linear or nonlinear model. 
However the computional cost it implies for even the smallest of models is 
likely to be inhibitive. For example in their paper Fair and Taylor use 
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the programme to estimate the parameters of a model. To this end 28,000 
passes through the model ar. e required for convergence of FIML estimates. 
(A pass through the model consists of one Gauss-Seidel iteration). 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that for linear models at 
least it is possible to use standard analysis to provide closed forms for 
the first order conditions for maximisation of the likelihood function 
without having to impose a solution prior to estimation. These first 
order conditions can be written in a general form to cover virtually all 
linear R. E. models so that they may be programmed and then used to solve 
for the M. L. E. 's by simple numerical methods. 
Before we proceed we must pay heed to an alternative solution and 
estimation technique advanced by Chow (1981). Again for full details the 
reader is referred to the paper itself. 
To obtain a solution Chow employs identities of the form 
e yt jt-1 = yt + St 
yeI=y+ (1-CL)St+l t-1 t+1 t+1 
Then substituting out for the R. E. terms in a model gives a structure in 
terms of observables with M. A. error processes. 
yt = «yt-1 + Bxt + c0§ cl&t + ut 
t+i 
The suggestion then is to estimate this structure by standard maximum 
likelihood methods. It is claimed that this procedure does not require 
any knowledge of the exogenous variable processes but more importantly 
that it allows the data to reveal the form of the solution rather than 
it being imposed a priori. Closer examination of the method however 
reveals that it does not reveal the form of the solution and so its 
use for policy analysis is curtailed. This is not surprising considering 
that the method does not incorporate information from the exogenous 
variable processes. Furthermore, it does not allow us to impose the 
forward solution during estimation. This is important where the 
latter is suggested by the model's theoretical structure. For example, 
the model of Hall (1978) has a priori a 'unique stationery solution' 
(or 'saddlepoint') property and fully efficient estimation here would 
require imposing the restrictions of the forward solution only. 
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The method we propose below may be used in all cases regardless 
of whether or not the model solution is determinate. 
. 6.2 An Alternative Approach to FIML Estimation 
In this section we attempt to derive analytical forms for the first 
order conditions (henceforth F. O. C. ) of the likelihood function of a gxl 
vector of endogenous variables yt with respect to the structural 
parameters of the model governing yt written as [231 
Cyt = nyt1 + rxt + Qyt_i + ut (2.1) 
where C, fl and Q are gxg matrices, r is a gxk matrix (possibly subject to 
exclusion restrictions) and ut is a gx1 vector of normal structural 
disturbances where 
E(utut') =S 
It is assumed that I" and the vector of exogenous variables can be 
written in such a way as to be able to represent the x-processes jointly 
as 
xt _ Pxt-1 + 6t (2.2) 
where Et is a kxl vector of disturbances independent of ut Wt. 
We assume for the time being that s-1 is of full rank. This assumption 
is quite severe in that it seriously restricts the number of models that 
can be written in the form of (2.1) and so we relax this at the end of the 
-------------------- 
[23] From now on superscript 'e' unambiguously denotes a R. E. conditional 
on f_1. 
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section where we consider how to overcome the complications raised by .1 
being singular Another respect in which (2.1) is not perfectly 
general is that it doesn't deal with expectations horizons of two or more 
periods (Yt1'i>O). Whilst we believe most models conform to (2.1) this 
case is dealt with also at the end of the section. 
We may write the quasi reduced form of (2.1) as 
yt = Ayte +1 + 
Bxt + Dyt_1 + °t (2-3) 
where A= C-1, , etc. 
Following chapter 4 the exhaustive set of solutions to (2.3) may be 
parameterised by the gxg matrix 
xl 0 
0 N1 as follows 
Yt = Ayt0 + [I-A] Yt1 (2.4) 
where yt0 and ytl are two distinct solutions to (2.3). The solutions we 
choose for yt0 and yt1 are the intuitively appealing and empirically 
popular 'forward' or 'forward looking' solution (ytF) and a 'backward' or 
'backward looking' solution (ytB). Analytical forms for the latter are 
easy to come by and are well documented in the literature (see for example 
Pagan (1982)). It is the former however that has been overwhelmingly and 
almost exclusively popular in the empirical literature but the absence of 
a general form for this solution for a model such as (2.1) has seriously 
restricted FIML estimation to simple one or two equation models such as 
that of Burmeister and Wall (1983). As an example of this difficulty we 
quote Wallis who in his discussion of FIML estimation of models with 
forward R. E. states that such estimation is possible 
"provided that the parameter restrictions resulting from 
the dependence of the R. E. on the predictions of all future 
values of the exogenous variables .... can be conveniently 
expressed" 
(Wallis (1980)) 
chapter 
The main force and novelty of this / then is the derivation of a 
neat analytical representation of the restrictions implied by the forward 
solution. This, together with the backward solution allows us to 
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analytically derive and then solve the F. O. C. of the likelihood function of 
the yt and so to obtain- M. L. E. 's of the structural parameters in C, LIr, Q 
and those describing the solution (the ), 's in A). 
We begin then by deriving the forward solution. To this end we use a 
method similar to that of undetermined coefficients. 
The final form of ytF from (2.3) may be written as 
yt 
F 
=F1xt-1 +F0xt +FDyt-1 + vt (2.5) 
where F1, FO and FD are gxk, gxk and gxg matrices respectively. Lags of 
greater than one will not enter (2.5) for the simple reason that given 
(3.1) and (3.2) the variables dated at time t-1 are a sufficient basis for 
determining the forward expectations stream xt+i and yt+i which arise on 
forward solution of (2.5). 
The next step is to advance (2.5) by one period and take expectations 
conditional on flt_l to get 
yt+1 = F1Pxt-1 + F0F2xt-1 + FDyte (2.6) 
Now taking expectations of (2.5) gives an expression for yte which when 
substituted into (2.6) gives 
Yt+1 = (F1P+FoP2 + F0F1 + FDFOP)xt_1 + Fyt-1 
Substituting this expression for yt1 in (2.3) and comparing coefficients 
therein with their counterparts in (2.5) gives the implicit relationships 
for Fl, FO and FD as 
(i) F0 =B and so 
(ii) F1 = A(FýP+BP2+FDFl+FDBP) 
(iii) FD = AFD +D 
(2.7) 
Explicit forms for F, and FD are not available (although a form for vecF1 
in terms of A, B, P and FO does exist) but (2.7) provides all the 
information we need to derive analytical derivatives of the likelihood 
function when the forward solution is imposed. 
We turn now to the derivation of a 'backward looking' solution to 
(2.3). Rearranging (2.3) gives 
Ayt 
_1 - 
vt 
+1 ' yt - 
Bxt - Dyt 
or Ayt+1 = yt - Bxt - Dyt_1 - vt - ASt+1 
e 
where NSt+1 = yt+1 - yt+l 
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is the error in the forward R. E. Taking yt to the L. H. S. and inverting the 
L. H. S. matrix lag polynomial gives 
yt+1 [A-IL]-1Bxt - [A-IL]-1Dyt_1 - [A-IL]-1Agt+1 - [A-IL]-1 t 
Taking expectations conditional on L)t. 
_1 again and substituting 
back into 
(2.3) gives 
yt = [I-A-1L]-1BPxt_1 - [I-A-1L]-1Dyt_1 + Bxt_1 + Dyt-1 
- [I-A-1L]-lut + [I-A-1L]-1gt+1 +t 
Finally premultiplying both sides by [I-A-1 L] gives a form for ytB as 
ytB = A-1yt_1 - [BP+A-1B]xt_1 - A-1Dyt_1 + Bxt (2.8) 
+ Vt - A-1 Vt-1 
To see that ytB is a solution to (2.3) we check that the two initial 
conditions for yte and yt+1 derived from (2.8) are consistent with (2.3). 
From (2.3) it is obvious that 
Yt e yt - Bkt - vt 
and it is immediately apparent that (2.8) yields the same form for yte. 
Advancing (2.8) by one period and taking expectations yields on 
initial condition for ytas +l 
Yt e_ A-1 e11 +1 Yt -A D't-1 + A- BPxt-1 
and substituting this into (2.3) gives 
Yt = Yte - Dyt_i + BPxt_i + Bxt + Dyt_j + vt 
or Yt = Yte + Bet + vt 
an initial condition for yte that we know satisfies (2.8) and (2.3) and so 
the condition for yt+l from (2.8) is consistent with that from (2.3). 
Now, combining ytB from (2.8) with ytF from (2.5) in (2.4) gives 
(a) yt = [/OFD+(I-A)A-1]yt-1 - (I-/\)A-'Dyt-2 + Bxt + [M1 
- (I_A)(BP+A-1B)]xt_i + °t - (I /VA-1°t_i (2.9) 
or more compactly 
(b) Yt = Hlyt-1 + H21't-2 + Bxt + Jlxt-1 + vt - (I. A)A-lvt-1 
where H1, H2 and J, are so as to conform with (2.9)(a). 
We have derived then useful analytical forms for the restrictions 
implied by two distint solutions to (2.3). This enables us to write the 
likelihood function for the yt in (2.9) and so to derive the F. O. C. 
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Before we go any further we must recall some matrix algebra and 
calculus. Using the theorems and conventions of Neudecker (1969) the 
following is true for conformable matrices A, B, and C 
(a) vec(ABC) (C'OA)vecB 
(b) dye/dxi = [did] (2.10) 
where the elements yj and xi form the vector y and x 
respectively 
(c) dvecA = dvecC dvecA 
dvecB dvecB dvecC 
(d) d(vecA) = vec(dA) 
(e) 6(AB) _ (6A)B + A(SB) 
and so 
(f) dvecAB = dvecA (BOI) + dvecB (IRA') 
dvecC dvecC dvecC 
(g) dvec(A-1) (A-1OA, -1) 
dvecA 
(h) dlog A= vecA'-1 
dvecA 
(i) dtrAB = (A)' 
dvecB 
Now to write the joint likelihood function of the yit, t=1,..., T, 
i=1,..., g replace the gxl and kxl vectors in (2.9) (yt' yt-1' yt-2 and xt, 
xt_1 respectively) by the gxT and kxT data matrices Y', Y1', Y2' and X', X1' 
respectively. The log liklihood function then becomes 
L(vec(Y')) = T/2 log rZJ-1 - 1/2[vec(Y'-H1Y'1-H2 Y'2-BX'-J1X'1)]' 
Z1 [vec (Y'-H1 Y'1-H2Y'2-BX'-J'1X'1) ] (2.11) 
where 
_ [(1-EI- JA-1.? A'-1 [I-AJ)@I l- [(I-NA- 
1? _2R ] 
where 
01 
1 
0 
1 
0 
10 
and where I= C'SC 
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Now using the relations in (2.10) it is reasonably straightforward to 
derive the F. O. C. for maximisation of (2.11) with maximands vecC, vecLI 
vecr, veer, vecS and vecA. These F. O. C. may be written as products of their 
components as 
dL dvecA dvecA 
1 dvec! dvec. Z 1 dL 
(a) ----- _ ----- ----- I------- ----- . ----- 
dvecü dvecfl dvecA dvecA-1" dyed dvec2. 
dvecFD dvecH1 dL dvecF1 dvecJ1 dL 
+ ----- ------ ------ + ------ ------ ------ 
dvecA-1 dvecFD dvecHl dvecA-1 dvecFl dvecJl 
dvecH2 dL dL 
+ ------- . ------ =Rfl . ----- 
dvecA-1 dvecH2 dvecfl 
dL dvecB dvecFD dvecH1 dL dvecF1 dvecJ1 
(b) ----- ------ . ------ . ------ + ------ . ------ 
dvecl" dvecI' dvecB dvecFD dvecH1 dvecB dvecF1 
dL dvecJ1 dL dL 
+ ------ ------ = Rr . ----- 
dvecJ1 dvecB dvecJl dvecr 
dL dvecD dvecFD dvecH1 dL dvecH2 dL 
(c) ----- = ----- ------ . ------ . ------ + ------ . ------ 
dvecQ dvecQ dvecD dvecFD dvecH1 dvecD dvecH2 
dvecF1 dvecJ1 dL dL 
+ ------ . ------ . ------ = RS . ----- (2.12) 
dvecD dvecF1 dvecJ1 dvecA 
dL dvecC-1 dvecA dL dvecB dL 
(d) ----- = ------- ------- . ----- + ------- . ----- dvecC dvecC dvecC-1 dvecA dvecC-1 dvecB 
devecD dL dvec5: dvecl dvecZ 1 dL 
+ ------ . ----- + ------ ------ . ------- . -------- 
dvecC-1 dvecD dvecC-1. dvecz . dvecZ dvec2. 
-1 
dL 
= Rc . ----- 
dvec C 
dL dvec]E dvecZ dvec. 2: 1 dL dL 
(e) ----- _ ----- . ------ . -------- . -------- - Rs . ----- dvecS dvecS dvec]. dvecZ dvecZ 1 dvecS 
dL dvecH1 dL dvecl dvec. 2'. 1 dL 
(f) ------ . ------ + ------ . -------- . -------- =- dvecA dvecA dvecH1 dvecA dvecý. dvec1 
dvecH2 dL dvecJ1 dL 
+ ------ . ------ + ------ ------ =0 
dvecA dvecH2 dvecA dvecJ1 
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where R(Z is a g2xg2 selector matrix of zeros with a unit entry on the 
diagonal in the jth row if the jth element of vecil is contrained to zero 
(excluded). Rs, Re and RS are the corresponding selector matrices for S, C 
and p respectively. 
Of the derivatives in (2.12) only dvecFD/dvecD, dvecFD/dvecA and 
dvec? /dvec?, dvec? JdvecA-1 and dvec? Jdvecr are sufficiently obscure given 
the rules in (2.10) to deserve explicit analysis. 
Recall that 
FD = A-1FD2 +D 
Now taking vecs of both sides and differentiating with respect to 
some vector say vecQ (Q is an mxn matrix) gives 
dvecFD dvecA-1 dvecFD dvecD 
------ - ------- . (FD2@I) + ------- (IWAt-1) + ----- dvecQ dvecQ dvecQ dvecQ 
Reapplying the same rule to dvecFD2/dvecQ and solving for dvecFD/dvecQ 
gives 
dvecFD 
[dvecAl 
dvecD 
- ------- (FD2flI) + ----- (FDOA1 -1) + (IOFD'A'-1) -1 (2.13) 
dvecQ dvecQ dvecQ 
Turning now to dvec2/dvecQ, this is the mnx(gT)2 matrix 
dvecZ 
----- = Z11 Z21 Z31... Zg1 Z12 Z22 Z32... Zg2... Z1T Z2T Z3T... ZgT 
dvecQ 
where Zil _ {viwi[0.... 07} 
Zit = {wiviwi[0.... O]} 
Zia = {[O]wiviwi[0.... 0]} 
Z(T-2) _ 
([0.... O]wiviwi[0]} 
Zi (T-1) = {[O .... O]wiviwi } 
ZiT = [[0.... 0]wivi} 
and where vi is the mnxg vector which forms the ith set of g columns (from 
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left to right) of 
dvec(Z (I-SVA-1? A, -1 (I-A) ) 
-------------------------- 
dvecQ 
wi is the mnxg matrix which forms the ith set of g columns (from left to 
right) of 
dvec (-? A'-' (I /)) 
----------------- 
dvecQ 
and where wi is the mnxg matrix chosen as wi but from 
dvec (-(INA-1 ) 
---------------- 
dvec Q 
The F. O. C. in (2.12) then define M. L. E. 's of the parameters of any 
dynamic simultaneous equation model with forward R. E. of time horizon one. 
In general no neat explicit solution will be available for the 
maximands in (2.12). It is therefore suggested that (2.12)(a) to (2.12)(f) 
be solved block by block iteratively using a NAG routine such as E04FAF 
(residual sum of squares minimisation routine) to find values of the 
maximands that satisfy the F. O. C. at each iteration. 
In the next section we describe a programme CLARE (Computationally 
efficient Likelihood estimation Algorithm for Rational Expectations) 
which solves (2.12)(a) to (2.12)(f) with D=0 (no predetermined variables) 
and 0=I (forward solution). The programming of the general F. O. C. in 
(2.12) in full however is left as the subject of future research. 
We now move to tackle the two very important generalisations to the 
above namely that of an expectations horizon greater than one and the case 
where fl is singular. We deal with them in this order. 
To accomodate an expectation horizon of not greater than n it is 
sufficient to consider the model 
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e Dyt = lbt+n + rxt + Qyt_1 + Ut 
with quasi reduced form 
yt = Ayt+n + Bxt + Dyt_1 + vt (2.14) e 
where notation is now obvious. 
The general solution to (2.14) may now be written in an analagous way 
to (2.4) as 
yt ' /TDyt-1 - (I-NA-1Dyt-n-1 + Bxt - (I-A)A-1Bxt_n (2.15) 
+ [iW1-(I-A)BP]xt-1 + °t - (I_A)A-1°t-n-1 
with (2.7)(b) and (c) replaced with 
(a) F1 =AZ FDiF1Pn-i +AI FD1BPn-i+1 i=0 i=0 (2.16) 
(b) FD = AFDn+1 +D 
Note that we may still obtain derivatives such as dvecF1/dvecQ by 
successive application of the vec differentiation rule (2.10)(f). In 
particular 
dvecF1 rn dvecAFDi (a) ------ =Z -------- {[Flpn-iýI] + [BPn-i+1ýI]} 
dvecQ i=0 dvecQ 
I- 
Z 
(Pn-i@A, FDi) 
i=0 
dvecAFD1 dvecA dvecFD1 
(b) -------- = ----- (FD10I) + ------- (! @A') (2.17) 
dvecQ dvecQ dvecQ 
dvecF 1 dvecF dvecF i-1 
and (c) ---- -- = ------ (FDi-19)I) + --------- (IOFD') 
dvecQ dvecQ dvecQ 
(2.17)(a) to (2.17)(c) may be used to construct derivatives analogous to 
those in (2.12). Writing a programme for the case of an n-period 
expectations horizon is thus a similar although considerably more complex 
task compared with that based on (2.12). 
Finally we consider the model in (2.3) but with A singular so that A-' 
does not exist. 
To overcome this problem we seek a transformation of the model such 
that the coefficient matrix on Yt+1 is invertible. Rao (1965) shows that 
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for any nxm matrix of rank r (say A) there exists nonsingular square ' 
matrices N(nxn) and M(mxm) such that 
N Ir 0M 
A 
L0 0 
where N is orthogonal so that 
N'N =I 
In our case n=m=g and so we may rewrite (2.3) as 
N1ý M11 M12 (N'B)1 
I(N'D)11 
Yt = Yt+l + Xt + Yt-1 + N'vt (2.18) 
N2' 0 (N'B)2 (N'D)2 
where N1', N2' are the rxg, (g-r)xg submatrices of N' and are thus of full 
rank. (N'B)1, (N'B)2 and (N'D)1, (N'D)2 are the respective rxk, (g-r)xk 
submatrices of N'B and N'D. Taking the second (lower) block of equations, 
advancing by one period and taking expectations conditional on J), t_1 gives 
N2lyte = (N'B)2P2xt_1 + (N'D)2yte 
Now substituting for yte in terms of yt and the error in the current 
expectation and rearranging gives 
(N'D)2yt = N2'yt+1 + (N'D)2Bxt - L(N'B)2P2+ (N'D)2BP]xt_1 + (N'D)2vt 
Stacking this with the upper set of equations in (2.18) gives the new 
system 
N1 [t4i1 e N1 Yt Yt+1 + {(NTD)2 
N2' (N'D)2B 
(N'D)1 
+ 
O 
Yt_1 
[Ni? 
v 
)2 
t 
NID 
0 xt 
[_N 
'B)2P2: (N tD)2BP xt_l 
or 
-Yt = Yt e +1 + 
I_xt + &t_1 + wvt 
Note that now P(in (2.2)) P where 
_P0 P 
L0 I 
in (2.20) is now non singular. 
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(2.19) 
(2.20) 
We consider our decomposition to be superior to the process described 
in Pagan (1982) called the 'shuffle algorithm' as our method converges in 
one step enabling the form (2.19) to be subject readily to analysis and in 
particular to differentiation. The final form is now written as in (2.4) 
with A replaced by A, B with B etc, and the F. O. C. 's are as in (2.12) except 
the maximands are now C, I, QA and w. These may be transformed to C, 
f r, LA by premultiplication of the relevant F. O. C. by matrix terms such 
as 
dvecC dvec, l dvecl" 
-----, -------9 -----11 etc. 
dvecC dvecC dvecC 
In practice most applied economists would be satisfied with the 
forward solution (A=I) and so the fact that fl is not of full rank is 
irrelevant. We believe that unless there is compelling a priori evidence 
to the contrary, the forward solution should be imposed since purely 
backward looking solutions rule out the possibility of news about future 
exogenous events affecting current endogenous variables. In reality the 
merest casual empiricism will reveal that such news has a profound 
influence on current economic events in sectors of the economy where 
forward expectations are relevant to decision making. 
As suggested in chapter 4 evidence in favour of (but not against) 
imposing the forward solution could take the form of examining the eigen 
values of a first stage estimate of A and if they all lie inside the unit 
circle then this restriction could be imposed on A itself and the forward 
solution imposed with more confidence than otherwise. 
These reservations aside, the analysis in this section when 
implemented in the form of a programme can provide a relatively efficient 
means of deriving FIML estimates of both the structural parameters and the 
solution parameters (the X's in A). This programme would be capable of 
handling most simultaneous econometric models. 
The next section describes an implementation of the analysis in this 
paper for the case of D=O and A=I, the implementation taking the form of 
the estimation program CLARE. 
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6.3 CLARE (Computationally efficient likelihood algorithm for estimating 
R. E. ) 
In this section we describe a programme CLARE which delivers FIML 
estimates of the parameters of the model 
(a) Cyt = S), Yt+l + rxt + ut 
with quasi reduced form 
(b) yt ° Ayt1 + Bxt + vt (3.1) 
and x-processes 
(c) Xt = PXt-1 + e't 
under the assumption that all the eigen values of A lie inside the unit 
circle leaving the forward solution unique amongst the set of stationery 
solutions. 
The reduced form (solution) to (3.1) is simply 
yt = Fxt_i + Bxt + vt 
where 
F= AFP + ABP2 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
We may write the log likelihood function as 
L= T/2 logIII-1-1/2 trY 1(Y-X1F'-XB')'(Y-X1F'-XB') (3.4) 
where all matrices are as in the previous section. Using the rules in 
(2.10) it is simple but tedious to show that the F. O. C. for maximization of 
(3.4) are 
(a) 
dL dL 
_ -(I(iC'-1 )[ (FP+BP2)®I][I-Pgfi' 7-1. vec(Z-'R'Xl) _R --- 
dvec, 'qveca 
dL 
(b) ----- _ -(IQC'-1)[P22A'] [I-POA']-lvec(X-mR'Xl)+vec(l-1R'X)) 
dvecl" 
dL 
= RI- ----- (3-5) 
dvecr 
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dL 
(c) ----- (C-1oC, 
-1)[I--@ I){(P2QA')(I-PQA')-lvec(Z 1R'3C1)} 
dvecC 
+ vec(Z-1R'X)} +(E)OI)([(FP+BP2)QII(I-POA')-lvec(Z-1R'X1)} 
dL 
+ (Ip(C'Y-1oI)+ (IOC'Z-1))vec(T/2Z 1/2 R'R = Re ----- 
dvecC 
where Ip is a permutation of the g2xg2 identity matrix and is equal to 
dvecC'-h /dvecC-1 and where Z is unrestricted so that dL/dveci 
1=0 
solves 
uniquely for and S and is written in the standard way as 
dL R'R 
(d) ------T =0 => 1= --- 
dvec2' T 
Finally R= Y-X1F'-XB'. 
Note that it is only possible to derive from (3.5) explicit solutions 
for vecF, vec. 2. and vecr where veer is subject to exclusion restrictions 
such that 
(I-Rr) veer" = veer' 
The solution. for vecI- is tricky and achieved as follows. Solve the 
leftmost equality in (3.5)(b) for veer in terms of dL/dvecl-to get a form 
such as (for example) 
dL 
vec2' = Q-1 (g- -----) 
dvecr 
(3.6) 
where Q is a gkxgk matrix of full rank and g is a gkxl vector. Now 
replace dL/dvecl" in (3.6) with the value it assumes to satisfy the F. O. C. 
when evaluated at vecf so that (3.6) becomes 
veer = Q-1(g-RI-Cg-Q(I-RI-)vecr]) (3.7) 
Now solve for vecr to get explicit form for vecr that satisfies the F. O. C. 
in the rightmost equality of (3.5)(b) as 
vecf = [I-Q-IRI-Q(I-Rr)]-1Q-1 (I_Rr)g (3.8) 
More explicitly for our likelihood function veeris 
veer =L (IQC'-' )E (IOC-')-RI-(IQC'-1 )E (IOC-1) (I-Rr-) ]-1 (3.9) 
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[(IIRCI-1)-Rr(IOCº-1 )]D 
where E_ (p29)A') (I-p@A')-1 [ (X1'XW? 
1 )+(X'Xbä. Z 1)]+ [X1'X105ý-1+X'X1ei-1 ] (I- 
p'OA)-1 (p 
210A) 
and D= [(p29)A')(I-p0A')-lvecI 
1(Y'X1)+veci 1(Y'X)] 
The five blocks of equations for RcdL/dveca, RÜdL/dvecfj vecF, veer 
and vec2. were programmed in Algol 60 along with a subroutine to calculate 
the Hessian (to provide asymptotic standard errors), the final value of 
the likelihood function at the maximum and a few other diagnostic 
statistics (D. W. and R2). The NAG library sum of squares minimisation 
routine E04FAA was used to solve the equations R. dL/dvecC and 
RüdL/dvecs2 for vecC and vecfl respectively at each iteration. One 
iteration of CLARE solves for veer, vecC, vec. -2, vecii and vecF in that 
order and on convergence the programme calls the subroutine HESS which 
provides asymptotic standard errors and some diagnostic statistics. 
Data are input by means of a single datafile (input stream CLAREIP on 
the Warwick B67) and output is to a disc outputstream called CLAREOP. All 
data must be entered in free format in blocks as set out in table 6.1. 
IG, IK, IT, IC, IA, IRG are integers describing the number of 
endogenous variables, exogenous variables, observations, and nonexcluded 
elements of vecC, vecf, and vecl-respectively. MCAL specifies the maximum 
number of iterations allowed to solve the F. O. C. using NAG Routine E04FAA. 
Recommended value for this parameter if in doubt is 50. EPS sets the step 
length for numerical differentiation of the F. O. C's for calculation of the 
Hessian matrix. Its recommended value is O. lxTTOL. The latter is a 
measure of convergence. When the sum of the squared updates on all the 
parameters is less than TTOL then the programme will enter HESS and 
terminate. For a model of around 10 parameters for example, TT0L=0.001 
will give (at least) estimation accuracy in the second decimal place. 
STPMXA and STPMXC are real arrays which set the maximum step length used 
by E04FAA to numerically differentiate the F. O. C. for vecC and veci2 
respectively. Each step should be set to about one tenth of the final 
value expected for the relevant estimate. 
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TABLE 6.1 
PROGRAMME NAME TYPE 
PARAMETERS MCAL, EPS, TTOL I, R, R 
STPMXA[IA] A 
STPMXC[IC] A 
UPDA, UPDC, UPDG R, R, R 
IG, IK, IT, IC, IA, IRG I, I, I, I, I, I 
XTOL, FTOL1 R, R 
VRC[IG2] A 
VRA[IG2] A 
VRG[IGK] A 
hATA and 
START VALUES P[IK, IK] A 
i[IG, IG] A 
VCR[IG] A 
VAR[IA] A 
VGR[IRG] A 
X[IT, IK] A 
XI[IT, 1K] A 
Y[IT, IG] A 
KEY: I=INTEGER R=REAL A=REAL ARRAY [.,. ]=ARRAY DIMENSIONS 
UPDA, UPDC and UPDG are the gain factors for the iterative procedure. 
Values of 1.0,1.5 and 1.0 were found to work well but if in doubt setting 
them all to unity will be robust. XTOL and FTOL1 set the accuracy to which 
E04FAA solves the F. O. C. Recommended values are 10-5 and 10-10 
respectively. These values are not critical however since convergence 
seemed to be unaffected by errors in solving the F. O. C's of vecC and vecLj 
Obviously the smaller the values the longer the programme spends in E04FAA 
but the shorter the time to convergence of all the parameters. The arrays 
VRC, VRA and VRG should contain a1 or 0 according to whether the 
corresponding element of vecC and vecr is included or not. Note that the 
diagonal elements of C are considered excluded. 
Turning to the data, P is the kxk parameter matrix in (3.1)(c) and is 
entered row by row. 5 provides start values for the variance covariance 
matrix of vt and again is entered row by row. VCR, VAR and VGR are start 
values for the included elements of vecC, vecfl and veer respectively. The 
elements should be entered in order of appearance in their respective 
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vecs. Finally, the TxK, TxK and Txg data matrices of X, X1, and Y should be 
entered column by column i. e., in standard time series form. 
On the B67 at Warwick processing time used to provide FIML estimates 
of the 12 parameters in the model in the next section varied from about 15 
to 30 minutes where accuracy was to the fourth decimal place. This time 
is between 30 and 60 times that taken by the TSP job which provided 
limited information 2SLS estimates as start values for the parameters. 
Timing seems largely to depend on the fit of the model. 
Finally, output is fairly brief and gives the estimates of C, L, I" and 
E respectively row by row. Beneath these in the "diagnostic statistics" 
section is provided the diagonal elements of the Hessian function 
d2L veca. 
- ---- where z= 
Ivecr 
SzSz' vecr 
These are estimates of asymptotic standard errors. Finally after the 
D. W. and R2 statistics comes the value of the L. R. test which compares the 
value of the likelihood function at the point of the R. E. and structural 
restrictions with that at the unrestricted point. High values of this 
statistic thus imply rejection of the R. E. restrictions by this criterion. 
6.4 A small Monte Carlo Study 
In this section we compare the performance of FIML against a limited 
information (IV) method due to McCallum (1977) by means of a small Monte 
Carlo Study of the following two equation model 
1.0 C12 Y1t all 
C21 1.0 ya 0 
e 0 Ylt+1 B11 B12 00 
Ixit 
x 2t 
e a22 Y2t+1 B21 B22 00 Xlt1 Lx2t: 
1 
u it 
+ ('. 1) 
u2t 
or in terms of (3.1) (a) 
CYt = ijyte1 + rxt + ut 
with AR(2) processes for the xit 
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(4.2) 
L. 
Xt = PXt-l + St 
where 
0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.0 Eft 
P= 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.1 , 
st = Ea ( E(S t) = bý 
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. (E (S2t) c ) 
2 
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0. 
Recall that the reduced form in terms of observables is 
yt = Fxt-1 + Bxt + vt 
where 
vecF = [I-P'@C-1i27vec[C-1S. ÜC-1BP2] 
(4.3) 
so that the restrictions on F depend upon the value assumed by P. Now the 
Monte Carlo exercise was conducted with the likelihood function being 
conditional on the x-processes and thus on the 'true' value of P. Limited 
information methods however do not impose restrictions implicitly and so 
could not make use of the 'true' value of P. As a result, d6l and d22 were 
chosen so as to give a good fit for the AR processes thus guaranteeing 
that the restrictions on F were more or less reflected by those obtained 
usng estimates of P (P using O. L. S on (4.3) say) from the generated data. 
In other words, care was taken to face the limited information method with 
data that corresponded to a genuine R. E. model. 
The number of observations chosen for the exercise was 46 as this 
broadly corresponds with the typical length of post war time series 
(especially quarterly data) in applied economics. 
The competitor for FIML chosen was McCallum's method. (McCallum 
(1977)). This was described in section 1 of this paper. 
Accuracy of the FIML estimates was correct to four decimal places. 
Inspection of the Hessian for negative semi-definiteness was made for each 
set as a check on the validity of maximum. Some of the runs were checked 
for local maxima by restarting from various start values and no such 
problems arose. 
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Three sets of experiments were conducted. One with a very high R2 
(0.98) another with an R2 more typically experienced in empirical 
macroeconomics (0.78) and a third set with a very poor fit of around 0.45. 
The first two sets contain four experiments and the third, two of 
independent data sets. Convergence time increased enormously as the fit 
decreased (hence only two experiments in the last set) it being double its 
value for high R2 than for low R2. 
Finally, the variance covariance matrix of the structural errors were 
unrestricted and uninteresting and so were concentrated out of the 
likelihood function. This concentration was useful in that it reduced the 
dimension of the Hessian and so decreased the scope for numerical error in 
its calculation. The results of our 3 sets of experiments are reported in 
tables 5.2 to 5.4. 
A glance at these tables show that despite the very good fit in the 
data sets in table 5.2 both vecc and veci. are very poorly estimated 
indeed. This may be because R. E. terms contribute less than 10% to the 
'explained variance' of the yt and so are not likely to be well defined by 
any estimation procedure. This view is reinforced by the dual fact that 
the coefficients on the variables that contribute most to the explained 
variance of the yt (111 and 1-22 in particular) are very precisely 
estimated in virtually all our data sets and also that a halving of the R2 
to 0.15 is not reflected fully by a likewise proportional increase in bias. 
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the means and variances of the 8 
coefficients under both methods to provide summary measures of. bias and 
efficiency. In columns 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 are standard mean and variance 
quantities calculated using the 4 estimation points provided by sets 1 and 
2 and the 2 points of set 3 (variances were obviously not calculated for 
the latter). Explicitly 
Ei 
n 
Mean(s) 1=1-- , Variance(e) (z @21-n. [Mean(S)]2/n i. 1 n 
where Si denotes an estimate of the parameter S. 
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COLUMN 
C12 
C21 
all 
a22 
r11 
r12 
r21 
r22 
C12 
C21 
all 
a22 
r11 
r12 
r21 
r22 
C12 
C21 
all 
a22 
r11 
r12 
r21 
r22 
12 
FIML 
Mean Variance 
-0.4371 0.00561 
0.4113 0.01013 
0.9919 0.00066 
1.0164 0.00301 
0.4050 0.00003 
-0.0662 0.00200 
0.1680 0.00350 
0.5714 0.00063 
(n=4) 
F IML 
Mean Variance 
-0.5754 0.07590 
0.3540 0.08366 
0.9350 0.03678 
0.9211 0.01487 
0.4186 0.00078 
-0.1646 0.02572 
0.1586 0.03471 
0.5311 0.00732 
(n=4) 
FIML 
Mean Variance 
-0.4555 - 
0.5974 - 
0.8973 - 
n AnuF - 
0.4491 - 
0.1657 - 
0.1051 - 
0.5775 - 
(n=2) 
3 
SET 1 (R2=0.98) 
Asymptotic 
Actual Variance 
-0.5 0.00935 
0.5 0.00641 
1.0 0.01844 
1.0 0.00979 
o. 4 0.000312 
-0.1 0.00344 
0.2 0.00216 
0.6 0.00033 
SET 2 (R2=0.78) 
Asymptotic 
Actual Variance 
-0.5 0.28922 
0.5 0.15684 
1.0 0.07719 
1.0 0.22356 
0.4 0.00495 
-0.1 0.05652 
0.02 0.05416 
o. 6 0.00601 
SET 3 (R2=0.45) 
Actual 
-0.5 
0.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.4 
-0.1 
0.2 
0.6 
5 
McCALLUM 
Mean Variance 
0.0467 0.17311 
-0.2834 0.04870 
0.4643 0.09442 
-0.3982 0.04987 
0.4364 0.00067 
0.1805 0.05990 
-0.1652 0.00606 
0.6342 0.00898 
(n=4) 
Mc CALLUM 
Mean Variance 
-0.4914 0.09576 
-0.3265 0.16910 
0.7611 0.23020 
0.4642 0.23935 
0.4720 0.00162 
-0.1206 0.02655 
-0.2545 0.03577 
0.4273 0.00758 
(n=4) 
McCALLUM 
Mean Variance 
0.0822 - 
-0.6768 - 
3.7211 - 
1.0664 - 
0.3733 - 
-0.1241 - 
-0.4289 - 
0.4953 - 
(n=2) 
Finally, asymptotic standard errors for set 1 are provided. These 
are just averages for each set of the negative of the diagonal elements of 
the inverse of the Hessian matrix of the likelihood function. This should 
give some idea as to the accuracy of the Hessian as a measure of 
variance/covariance of the residuals. 
Referring to the table it is clear that on both counts of mean and 
variance FIML is uniformly superior in virtually all the cases. Whilst 
this result is to be expected of FIML vis a vis limited information 
methods in correctly specified models, the high degree of bias and low 
efficiency of the limited information estimates in our study is both 
surprising and disturbing bearing in mind the method's widespread use. In 
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poorly fitting models this problem seems highly acute with biases as high 
as 620% and many estimates wrongly signed. 
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7. A TEST OF THE R. E. H. IN THE CONTEXT OF A SIMPLE FINANCIAL MODEL. 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, using the results 
and apparatus in the previous chapter we wish to assess empirical evidence 
for the hypothesis that rational expectations (henceforth R. E. ) play a 
crucial role in determining asset demands in financal markets. The second 
objective derives from the first. Investigators in this area had tried to 
explain the empirical importance of lagged asset stocks in their demand 
functions in terms of costly stock adjustment (see for example the work on 
discount house portfolios by Parkin (1970) ). Our model leads us to a 
different interpretation of those empirical lags. Loosely speaking, our 
model has asset demand functions determining prices that, given an 
exogenous asset supply, clear the markets. Under the R. E. hypothesis, 
expectations of future -asset prices, a crucial determinant of asset 
demands, are formed using lagged values of these stocks (and all other 
exogenous variables in the model). The reduced form of our model then 
includes lagged asset stocks that are associated not with costly 
adjustments but with expectation formation. 
In the following section we describe the asset model with an 
exogenous variable sub model. Section 3 presents parameter estimates and 
Section 4 describes a test of the hypothesis and in particular focusses on 
the nature of the alternative hypothesis of the test. Section 5 provides 
a summary and conclusion. 
t 
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7.2 The Model 
The model is designed to focus on asset demands and so it treats 
supplies as exogenous. Aggregation over assets (four assets) and sectors 
(1 sector) is very coarse. Two asset prices are determined from two 
demand equations (gilts and equities). The third asset (money) is 
separable from (exogenous to) the rest of the model and because it is not 
of interest is not estimated. The fourth asset is a residual asset given 
by a wealth identity. There are seven exogenous variables, two asset 
stock quantity indices (gilts and equities), a short rate of interest, a 
price level, nominal income, nominal wealth and nominal dividends and 
these are modelled as joint AR processes. These were chosen because we 
believe they are a minimal set of key exogenous variables for the model. 
The joint AR model that links them, a sort of macroeconomic sub model is 
the simplest basis from which to form R. E. of future asset prices that is 
reasonably defensible. (Henceforth we refer to this AR model as the sub 
model and to that of the endogenous variables as the main model). 
The four assets identified by the main model are: money used for 
transactions purposes (M2); gilt edged stocks with over two years to 
maturity; company equities and a residual asset which largely consists of 
highly liquid assets (building society deposits, treasury bills, local 
authority deposits and gilts with less than two years to maturity). There 
is no disaggregation over agents; the collection of a data base for such an 
exercise would in itself be a large undertaking. This absence of 
disaggregation severely limits the quantitative usefulness of the model 
(see Weale (1984) for a discussion of disaggregation in this context). We 
believe however that we still have a reasonable structure for testing the 
R. E. hyposthesis. 
The structure of the model rests on a particular view of the 
behaviour of companies and of the authorities. The key policy intrument 
is the short rate of interest on liquid assets (our residual categuory) 
which we proxy with the treasury bill rate (rt). 
The authorities are faced with the following budget constraint 
PSBRt _ &GBt + 1PMt - REVt (2.1) 
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(2.1) simply states that a fiscal deficit (PSBR) must be financed by 
either gilts sales (equal to the change in the value of gilt holdings 
(QVGBt) minus revaluations of outstanding debt (REVt)) or by issuing high 
powered money. This excludes short period assets such as treasury bills 
and so represents a longer term view of the constraint. Given that the 
authorities have a target short rate of interest and given that there is 
some fixed relationship between high powered money and some definition of 
liquidity (M3 say) then the term L-1PMt is constrained to be that quantity 
that leads to a market clearing money stock. Any other value will cause 
upward or downward pressure on short rates. This leaves the current 
supply of new gilts (in value terms) driven by the PSBR and the short rate 
of interest. Now our model is in terms of stocks and for the supply of 
gilts it is useful to write the identity 
GBt = GBt-1 + TBt 
where GBt is the 'quantity' of bonds of an 'average' type (average maturity 
and price) outstanding . 
Given the structure of policy described above then the number of new 
bonds supplied is driven by the PSBR and the targetted short rate of 
interest and will be independent of their price. This horizontal supply 
curve argument is. however only approximately true. The number of bonds 
required to finance a given deficit will vary inversely with their sale 
price. The argument is constructed implicitly around an equilibrium 
price. In any event in the medium and long term the PSBR will be far and 
away the most important influence on the new supply of (and, therefore the 
outstanding stock of) gilts. There is still the argument that the 
government will be tempted to issue more (less) gilts when the price is 
high (low) accepting the short run consequences of this funding action for 
the short rate of interest. There is however, strong anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that such responses were, at the very most spasmodic up until 
the start of 1972. 
"No attempt was made to peg long rates or to offset market 
trends in the gilt market entirely but the bank usually 
'leant into the wind' to reduce the rate of change of market 
prices in the interests of maintaining a broad orderly 
market for debt". (Goodhart (1984) p. 92) 
135 
It goes without saying that funding activities which alter the 
structure of interest rates within our average (price) measure are not 
accounted for in our model. We assume that such activities do not affect 
the price of our 'average' bond. Taking the view that the PSBR is 
exogenous to our model it does not seen too unreasonable to model the 
(quantity) supply of gilts as an exogenous variable. 
The supply of equities is treated in a similar fashion. We assume 
that investment is interest inelastic so that as with gilts we have a 
horizontal supply curve. Of course this view is not new. The Keynsian 
liquidity trap rests on interest inelastic investment. However, equity 
capital although the most important is not the only source of investment 
funds. Debentures and other loans may be called upon when the price of 
equities is too low. Further, the variance of equity prices far exceeds 
that of gilts so that a given level of investment (and it is the value of 
investment that we argue is exogenous) will require varying quantities of 
equity to finance it over our sample period. Sadly we are forced to 
abstract from such realities and maintain our heroic assumption that the 
supply of equity capital is independent of its price. One saving grace on 
this score is that we have GDP in our exogenous variable sub model and 
this is undoubtedly the most important variable influencing investment 
decisions. 
Financial wealth (in our model, the sum of our four assets) is 
forecast as an exogenous variable. Broadly speaking the stock of wealth 
is the integral of saving over the past so that lagged wealth and GDP 
terms should be a sufficient basis for predicting current wealth. Once 
again this is not wholly true because wealth rises and falls with asset 
prices through revaluations. As with bonds and equities we argue that the 
influence of prices is minor relative to the determinants we have 
included. 
Nominal income (GDP) is modelled primarily as an autoregressive 
process. This is not to say that asset prices (the endogenous variables 
in our model) do not affect GDP, in reality they probably do. For 
simplicity's sake their influence is ignored (although we still have a 
short rate of interest in the sub model). Our treatment of GDP allows the 
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possibility of a trade cycle and so is a reasonable basis for 
expectations, at least in the context of our simple macroeconomic sub 
model. 
Aggregate dividends, related to aggregate profits should be 
adequately explained by their own past and by (lagged) GDP. Dividends 
play a key role in the model. Unlike the coupons on gilts, nominal 
dividends are index linked. Broadly speaking (for a given income 
distribution) they will rise and fall with nominal GDP and not with the 
price level. Inflation then only plays a role in the exogenous variable 
sub model (as a determinant of short rates in fact). It has no role in the 
main model because all the variables relevant to returns on assets and 
competing assets are already present (namely, capital gains, current 
prices and dividends). The implicit assumption then is that real assets 
(other than equity) whose nominal return is primarily the rate of 
inflation, are not an option considered by our wealth holders. 
This then completes our description of the sub model. Although there 
is an economic structure behind it, no overidentifying structural 
restrictions were imposed on the joint AR reduced form. Any exclusion 
restrictions arising from recursivity were however imposed. The sub model 
with parameter estimates is presented in the next section. 
Finally we turn to the main model. The asset demand functions are 
simple log linear forms explaining quantity indices (outstanding stocks 
divided by a price index) in terms of own and competing capital gains and 
own and competing current returns. Wealth is a scaling variable. These 
quantity indices are exogenous so that given an equilibrium condition the 
two asset prices must clear the markets. The normalisation given below in 
equation (2.2) is therefore a little misleading. 
The current return on equities is measured as aggregate nominal 
dividends divided by a price index giving the identity 
RC _ Dt - PCt + constant 
where RC and PC are the rate of return on and price of equities and Dt is 
aggregate nominal dividends. Here and henceforth all variables are 
natural logarithms unless other wise stated. 
137 
Using this identity to replace current returns in the asset demand 
functions we described above gives us our main model. 
(a) GBt " 0111 (PGt+1 - PGt) +a 12(PCt+e 1- PCt) +C 11 PGt 
+C 21 PCt +Y 14rt +Y 17Wt +Y 19Dt +Y110. +U1t 
(2.2) 
(b) CBt = °c21(PGt+1 - PGt) + a22(PCt+1 - PCt) + C22PCt 
+ C21 PGt + Y24rt + Y27Wt + Y29Dt + Y210 + u2t 
GB and CB are the outstanding quantities of gilts and equities and PG 
and PC their respective prices. W and D are aggregate nominal wealth and 
dividends respectively and u1 and u2 are error terms. Superscript 'e' 
denotes a rational expectation formed at time t-1. 
In writing (2.2) we have ignored completely the redemption values of 
government bonds. Because our data excludes short bonds we argue that the 
present (discounted) value of redemption monies is small enough to be 
excluded. In any case we would only expect it to be relevant when the 
average maturity date of the bonds in our sample is highly variable and we 
have no reason to believe this is so. Aside from this (2.2) includes all 
the variables of interest to asset holders. Explicitly these are capital 
gains ((PGt+1-PGt) and (PCt+1-PCt)), current returns ((constant coupon - 
PGt), (Dt-PCt) and rt) and of course wealth NO. 
If investors were neutral to risk we would expect their response to 
expected capital gains to be equal to their responses to current returns. 
No such constraint is imposed in (2.2) so leaving investors' attitude to 
risk unspecified. In any event the capital gains terms are approximately 
percentages whilst the current returns terms are logs of percentages and 
it is not clear what constraint risk neutrality implies for the 
coefficients. 
A priori we would expect aI1, oc221 C12, C21, Y171 Y27 and Y29 to be 
positive and oc21, a12, C1 1, C221Y14, Y24 and Y19 to be negative. 
Note that there are two restrictions arising from the identity 
linking D and PC namely 
C12 =- y19 
138 
and C22 - -. '29 
In the estimated model, (where the equations are normalised on PGt 
and PCt) these simple restrictions become nonlinear. Unfortunately our 
estimation routine CLARE has no facility for imposing such restrictions 
and so the coefficients were estimated freely. The estimates for the main 
model are presented in the next section. 
7.3 Estimates of the model 
(i) The Data 
The data are quarterly with the basic sample running from 1967(1) to 
1971(4). Additional observations were collected spanning 1972(1) to 
1976(4) but, in the case of asset stocks these data are highly unreliable 
as we discuss below. 
The stocks, provided by the C. S. O. but not published were measured at 
the end of each quarter. Gilts consist of all outstanding government 
stock with more than two years to mature and equities consist purely of 
ordinary shares. Both were measured from the liabilities side of the 
balance sheet provided by the C. S. O. The 3.5% war loan price index was 
chosen to proxy PG, primarily because this issue still represents about 
one third of total gilts holdings. For the equity price (PC), the FT 
ordinary share index of industrial shares was chosen although over the 
entire period there were no substantial differences between the available 
series. Both price indices were measured on the last Friday of each 
quarter. 
Dividends were calculated as the product of the FT thirty share 
dividend yield and the outstanding stock of equities. Nominal GDP was 
measured at factor cost from the expenditure side and the price level was 
the retail prices index. Both of these series are readily available from 
the E. T. A. S. (1977). The end of quarter treasury bill rate series is 
published in Financial Statistics. 
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Because the asset prices are measured at the end of the quarter it is 
vital that the book value of the stocks are right up to date when measured. 
A priori we might expect our quantity indices to be of a poor quality 
especially when the stock prices are highly volatile within and across 
quarters. A glance at the data shows that relative to our basic sample 
(1967(1) to 1971(4)) equity prices during the later period to 1976(4) were 
highly volatile. In particular, between 1974(4) and 1975(1) the index 
rose by over 83% and between 1973(3) and 1973(4) fell by 25%. In sharp 
comparison, the largest movement in our basic sample is only 12%. Now, our 
quantity index (for equities) is meant to represent the physical capital 
stock and can only contract through time because of bankruptcies or 
redemptions. Both of these influences on the capital stock over the 
period to 1976 were probably limited to a few percent of the stock. 
Referring to table 7.1 we see, however that our quantity index records over 
a 10% fall between 1972(4) and 1973(1), a staggering fall of 43% between 
1974(4) and 1975(1) and a 7% fall between 1975(4) and 1976(1). A check 
with the data compilers at the C. S. O. revealed that the three quarters 
1972(1) to 1972(3) are grossly underestimated but, at the time of writing 
we have received no revised data. We infer therefore that whilst the data 
of our basic sample has no discontinuities and anomalies, there are sharp 
discontinuities in the later sample as the graph in table 7.1 shows. 
In marked contrast, the gilts quantity index graphed in table 7.1 is 
well behaved over the entire period to 1976(4). This is probably because 
our measure of gilts (or any measure for that matter) is far less volatile 
than the price of equities. A further explanation lies in our belief that 
the Bank of England keeps a much more up to date and accurate book record 
of outstanding government debt (gilts) than company secretary's do of 
company debt (equity). 
These inaccuracies were unfortunate in that we were forced to 
constrain our basic sample to a mere 20 observations. There was, however 
another reason for this choice of sample, namely that there was a marked 
structural break in the behaviour of our exogenous variables around the 
end of 1971. This is hardly surprising considering the events taking 
place at the time. Competition and credit control restructured the 
banking sector and the clearing banks cartels were broken up. The 
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exchange rate was floated and provided a new target for the short rate of 
interest. Finally the miners' strike in 1974 was a peculiar factor 
influencing GDP in the later sample. 
Bearing all these factors in mind, the focus of interest falls on our 
basic sample. We do use our later sample to casually assess parameter 
stability, etc. but these are only of passing interest and we hesitate to 
draw any results or inferences from this period. 
(ii) The exogenous variable sub model 
Because we have only 20 observations in our basic sample we had to 
restrict ourselves to lags of two in our AR model. Third order lagged 
dependent variables were tried but none were significant. As we noted 
above no attempt was made to identify structural parameters of the 
submodel by means of imposing overidentifying restrictions so the reduced 
forms presented were used directly to generate the R. E. 
The seven equation are set out in (3.1)(a) to (3.1)(g) (standard 
errors are in brackets). 
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(a) GBt = 0.387 + 0.943 GBt-1 
(0.29) (0.05) 
s e. = 0.033 R2 = 0.960 R2 = 0.957 h= -0.899 
(b) CBt = -3.139 + 0.502 CBt_1 + 0.600 Yt_2 
(1.53) (0.19) (0.25) 
s. e. =0.054 R2 = 0.871 R2 = 0.855 h=1.84 
(c) Pt = -1.160 + 0.772 Pt_1 + 0.225 Yt_1 
(0.19) (0.05) (0.04) 
s. e. =0.055 R2 = 0.997 R2 = 0.996 h=0.716 
(d) rt = -0.931 - 2.103 Pt_1 + 0.876 rt_1 + 1.024 Yt_1 
(2.66) (0.87) (0.14) (0.62) 
s .e. =0.085 R2 = 0.800 
R2 = 0.756 h= -0.378 
(e) Yt = -0.65 + 0.550 Yt_1 + 0.542 Yt_2 - 0.081 rt_1 
(0.89) (0.22) (0.24) (0.06) 
s. e. = 0.028 R2 = 0.908 R2 = 0.890 h= -1.682 
(3.1 ) 
(f) Dt = 2.446 + 0.545 Dt_1 + 0.271 Yt_2 
(1.59) (0.20) (0.16) 
s .e. =0.055 R2 = 0.659 R2 = 0.616 .h=1.684 
(g) Wt = 0.403 + 1.531 Wt-1 - 0.716 Wt-2 + 0.189 Yt_1 
(0.50) (0.18) (0.16) (0.07) 
s .e. =0.019 R2 = 0.976 R2 = 0.971 
h= -1.359 
f 
Yt and Pt are nominal GDP and a price level respectively. h is Durbin's h 
statistic. 
Because the equations in (3.1) represent a reduced form it is hard to 
interpret the coefficients. However casual inspection of the system 
reveals that the model has the sort of dynamic responses that accord with 
our a priori view of the world. Lagged GDP plays a significant and 
sensible role in generating wealth, the supply of equities and dividends. 
This is also true in the equation for the price level where it picks up the 
pervasive influence of excess demand. 
Taking the coefficients on Yt_1 and Pt_1 in (3.1)(d) we see that, as 
would expect lagged real GDP (Yt-1-Pt-1) has a downward effect on short ra 
Unfortunately we are still left with a separate negative influence of the 
price level on the rate which is contrary to our intuition. Rather we 
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would expect higher prices to lead to an increase not a decrease in the 
rate. GDP and the quantity of gilts are explained well by their past 
although rt_l has a small (and not very significant) negative influence on 
the former. We argue than that on the whole the sub model in (3.1) is 
sensible and a reasonable basis for the generation of R. E. of the exogenous 
variables as required by the main model. 
(iii) The model of asset demands (the main model) 
Because of the exogeneity structure of the asset demand functions, 
they have been normalised to leave the endogenous variables (asset prices) 
on the left hand side. Conditional on the parameters of the sub model the 
system in (2.2) was estimated using the programme CLARE. CLARE imposes 
the familiar 'forward' solution on the model. This is unique when the 
eigen values of the matrix premultiplying the R. E. vector in the quasi 
reduced form lie inside the unit circle. The estimates below satisfy this 
condition so that the imposition of this solution is ex post justified. 
Parameter estimates for the main model are laid out in equations (3.2)(a) 
and (3.2)(b). 
(a) PGt = 5.833 - 0.266 PCt + 0.028 PGt+1 - 0.141 PCt+1 (1.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
- 1.141 GBt - 0.102 rt + 0.950 Wt - 0.308 Dt (0.02) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) 
R2 = 0.999 D. W. = 1.64 (3.2) 
(b) PCt = -11.966 + 0.099 PGt + 0.293 PCt+1 - 0.223 PGt+1 (5.12) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
- 1.615 CBt + 0.008 rt + 1.434 Wt + 0.719 Dt 
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.0ü) 
R2 = 0.999 D. W. = 1.75 Log of Likelihood Function = 72.81 
To interpret these estimates more easily we refer to table 7.2 where 
the parameters in the asset demand equatons (2.2)(a) and (2.2)(b) implied 
by (3.4)(a) and (3. ')(b) respectively are displayed. 
Out of the sixteen structural parameters only three have perverse 
signs and two of these are of a negligible order of magnitude. The cross 
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Table 7.2 
Parameter estimates of the asset demand model in equation (2.2) 
EQUATION 1 EQUATION 2 
Parameter Basic sample Later sample Parameter Basic sample Later sample 
0111 0.025 -0.071 a21 -0.138 -0.556 
a12 -0.124 -0.155 a22 0.181 0.731 
C11 -0.852 -1.425 C21 -0.077 0.298 
C12 -0.357 -0.191 C22 -0.438 -0.206 
y14 -0.089 -0.151 y24 0.005 0.044 
y17 0.833 1.228 '27 0.888 0.586 
y19 -0.270 -0.004 y29 0.445 0.037 
y110 5.112 -2.403 y210 7.409 0.650 
D. W. 1.64 2.02 D. W. 1.75 1.78 
price effects in both equations and the coefficient on rt in the second 
equation are the parameters in question. The unimposed restriction that 
the coefficient on Dt be equal and opposite to that on PCt is satisfied 
almost exactly in the second equation but not by any criterion is it 
satisfied in the first where the coefficient on PCt is perverse. With 
these minor exceptions the coefficients are on the whole, sensible. We 
note that the own price effects are much larger than the effects of 
capital gains (the cross price effects are of course perverse). It is 
quite possible that the variance of expected capital gains are responsible 
for their discounting. The closeness to unity of the wealth terms ensure 
that stock holdings as a share of wealth are broadly stable as wealth 
grows (although the share contracts slightly with growing wealth). 
All coefficients are significant by the asymptotic t-ratio criterion. 
The t-ratios are in fact, alarmingly large in certain cases. The wealth 
term in the second equation has the largest t-ratio at around 200 and two 
others are over 100. Whilst the information matrix was estimated 
numerically and not calculated exactly from analytical second derivatives 
we do not believe these numerical estimates to be poor. The estimated 
matrix was relatively insensitive to choice of steplength, dispelling 
worries in this quarter. The estimated variance covariance matrix of the 
quasi reduced form had elements of order of magnitude 10-4. Taking 
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expectations as data (as the quasi reduced form does) it seems that the 
order of magnitude of OLS t-ratios from this quasi reduced form would be 
the same as reported. In short then, it seems that these small standard 
errors simply reflect well defined parameter estimates. 
Finally the Durbin-Watson (D. W. ) statistics although in the 
inconclusive region are close enough to the upper bounds to be considered 
satisfactory. We must bear in mind that D. W. statistics have been found to 
be powerful against alternative hypotheses (forms of misspecification) 
besides that of first order error autocorrelation. All in all then, we 
believe that our estimates are satisfactory and plausible. 
Before we move to a test of the R. E. hypothesis we thought it useful 
to reestimate our model for the data we have from 1972(1) to 1976(4). 
Because of the poor quality of the data in this period we treat these 
estimates with only passing interest. The estimates are tabulated in 
column B of table 7.2 and comparing these with column A we see that 
although all but three of the parameters are of the same sign and all but 5 
the same order of magnitude, we would hesitate to describe the parameters 
as stable. The two constants and the coefficient on the own capital gain 
have shifted substantially. Further, the dividends terms in both 
equations are insignificant and do not satisfy the unimposed constraint 
vis a vis the coefficients on PC. The perverse coefficient on rt in the 
second equation is also insignificant. Just how much of the parameter 
instability is due to our coarse model, how much is due to the events noted 
above in the sample and how much is a consequence of poor quality data 
(the gilts quantity index) is not clear. Because the focus of this paper 
is a test of the R. E. hypothesis we do not dwell on the issue here. 
Finally, we performed a simple simulation exercise with the model 
using estimates from the basic sample into the later sample. For this 
purpose, one period ahead asset prices were regressed on the variables in 
the information set and predictions from these equations were used as 
proxies for the R. E. terms. This does not correspond to ä consistent 
expectations forecast. However, bearing in mind that this exercise is of 
limited interest, the method is a quick and easy way to generate within 
sample unbiased forecasts. 
146 
H 
J 
ý 
H 
H A W U 
1 -- Icn 
1 1 
re, 
1n 
l t 
I ch 
" 1 
1 
N 
/ 
Ü 
( 
/ 
Cl) 
P4 rn 
2 
j 
/1 
- cv 
Ind 
I 
U ý / 
t 
Oý 
44 
1 N 
iI --.; cr) N 
N 
O Op 
N 
147 
cn w 
H 
P4 
P4 
H 
' ýý w 
.w 
E-4 
H 
6 
V 
O 
W 
H 
0 
H 
93 :: 3 Ü 
i f 
l 
r / 
_ cn 
--r N 
/j 
. j 
r) 
f/ 
\ ... CJ 
cyl 
ON 
i 
/ I N 
O. 
n 10 L 
'- N 
Ql 
CY) 
-N 
In 
148 
The results are graphed in tables 7.3 and 7.4. These tables show 
clearly that whilst the predicted series have large residuals by the end 
of 1976 and whilst these residuals are all positive (PG) or all negative 
(PC), the major changes in the series are picked up fairly well and the 
dynamics seem well described. Undoubtedly having coefficients whose 
signs are not perverse contributes to the latter. Taken literally, 
however the forecasts are bad both series being in error by 100% at the 
end of the forecast period. Again we do not know where to lay the blame 
for this poor forecast. 
To sum up then we are able to say that we have successfully estimated 
a coarse, simple but a priori sensible model of asset demands. The 
parameter estimates we have obtained whilst reasonable from an a priori 
point of view are not stable over the period 1972(1) to 1976('4). The 
forecast reinforces this view of instability whilst providing some 
comfort in the fact some of the out of sample dynamics are forecast by the 
model. 
We now turn to the focus of this chapter; a test of the R. E. 
hypothesis. 
7.4 A Test of the R. E. Hypothesis 
(i) The null hypothesis 
It is obvious from the nature of R. E. that no test of the hypothesis 
is independent of the model used to construct the test. In particular the 
simple hypothesis that expectations in asset markets are formed 
rationally is untestable as such. In this paper, however we have tried to 
develop a model that is as general as possible. The assumption of 
imperfect substitutibility between assets implicit in our model takes in 
the case where there is perfect substitutibility. Higher degrees of 
substitution will be reflected in larger own and across price responses 
and in the limit the total rate of return (current return plus capital 
gain) on all assets is forced to be equal. In this case our equations 
reduce to the familiar term structure equation always associated with 
efficient markets in the literature. Tests of the R. E. hypothesis have in 
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the past been undertaken predominantly against such a term structure 
equation and, it is in this respect that the work in this paper is 
fundamentally different. 
(ii) The alternative hypothesis 
Wallis (1980) and Hoffman and Schmidt (1981) put forward likelihood 
based tests of the within and cross equation restrictions that R. E. impose 
on a reduced form and it is such a test that we adopt here. The problem 
with this procedure is that the interpretation or economic significance of 
the alternative hypothesese encompassed in the unrestricted reduced form 
is often rather vague. It may be the case that a reduced form containing 
the variables in the information set plus the current exogenous variables 
encompasses most or many alternative (expectations) hypothesese of 
interest but this is unlikely, especially in a small and simple static 
model such as the one we are considering. A particular alternative of 
interest to us here is that of adaptive expectations. In our model, this 
assumption in place of R. E. would imply a reduced form for (2.2) of 
(a) GBt = @(L)[f11+l12PGt+fl13PCt+114rt+fl15Wt+U16Dt] 
+(1-62L)2. 
(1-61)2PGt-1+(1-&1L)2(1-&2)2PCt-1 
+(1-&(L))GBt+B(L)ut 
(b) CBt = 6(L)L121+fl22PGt+fl23PCt+fl24r, +fl25Wt+fl26Dt] 
+(1-&2L)2(1-81) 
2 PGt_1+(1-B1L) (1-92) 2 Pct-1 
+(1-e(L))GBt+&(L)u a 
(4.1) 
A glance at our sub model in (3.1) reveals that even ignoring the M. A. 
error process our unrestricted reduced form will include no lagged price 
terms so that we cannot expect our test to have much power against this 
key alternative hypothesis. To test against adaptive expectations would 
require a non-nested test and it is not clear how if at all such a test 
could be computed. 
One hypothesis of interest in our set of alternatives is centred on 
the idea originally due to Fischer that (in the long run) the real rate of 
interest was equal to a constant. This has led to a view that 
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expectations of future bond and equity prices were formed from the current 
view of long term inflation (see for example, Frankel (1982)). This in 
turn has led to specifications which have lagged price level terms to 
proxy for such expectations. Because the price level enters our submodel 
its lagged values enter the unrestricted reduced from so that we expect 
our test to have good power against this particular alternative. 
Returning to the introduction of this paper we suggested that the 
proper role for lagged stocks in an asset model is as part of a prediction 
process. Because lagged adjustment is rife in the asset markets 
literature it would be most interesting if this view was rejected in 
favour of R. E. Typically, expectations are subsumed in stock adjustment 
models so that our unrestricted reduced form contains all the variables 
relevant to this alternative model. 
Before we proceed with the test we note another problem of the 
proposed test, namely that it does not allow the overidentifying 
restrictions on the quasi reduced form (the traditional reduced form that 
contains only predetermined, exogenous and expectations terms) to be 
tested separately. Fortunately our model is just identified by the 
standard criteria, that is, treating expectations terms as exogenous 
variables, the structure is just identified by the standard conditions and 
so the problem does not arise. 
Moving to the test itself, we chose a likelihood ratio x2 test as this 
was the most convenient likelihood based test available. The number of 
terms in the unrestriced reduced form (excluding elements of the error 
variance covariance matrix as this was unrestricted) was 30 and the number 
of parameters under the null was 16 leaving 14 restrictions and a x2 
statistic with 14 degrees of freedom. More explicitly we have 
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HO: - The model 4(a) and 4(b) 
H1: - yt = (Toxt + TT1xt-1 + F12xt-2 
where yt PGt, xt = GBt xt = Yt 
Pct CBt Wt 
Pt constant 
rt 
Yt 
ut 
Dt 
and fl0, n, and 52 are unrestriced. 
The value of the x14 statistic for the test was 15.36. When compared with 
a critical value of 23.69 (5% tail) the restrictions escape rejection by a 
very comfortable margin. Indeed the probability of getting a x2 value as 
low as ours is about 0.5. 
In sum then we have tested our R. E. model against a general 
alternative and the results as far as the R. E. hypothesis is concerned are 
very encouraging. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In thischQx-we have described estimated and tested a simple static 
R. E. model of aggregate asset demands. Whilst the model does not Arovide 
good forecasts of asset price levels outside its sample, it does produce a 
forecast that mimics the dynamic behaviour of the data quite well. A test 
failed to reject the restrictions implied by the hypothesis with a large 
margin of comfort. Whilst this test could be expected to have good power 
against certain alternatives of interest it is unlikely to have any power 
against adaptive expectations and so our success must be qualified and put 
in perspective. 
We end with a note on the information set. Because it is 
an equilibrium model where prices clear markets, the latter must be 
observed by agents at the time of the market transactions. More properly 
then, our information set should have been all the exogenous variables 
dated at time t-1 plus the current asset prices. In the annex we derive 
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the minimum mean square error predictor in this case. It is clear from 
this that if the extra information (current prices) is to be of use then 
the variance covariance matrix of both structural errors and of exogenous 
variable process errors must be known. The assumption that we have 
implicitly made in choosing the R. E. predictor is that the latter matrices 
are unknown (or at least are subjectively highly uncertain). Whilst this 
assumption may by unpalatable (especially since other unobservables, 
namely the parameters of the model are assumed known) estimation 
incorporating this predictor is a considerably more complex exercise. 
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APPENDIX 
Consider the model 
yt = A(Ytl ) *) + Bxt + ut; (Al) 
xt ' Pxt-1 + Et 
_ 
where ut ( )N (0,. ß. u) and 
Et (-)N(0,56), CI ' is an information set which 
includes xt-1-i' Yt-i Vi> C. Yt and xt are gxl and kxl vectors and A, B and 
P are all known conformable parameter matrices. 
Solving (Al) forwards gives 
(ID 
,n yt 
1ý1A1(xt+iýýt 
+ Bxt + ut 
Denoting 
xt 
= xteIs 
we can using the commutative law of expectations write 
xt+iIZ* = E{(xt+ljn )jS *} ui>O 
L)t is an information set containing xt'xt-1-i \i>U where 
(A3) states quite simply that yt is only of help in 
because it helps to predict xt. Using (A3), (A2) becomes 
yt =xt + Bxt + ut 
where 
vecF = vec A1BP1 = (I-P'eA)-1vecABP2 i=1 
(A2) 
(A3) 
predicting xt+1 
To derive a form for xt we combine the reduced form of (A4) with the 
exogenous variable processes to make a state space model. 
Because the model is linear the minimum mean square error estimator 
(MMSEE) of xt will be linear in yt and xt_,. The vector xt itself will 
appear in the observable reduced form because it enters the structure (Al) 
independently of any expectations mechanism. 
can therefore be written as 
Yt = 
Ixt-1 + @xt + Ut 
where ut = Lut and E(utut') is denoted as 
14 
The observable reduced form 
(A5) 
Combining (A5) with the 
exogenous variable processes gives us the familiar state space 
measurement and transient equations 
[xtext 
_l 
I- 
rst 
xt + 
Yt eU 
L- L 
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where yt = yt - 
IXt_l 
and 
xt = Pxt_1 + Et(A7) 
respectively. 
(A6) states our objective; to measure the state variable xt using the 
information set xt_1 and yt. (A7) simply describes the motion of the 
state variable through time. 
The MMSEE of xt is just the Generalized Least Squares estimate of xt 
(see Harvey (1981) pp. 108-109). This is 
xt = Pxt-1 + K(yt-exteIxt-1 Pxt-1 + K(yt-ePxt-1 (A8) 
where K is analogous to the Kalman Filter Gain matrix and is written as 
of course is the variance covariance matrix of the R. E. error in ->-RE' 
predicting yt from xt-1-i(i>0). 
Combining (A8) with (A4) gives 
yt = (I-FK)-1F(I-K(I+BP))xt_1+(I-FK)-1Bxt+(I-FK)-1ut (A9) 
Equating coefficients with those of (A5) gives a solution for the 
parameter matrices 
1,8 and L. The general form of these solutions is 
uninformative but it is clear that the nonlinear within and cross equation 
restricitons on the reduced form are different from those of the R. E. case. 
The two predictors coincide in the limit as the largest element of %-1 
tends to zero i. e. when the 'noise' contaminating the signal becomes large. 
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$. CONCLUSION 
8.1 A summary of the main results and their significance 
Undoubtedly the main contribution of this thesis is the 
simplification (and potential cost reduction) of FIML estimation of R. E. 
models. The approach described in chapter six is we believe superior (for 
linear models) to others in terms of cost and computational efficiency. 
More important perhaps is the degree of certainty with which our method 
delivers true FIML estimates. An approach that relies on numerical 
differentialtion may fail if the likelihood function is not sufficiently 
'well-behaved' in the parameter space. If for example there are 
discontinuities or 'flats' in this space then there is no guarantee that 
such routines will converge to FIML estimates if they converge at all. 
We have demonstrated that our approach is feasible by writing and 
using a programme (CLARE) designed to estimate the structural parameters 
of a particular class of linear R. E. models. The programme was then 
successfully applied to the data to estimate the parameters in a simple 
model of financial asset demands. 
More important than these estimates was the test of the R. E. 
hypothesis in a financial assets model that the programme allowed us to 
carry out. There is a voluminous literature concerning R. E. in financial 
markets but virtually all the focus of attention has fallen on testing the 
joint hypothesis of R. E. and efficient markets. The popularity of such 
models we believe lies in the ease with which they allow estimation and 
testing to be carried out. Our empirical model, however, incorporates the 
efficient markets assumption as a special case and so our approach is more 
general than that found in the literature. Furthermore we took care to 
ensure that our test has reasonable power against alternative hypothesese 
of interest in contrast to the literature where this issue is largely 
neglected. The test, a likelihood ratio test, was passed with a large 
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margin of comfort providing support for the R. E. hypothesis that is far 
more convincing than the support that has been offered in the literature 
in the past. 
The results concerning simulation of R. E. models whilst of less 
practical importance are nonetheless quite informative. The universal 
adoption of terminal conditions by forecasters as a means of making the 
solution of an R. E. model determinate is undoubtedly due to the simplicity 
and low cost of the procedure. In showing that there is no theoretical 
justification for using terminal conditions we have sounded a clear 
warning to model users that a model solution chosen in this way will be 
arbitrary. 
By contrast the work on the Fair-Anderson simulation method is more 
positive. Any model user wishing to simulate standard models under the 
assumption of R. E. will be able to assess the degree of bias he can expect 
in his policy multiplier estimates by looking at the form(s) of the 
O. E. P. (s) of the expectations variables. If they are close in M. S. E. to the 
extrapolative proxies used for estimating the parameters of the standard 
model then these biases are unlikely to be serious. Forecasters are also 
warned, however, that multipliers to the unanticipated components of 
policy are likely to be seriously biased in all cases. 
The small amount of original work in chapter 2 is of passing interest 
only. Here we have shown that the simulation of theoretical models in the 
manner proposed by Fair (1974) is an arbitrary way to proceed. This is 
not to say that theoretical models should not be explored using numerical 
methods. Rather that the assumptions of the experiments and in particular 
the manner in which the model's coefficients were chosen should be made 
clear and should be supported by reasoned argument. 
Finally, the results in the same chapter on Lipsey and Parkin's 
incomes policy study is of some historical interest. These results 
suggest that simultaneity bias in the intercept and slope dummies, which 
were included to measure the impact of the policy may have led the authors 
to underestimate the influence of a prices and incomes policy on the wage 
price relationship. 
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8.2 Unfinished work 
It was never our objective to address ourselves to all of the 
problems that the existence of R. E. poses for policy analysis and although 
we believe we have approached the most important ones, there are still 
problems that this thesis has not fully resolved. In particular the 
procedure advanced in preference to the use of terminal conditions in 
chapter four is expensive, time consuming and not applicable to nonlinear 
models. With regard to the latter it is not clear whether or not there is 
a parameterisation of the complete set of solutions to a nonlinear model 
analagous to that of a linear model. One answer to the problem may be to 
pass the solution through a point considered 'reasonable' by the modeller 
(it is not unknown for modellers to use their judgement in similar 
circumstances). There is no compulsion, however, to make these terminal 
points equilibrium or steady state points. Whenever used a sensitivity 
analysis should be conducted to see if the choice of terminal values (or 
terminal data) is of any significance. We believe that in many cases it 
will not be important (such cases in linear models correspond to those 
where the forward solution is uniquely stationary). 
One development of the thesis which begs for further work is the 
implementation of the results on estimation in chapter six. The programme 
CLARE was written under the burden of research time and computer resource 
constraints. It is therefore applicable only to a particular class of 
models and is not as computationally efficient as it could be. Software 
that efficiently solves the first order conditions of the likelihood 
function for the general case would be of great benefit to empirical 
economists. However, further research into the best (in terms of 
computational efficiency) means of solving these nonlinear equations 
would be required. For example, we believe that the Gauss-Seidel 
technique adopted for CLARE was relatively inefficient and that an 
investigation of an alternative, say Newtonian, method would be worthwhile. 
As we suggested in the introduction to the thesis the development and 
use of powerful tests of the R. E. hypothesis is still a relatively 
untouched area. It does seem alarming that the hypothesis is so widely 
accepted and imposed in all sectors of econometric models with so little 
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empirical support to back up its use. Again the possibility of cheap FIML 
estimation opened up by this thesis (conditional on the software being 
written) should encourage more empirical work in this area. 
We recognise that the estimation and testing procedure we have 
advanced is not applicable to nonlinear models. In these cases we would 
recommend that as a prelude to the incorporation of R. E. into a particular 
sector of an econometric model that a small and simple linear model of the 
sector be built, estimated and tested as we have done for the financial 
sector in chapter six. Many large modelling schools maintain a small 
linear condensed form of their model so that this procedure should not 
raise many difficulties. Armed with this empirical support for the 
hypothesis the modeller may then proceed with a clearer conscience to 
incorporate the assumption into his model using standard limited 
information estimation techniques. 
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